In an encouraging development which suggests the government feels secure enough both in its legitimacy and in its ability to weather the negative publicity the enemies of a unified Bosnia and its Bosniak plurality will almost certainly exploit, the government of Bosnia is now making vigorous efforts to crack down on mostly-Wahhabi extremists left behind from the numerically relatively small but notorious mujahideen forces who disgraced the Bosnian cause by committing numerous atrocities in an attempt to hijack the Bosnian cause in the name of fundamentalism and global jihad.
Please see this article from the Southeast European Times for more details.
In Bosnia, a war was fought between civic nationalism and individual liberty versus ethnic nationalism and collectivism. Bosnia's struggle was, and is, America's struggle. Dedicated to the struggle of all of Bosnia's peoples--Bosniak, Croat, Serb, and others--to find a common heritage and a common identity.
Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
Thursday, May 07, 2009
Sunday, November 30, 2008
Regarding the Comment Moderation policy at "Americans for Bosnia"
As a general rule, I publish all submitted comments with the exception of advertising spam, because I believe it is important to let the "other side" reveal itself, as well as proving that I am confident enough in the justness of this cause to allow contrary voices to have their say on my own blog.
However, today I rejected a comment which was not from an advertiser, but rather from a blogger with a very different agenda than my own. The author, "Bengal Under Attack," wanted me to post a comment directing readers to the following link to his own blog post:
900% Growth of Islamic Population
I admit that it may seem perverse to refuse to publish a comment, and then to turn around and devote one of my own posts to the very same link. However, I want my reasons for refusing to post his comment to be clear. Given the recent events in Mumbai, and the continued threat to world peace posed by Islamic terrorism, the last thing I want to do is to provide ammunition to those who would distort my silence on this issue as either ignorance of the genuine threat we all face from Islamist terror, or even tacit support for their cause. Nothing could be further from the truth.
I could have merely noted that his primary concern is the Indian subcontinent and left it at that, but even a cursory read of his article reveals that he considers Islam--and Muslims--to be a threat in all places at all times in all situations. In the opinion of the author, Muslims are a threat to us not because of a confluence of religious fundamentalism and geopolitical realities, but simply because they are breeding so quickly. I trust I do not need to expend effort and bandwidth explaining what I think of this kind of logic.
One more thing--it is worth noting which of my now more than 400 posts the author chose to comment on. It was not a recent post; rather, it was this one from June 28 of this year:
"The Nationalist Serbian Intellectuals and Islam: Defining and Eliminating a Muslim Community" by Norman Cigar
It is just possible that the author, seeking to post in as many blogs as possible, simply did a quick search for "Islam" or "Muslim" and/or other keywords, and simply pasted the same generic comment into each link he found without regard for the content of the post he was "commenting" on. Although, in that case, I find it odd that he would have only posted in one, six-month old post on my blog--especially when one considers that I have used the label "Islam" 20 times and "Muslim" an additional 21 times prior to this post.
So one has to wonder about the agenda of an author who would search for a six-month old post examining the racist ideology supporting the genocide of a Muslim community only to link to an article decrying the higher birthrate among Muslims compared to non-Muslims. But, I would argue, one needn't wonder for terribly long.
However, today I rejected a comment which was not from an advertiser, but rather from a blogger with a very different agenda than my own. The author, "Bengal Under Attack," wanted me to post a comment directing readers to the following link to his own blog post:
900% Growth of Islamic Population
I admit that it may seem perverse to refuse to publish a comment, and then to turn around and devote one of my own posts to the very same link. However, I want my reasons for refusing to post his comment to be clear. Given the recent events in Mumbai, and the continued threat to world peace posed by Islamic terrorism, the last thing I want to do is to provide ammunition to those who would distort my silence on this issue as either ignorance of the genuine threat we all face from Islamist terror, or even tacit support for their cause. Nothing could be further from the truth.
I could have merely noted that his primary concern is the Indian subcontinent and left it at that, but even a cursory read of his article reveals that he considers Islam--and Muslims--to be a threat in all places at all times in all situations. In the opinion of the author, Muslims are a threat to us not because of a confluence of religious fundamentalism and geopolitical realities, but simply because they are breeding so quickly. I trust I do not need to expend effort and bandwidth explaining what I think of this kind of logic.
One more thing--it is worth noting which of my now more than 400 posts the author chose to comment on. It was not a recent post; rather, it was this one from June 28 of this year:
"The Nationalist Serbian Intellectuals and Islam: Defining and Eliminating a Muslim Community" by Norman Cigar
It is just possible that the author, seeking to post in as many blogs as possible, simply did a quick search for "Islam" or "Muslim" and/or other keywords, and simply pasted the same generic comment into each link he found without regard for the content of the post he was "commenting" on. Although, in that case, I find it odd that he would have only posted in one, six-month old post on my blog--especially when one considers that I have used the label "Islam" 20 times and "Muslim" an additional 21 times prior to this post.
So one has to wonder about the agenda of an author who would search for a six-month old post examining the racist ideology supporting the genocide of a Muslim community only to link to an article decrying the higher birthrate among Muslims compared to non-Muslims. But, I would argue, one needn't wonder for terribly long.
Labels:
Bosnia,
Genocide,
Islam,
Islamophobia,
Muslim
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
"Islam in Europe": Professor Ermin Sinanovic
[I regret that I will be unable to attend this discussion, but if you are in the Washington DC area tomorrow I encourage you to check it out]
The Bosniak-American Advisory Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina cordially invites you to
a Capitol Hill briefing with Prof. Ermin Sinanovic.
Islam in Europe:
Institutionalization, immigration, and integration.
Thursday, October 23, 2008 ::: 2.00 - 3.00 pm ::: Rayburn Building 2255
The Bosniak-American Advisory Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina cordially invites you to
a Capitol Hill briefing with Prof. Ermin Sinanovic.
Islam in Europe:
Institutionalization, immigration, and integration.
Thursday, October 23, 2008 ::: 2.00 - 3.00 pm ::: Rayburn Building 2255
Sunday, October 19, 2008
"Faith At War" by Yaroslav Trofimov
I haven't read the entire book, so I hesitate to recommend it based on only the final chapter, but Faith at War: A Journey on the Frontlines of Islam, from Baghdad to Timbuktu by Yaroslav Trofimov concludes with a depressing but balanced look at the influence of Wahhabi extremism and hardline Islamist proselytizing in Bosnia.
Trofimov is a keen observer, and one of the most telling details comes when he notes that actual nature of the Saudi-financing mosque rebuilding efforts post-Dayton:
"Rebuilding in Bosnia, the Saudi way, turned out to be more like destruction. The austere Wahhabi ideology holds frescoes and paintings to be un-Islamic, and considers elaborate gravestones and Sufi tekke, prayer lodges, a common sight in the courtyards of Bosnian mosques, to be miscreant abominations. Saudi-financed rebuilding of mosques damaged in the war usually consisted of bulldozing the cemetaries and the tekkes--many dating back to the Middle Ages--and refashioning the ancient mosques in a graceless Saudi style."
And so on. The details of the architectural rape of the Begova Dzamija are painful to read, and infuriating to reflect on. This should not have happened. It needs to be said yet again--when their existence was first threatened, the Bosniaks first turned to the West. When we did nothing, only then did some of them choose to follow the example of the jihadists in their midst.
Trofimov also details the Bosnian connection with Al Qaeda, and the role that the Bosnian war played in providing a training ground for future jihadists, including two of the 9/11 hijackers. He also interviews some radicalized Bosnian Muslims who are as anti-American and anti-Semitic as any Arab mujahideen. The abandonment of Bosnia by the West, and the ferocity of the mostly Arab mujahideen volunteers made quite an impression on some of Trofimov's interview subjects.
There is a silver lining, and that is that the seed of Wahhabi intolerance does not seem to have spread beyond a small minority. This book was published in 2005 and the Bosnia reporting was done sometime before then--even then, Trofimov notes that the society remained largely secular, and on his second trip he noted that what Bosniaks seemed to be pushing for was integration into Europe by way of EU membership, rather than turning its back on the West and huddling in the Islamist fold. Three-plus years after this book went to print, that still seems to be the case.
Yet, we know the extremists are still there, and some of them dared show their faces in public during the assaults on the Sarajevo Gay Pride parade. Bosnians--not just Bosniaks--still by and large want to join the West, to integrate into Europe. We do not have the right to keep them waiting forever, and books like this remind us that failures to act also have consequences.
Trofimov is a keen observer, and one of the most telling details comes when he notes that actual nature of the Saudi-financing mosque rebuilding efforts post-Dayton:
"Rebuilding in Bosnia, the Saudi way, turned out to be more like destruction. The austere Wahhabi ideology holds frescoes and paintings to be un-Islamic, and considers elaborate gravestones and Sufi tekke, prayer lodges, a common sight in the courtyards of Bosnian mosques, to be miscreant abominations. Saudi-financed rebuilding of mosques damaged in the war usually consisted of bulldozing the cemetaries and the tekkes--many dating back to the Middle Ages--and refashioning the ancient mosques in a graceless Saudi style."
And so on. The details of the architectural rape of the Begova Dzamija are painful to read, and infuriating to reflect on. This should not have happened. It needs to be said yet again--when their existence was first threatened, the Bosniaks first turned to the West. When we did nothing, only then did some of them choose to follow the example of the jihadists in their midst.
Trofimov also details the Bosnian connection with Al Qaeda, and the role that the Bosnian war played in providing a training ground for future jihadists, including two of the 9/11 hijackers. He also interviews some radicalized Bosnian Muslims who are as anti-American and anti-Semitic as any Arab mujahideen. The abandonment of Bosnia by the West, and the ferocity of the mostly Arab mujahideen volunteers made quite an impression on some of Trofimov's interview subjects.
There is a silver lining, and that is that the seed of Wahhabi intolerance does not seem to have spread beyond a small minority. This book was published in 2005 and the Bosnia reporting was done sometime before then--even then, Trofimov notes that the society remained largely secular, and on his second trip he noted that what Bosniaks seemed to be pushing for was integration into Europe by way of EU membership, rather than turning its back on the West and huddling in the Islamist fold. Three-plus years after this book went to print, that still seems to be the case.
Yet, we know the extremists are still there, and some of them dared show their faces in public during the assaults on the Sarajevo Gay Pride parade. Bosnians--not just Bosniaks--still by and large want to join the West, to integrate into Europe. We do not have the right to keep them waiting forever, and books like this remind us that failures to act also have consequences.
Wednesday, October 08, 2008
Recent Story on "El Mujahid" Division
In light of the recent sentencing of Bosnian General Rasim Delic, this article from International Relations and Security Network is quite timely:
Al-Qaida's Bosnian War Move
Consider some of the details of his case, such as being mocked in court by some of the very mujahidin he was accused of being responsible for. And then read this recent article, by Marko Attila Hoare:
A Tale of Two Generals
The unfairness of this rankles, as does the fact that fugitive war criminal Ratko Mladic is the subject of biography entitled Ratko Mladic: Tragic Hero. It would be difflicult not to consider the possibility that Delic is a victim, not of a conspiracy, but a misguided and slightly dissonant effort to manufacture a semblance of "balance" where none exists.
At the same time, one cannot ignore that this is yet another example of how collusion with Islamic extremists compromised Bosnia's honor; the sad fact that 70 seemingly unarmed Wahabbi youth were able to violently disrupt a well-publicized gay festival despite plenty of advance warning suggests that thus-far secular Bosnia is not immune to the appeal of fundamentalism in a time of confusion and insecurity.
Al-Qaida's Bosnian War Move
Consider some of the details of his case, such as being mocked in court by some of the very mujahidin he was accused of being responsible for. And then read this recent article, by Marko Attila Hoare:
A Tale of Two Generals
The unfairness of this rankles, as does the fact that fugitive war criminal Ratko Mladic is the subject of biography entitled Ratko Mladic: Tragic Hero. It would be difflicult not to consider the possibility that Delic is a victim, not of a conspiracy, but a misguided and slightly dissonant effort to manufacture a semblance of "balance" where none exists.
At the same time, one cannot ignore that this is yet another example of how collusion with Islamic extremists compromised Bosnia's honor; the sad fact that 70 seemingly unarmed Wahabbi youth were able to violently disrupt a well-publicized gay festival despite plenty of advance warning suggests that thus-far secular Bosnia is not immune to the appeal of fundamentalism in a time of confusion and insecurity.
Monday, August 18, 2008
Serbian Muslim Community Commits Act of Stupidity in name of "Tolerance"
Even as Random House caved in to fears of Muslim anger over the planned publication of a novel on Muhammed's child wife, a Belgrade publisher has taken similar action due to complaints from Serbia's Muslim community leader:
Serbia Withdraws Book amid Muslim Anger
This is exactly not what is needed; and shame on the leadership of Serbia's Muslim community for playing up fears of Muslim "anger" and outrage; not only is this a blow against freedom of speech, it only reinforces stereotypes about Islam that nationalists use against normally moderate Slavic Muslims. A very depressing and disheartening episode all around.
Well, it appears that the Grand Mufti is happy with the publisher's decision to cower in the face of religious extremism:
Serbia’s Muslims Hail Withdrawal of Book*
This quote was particularly disturbing:
"Zukorlic assessed this was a good opportunity for the people, regardless of their religious beliefs, to point out the fact that there are values which are not subject to marketing and which must not be desecrated."
Freedom of thought is not possible when some ideas--and yes, some "values"--are considered untouchable and beyond criticism or discussion. This is a bad day for democracy in Serbia and for Islam in the Slavic world.
*It should be noted that, just as Serb nationalist extremists shouldn't be allowed to speak for all Serbs, it's not clear how many of Serbian Muslims actually agree with this pious asshat.
Serbia Withdraws Book amid Muslim Anger
This is exactly not what is needed; and shame on the leadership of Serbia's Muslim community for playing up fears of Muslim "anger" and outrage; not only is this a blow against freedom of speech, it only reinforces stereotypes about Islam that nationalists use against normally moderate Slavic Muslims. A very depressing and disheartening episode all around.
UPDATE:
Well, it appears that the Grand Mufti is happy with the publisher's decision to cower in the face of religious extremism:
Serbia’s Muslims Hail Withdrawal of Book*
This quote was particularly disturbing:
"Zukorlic assessed this was a good opportunity for the people, regardless of their religious beliefs, to point out the fact that there are values which are not subject to marketing and which must not be desecrated."
Freedom of thought is not possible when some ideas--and yes, some "values"--are considered untouchable and beyond criticism or discussion. This is a bad day for democracy in Serbia and for Islam in the Slavic world.
*It should be noted that, just as Serb nationalist extremists shouldn't be allowed to speak for all Serbs, it's not clear how many of Serbian Muslims actually agree with this pious asshat.
Saturday, July 05, 2008
On "Islamophobia"
In a recent post at his blog Greater Surbiton, Dr. Marko Attila Hoare considers the question Is Islamophobia equivalent to racism or anti-Semitism? His focus is on the Balkans, but I believe that the reason why, as he puts it
"There is some resistance among liberal intellectuals to the term ‘Islamophobia’..."
has little to do with the region. While he does conclude that sentence by correctly noting that
"...it is assumed that Islam is a religion, therefore an ideology, and it is questioned if one can be prejudiced against an ideology."
the larger debate in the West over Islam and the unfortunately named (if necessary and worthwhile) "War on Terror" inevitably frames most any public discussion of Islam and its adherents.
I do not wish to make more of this than necessary since I do agree with Dr. Hoare's larger point, but at the risk of seeming callous or unsympathetic (and I would hope that after over two years of relatively steady work and advocacy on this blog I would be safe from such accusations), I am compelled to point out the unfortunate, reflexive use of the word "Islamophobia" by individuals who are less interested in fighting bigotry than in curbing or diverting useful, or even merely pointed, criticism of the practice of Islam in certain places, certain cultural or social practices within the Muslim world, and so on. I would not at all be surprised if some of the voices being raised in dismay at the current endorsement of sharia law in Great Britain were not met with indignant claims of bigotry against non-Western cultural practices and Islamophobia.
As a staunch secularist, I hesitate to endorse giving sanction and legitimacy to a word which, from a certain perspective, seems tailor-made for the purpose of stifling criticism of religious belief or of any religious institution. At the same time, I recognize and abhor the signs of genuine bigotry, hatred, and fear directed towards the Muslim world and individual Muslims wherever I encounter or learn of them. That there exists genuine bigotry against Muslims because they are Muslims seems irrefutable. Serb and Croat nationalists and their apologists wouldn't go to such great lengths to appeal to such sentiment if it didn't exist.
So is Islamophobia a better term than, say, "Muslimophobia"? It is somewhat less awkward, no doubt, but is it more fitting, since our concern should be with the existence of bigotry directed at individuals because of their religious affiliation rather than with the religion itself?
Ultimately, I would say yes. Muslims are not a race, an ethnic or national group (speaking globally, rather than in the narrower, pre-Bosniak Yugoslav context); they lack linguistic and culturally unity. The only thing which the 1.2 billion or so Muslims have in common is their religion (putting aside the great diversity of sects and schisms within Islam, and of course the varying degrees of personal piety). Islamophobia preaches hatred and intolerance towards the Muslims of the world because they are presumably all unquestioning followers of an implacably hostile and unwaveringly anti-Western/anti-Christian belief system. Islamophobia is premised on a crude, nuance-free, and deliberately confrontational misrepresentation of one of the largest religions on the planet. In order to justify the bigotry against members of a group who are only identifiable as followers of a belief system, it is necessary to both demonize that belief system and to believe that all adherents are unquestioning followers of said systems dictates and teachings.
"There is some resistance among liberal intellectuals to the term ‘Islamophobia’..."
has little to do with the region. While he does conclude that sentence by correctly noting that
"...it is assumed that Islam is a religion, therefore an ideology, and it is questioned if one can be prejudiced against an ideology."
the larger debate in the West over Islam and the unfortunately named (if necessary and worthwhile) "War on Terror" inevitably frames most any public discussion of Islam and its adherents.
I do not wish to make more of this than necessary since I do agree with Dr. Hoare's larger point, but at the risk of seeming callous or unsympathetic (and I would hope that after over two years of relatively steady work and advocacy on this blog I would be safe from such accusations), I am compelled to point out the unfortunate, reflexive use of the word "Islamophobia" by individuals who are less interested in fighting bigotry than in curbing or diverting useful, or even merely pointed, criticism of the practice of Islam in certain places, certain cultural or social practices within the Muslim world, and so on. I would not at all be surprised if some of the voices being raised in dismay at the current endorsement of sharia law in Great Britain were not met with indignant claims of bigotry against non-Western cultural practices and Islamophobia.
As a staunch secularist, I hesitate to endorse giving sanction and legitimacy to a word which, from a certain perspective, seems tailor-made for the purpose of stifling criticism of religious belief or of any religious institution. At the same time, I recognize and abhor the signs of genuine bigotry, hatred, and fear directed towards the Muslim world and individual Muslims wherever I encounter or learn of them. That there exists genuine bigotry against Muslims because they are Muslims seems irrefutable. Serb and Croat nationalists and their apologists wouldn't go to such great lengths to appeal to such sentiment if it didn't exist.
So is Islamophobia a better term than, say, "Muslimophobia"? It is somewhat less awkward, no doubt, but is it more fitting, since our concern should be with the existence of bigotry directed at individuals because of their religious affiliation rather than with the religion itself?
Ultimately, I would say yes. Muslims are not a race, an ethnic or national group (speaking globally, rather than in the narrower, pre-Bosniak Yugoslav context); they lack linguistic and culturally unity. The only thing which the 1.2 billion or so Muslims have in common is their religion (putting aside the great diversity of sects and schisms within Islam, and of course the varying degrees of personal piety). Islamophobia preaches hatred and intolerance towards the Muslims of the world because they are presumably all unquestioning followers of an implacably hostile and unwaveringly anti-Western/anti-Christian belief system. Islamophobia is premised on a crude, nuance-free, and deliberately confrontational misrepresentation of one of the largest religions on the planet. In order to justify the bigotry against members of a group who are only identifiable as followers of a belief system, it is necessary to both demonize that belief system and to believe that all adherents are unquestioning followers of said systems dictates and teachings.
Labels:
Balkans,
Bosnia,
Islam,
Islamophobia,
Marko Attila Hoare
Sunday, June 29, 2008
"Christ Killer, Kremlin, Contagion" by Michael Sells
The other essay from the collection The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy by Michael Sells which explicitly addresses the Bosniak Muslims is by Michael Sells, author of The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, which I have previously considered in this blog.
At the beginning of this essay, Sells recounts the massacre of Srebrenica, and the sordid history of ethnic cleansing which led up to it, and asks the obvious question--why did the international community, knowing what it knew, stand by and do nothing? One reason, he posits, is the widespread acceptance of the myth of historical inevitability. He writes:
"...there is an interior logic to such madness. That interior logic begins with the myth of age-old antagonisms: Muslims and Christians inBosnia have been killing one another for centuries we are told. It is not only that there have been tragic conflicts in the past in Bosnia but that the root of those conflicts are inscribed into the fabric of the culture: the conflict is inevitable, and it would be a form of cultural imperialism for anyone to interfere with it. Serb and Croat militants turned this myth of age-old antagonisms into an ideology to motivate and justify their attempt to create religiously pure and homogenous Orthodox Serb and Croat Catholic states. A wider circle of writers from outside the Balkans, writing for a different audience, have advanced their own version of essential Balkan incompatibilities."
The first several pages of this essay cover the influence of The Mountain Wreath and other nationalist mythology in contemporary Serb nationalist discourse; this material would essentially be a rehash of my review of his book so I won't dwell on his excellent summary.
When he then goes on to discuss the anti-Islamic writings of Giselle Litmann, alias Bat Ye'or, and Jacques Ellul, who have essentially collaborated in the development of a particular strand of explicitly Christian anti-Islamic thought, one which proposes that Islam has at all times and all places one unchanging nature, and a violent and oppressive one at that. While Christianity allegedly can and has changed over the centuries, Islam cannot, and furthermore it is a totalitarian system which maintains sway over all its believers. Islam is incapable of peaceful coexistence or compromise. The presence of Muslims automatically means the presence of Islam, and Islam is always and everywhere a sworn foe of Christianity, Judaism, and Western cultural and political values.
While neither "expert" seems to have explicitly called for genocidal violence against Muslims, it would be expecting too much for others not to draw the obvious conclusions from such extremist rhetoric. Yet their simplistic, implacably contentious analyses have managed to obtain a certain level of visibility and legitimacy; we can thank Bernard Lewis for bringing Bat Ye'or the wider audience she had previously lacked.
The final Western "expert" on Islam Sells considers is Robert Kaplan, author of Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, the book that famously convinced President Bill Clinton that turning his back on the Muslims of Bosnia was a sound foreign policy decision. I have only read excerpts from the book, so I was a little surprised to discover how much of this highly-praised and oft-quoted text is focused on the smells and alleged poor hygiene of Muslims in the former Ottoman Empire. It is one thing to declare that Islam is to blame for the rise of Communism in Eastern Europe (who knew?), but quite another to dismiss the entire region as an irredeemable pigsty full of surly, untrustworthy people who, well, smell bad. Of course, Kaplan might have spent so much time on the appearance and odor of places like Pristina since, like Bernard Lewis, he seemingly couldn't be bothered actually talking to any of the millions of Muslims he derides. Clearly, I need to read this book more comprehensively.
Sells concludes his essay with a discussion of the different variations of prejudiced, based on the essay "The Anatomy of Prejudice" by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, which defines three different character types:
"The obsessional type is characterized by an ideology of filth and cleansing...The hysterical type is charactered by fear of impotence and castration...the narcissistic type is typified by sexism, homophobia, and the constricted societies they reflect and help construct."
All of the texts Sells has discussed fit each of the above characteristics; the anti-Muslim rhetoric of Serb nationalists and their Western enablers is naked bigotry of the basest kind, even when dressed up in the progressive language of "incompatible cultures" such as when the allegedly anti-feminist nature of Balkan Islam was used as a justification for a war in which the gang rape of Muslim women was a premeditated tactic of terror.
Sells concludes his essay with this powerful passage:
"When, after the Srebrenica massacre, NATO finally intervented, what it found was something less romantic than embattled Christian soldiers under perennial attack from the perennial enemy Islam. Behind the mask of civilizational clash, evil empire, and Muslim contamination it found the common tragedy of human history: victims who, contrary to expectations, had done nothing to deserve their fate and had threatened nobody. And perpetrators building their identity through a vain attempt to reject an other who was, in fact, a part of themselves."
At the beginning of this essay, Sells recounts the massacre of Srebrenica, and the sordid history of ethnic cleansing which led up to it, and asks the obvious question--why did the international community, knowing what it knew, stand by and do nothing? One reason, he posits, is the widespread acceptance of the myth of historical inevitability. He writes:
"...there is an interior logic to such madness. That interior logic begins with the myth of age-old antagonisms: Muslims and Christians inBosnia have been killing one another for centuries we are told. It is not only that there have been tragic conflicts in the past in Bosnia but that the root of those conflicts are inscribed into the fabric of the culture: the conflict is inevitable, and it would be a form of cultural imperialism for anyone to interfere with it. Serb and Croat militants turned this myth of age-old antagonisms into an ideology to motivate and justify their attempt to create religiously pure and homogenous Orthodox Serb and Croat Catholic states. A wider circle of writers from outside the Balkans, writing for a different audience, have advanced their own version of essential Balkan incompatibilities."
The first several pages of this essay cover the influence of The Mountain Wreath and other nationalist mythology in contemporary Serb nationalist discourse; this material would essentially be a rehash of my review of his book so I won't dwell on his excellent summary.
When he then goes on to discuss the anti-Islamic writings of Giselle Litmann, alias Bat Ye'or, and Jacques Ellul, who have essentially collaborated in the development of a particular strand of explicitly Christian anti-Islamic thought, one which proposes that Islam has at all times and all places one unchanging nature, and a violent and oppressive one at that. While Christianity allegedly can and has changed over the centuries, Islam cannot, and furthermore it is a totalitarian system which maintains sway over all its believers. Islam is incapable of peaceful coexistence or compromise. The presence of Muslims automatically means the presence of Islam, and Islam is always and everywhere a sworn foe of Christianity, Judaism, and Western cultural and political values.
While neither "expert" seems to have explicitly called for genocidal violence against Muslims, it would be expecting too much for others not to draw the obvious conclusions from such extremist rhetoric. Yet their simplistic, implacably contentious analyses have managed to obtain a certain level of visibility and legitimacy; we can thank Bernard Lewis for bringing Bat Ye'or the wider audience she had previously lacked.
The final Western "expert" on Islam Sells considers is Robert Kaplan, author of Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, the book that famously convinced President Bill Clinton that turning his back on the Muslims of Bosnia was a sound foreign policy decision. I have only read excerpts from the book, so I was a little surprised to discover how much of this highly-praised and oft-quoted text is focused on the smells and alleged poor hygiene of Muslims in the former Ottoman Empire. It is one thing to declare that Islam is to blame for the rise of Communism in Eastern Europe (who knew?), but quite another to dismiss the entire region as an irredeemable pigsty full of surly, untrustworthy people who, well, smell bad. Of course, Kaplan might have spent so much time on the appearance and odor of places like Pristina since, like Bernard Lewis, he seemingly couldn't be bothered actually talking to any of the millions of Muslims he derides. Clearly, I need to read this book more comprehensively.
Sells concludes his essay with a discussion of the different variations of prejudiced, based on the essay "The Anatomy of Prejudice" by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, which defines three different character types:
"The obsessional type is characterized by an ideology of filth and cleansing...The hysterical type is charactered by fear of impotence and castration...the narcissistic type is typified by sexism, homophobia, and the constricted societies they reflect and help construct."
All of the texts Sells has discussed fit each of the above characteristics; the anti-Muslim rhetoric of Serb nationalists and their Western enablers is naked bigotry of the basest kind, even when dressed up in the progressive language of "incompatible cultures" such as when the allegedly anti-feminist nature of Balkan Islam was used as a justification for a war in which the gang rape of Muslim women was a premeditated tactic of terror.
Sells concludes his essay with this powerful passage:
"When, after the Srebrenica massacre, NATO finally intervented, what it found was something less romantic than embattled Christian soldiers under perennial attack from the perennial enemy Islam. Behind the mask of civilizational clash, evil empire, and Muslim contamination it found the common tragedy of human history: victims who, contrary to expectations, had done nothing to deserve their fate and had threatened nobody. And perpetrators building their identity through a vain attempt to reject an other who was, in fact, a part of themselves."
Labels:
Bosnia,
Christianity,
Civil Religion,
Genocide,
Islam,
Michael Sells,
Muslim
Saturday, June 28, 2008
"The Nationalist Serbian Intellectuals and Islam: Defining and Eliminating a Muslim Community" by Norman Cigar
One of the two essays from the book The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy that explicitly addresses the plight of the Bosniak Muslims. Cigar is also the author of the essential work Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing and comes to the subject with a wealth of knowledge and a clear perspective.
The gist of Cigar's essay is most likely familiar to most readers of this blog, as the influence of Serbian intellectuals and writers like Cosic, Draskovic, Karadzic, Raskovic, Plavsic, and many others is well-known to even a casual student of the last Balkan wars. Here (in line with the theme of the book), Cigar focuses on the demonization of Islam and ethnic Muslims by Serb nationalists; the opening sentences of his essay:
"Recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina provide significant material for a case study on the impact that external images of Islam can have on Muslims as a community and as individuals. Perhaps there was no more striking aspect in this process of creating images than the role that Serb intellectuals played as they exercised their craft of developing and disseminating knowledge and engaged in political activity."
Cigar goes on to show that Serb nationalist intellectuals were consistent in creating an "in-group/out-group" mentality regarding the Serbs versus the "others." What is of note in the context of this book is how Serbs tried to play to outside (particularly Western) sensibilities by playing off stereotypes about and fears of Muslims and Islam. What is also striking is how ridiculously crude and irrational much of this "intellectual" rhetoric was. Consider this quote from writer Dragos Kalajic, speaking of the allegedly "unmanly" nature of the (allegedly "Serb") converts to Islam after the Ottoman conquest:
"..it is appropriate to point out that effeminacy and symbolic or actual homosexuality are not the only means by which to escape from a manly nature that is threatened with violence, terror, or death. The Serbian experience shows that there are many other ways of avoiding duty and responsibility stemming from too onerous a fate, which history has imposed on the Serbs. Historically, the first and easiest path of avoidance from unavoidable fate was actually opened up by the Ottoman occupation...[and] drove many Serbs along the road to treachery"
This is, of course, a load of nonsense, but it's the sort of nonsense that people like Diana Johnstone and Julia Gorin take very seriously. To say nothing of the quote from Radovan Karadzic wherein he tries to distinguish which Muslims could still be converted to Orthodoxy--apparently, religious conversion is a matter of genetics:
"When it is a question of the Serbs of the Islamic faith, there was always a great divide that determined whether they were to be more Muslim or more Serb. Those in whom the religious element predominated, and orientation toward Islam's fundamentals, were lost forever to the Serbian nation."
It goes on, but even that short quote is enough to make the obvious parallels to the Nazi efforts to determine which people in the occupied East had sufficiently "Aryan" characteristics; Cigar rightly notes that in this day and age nationalist extremists know better than to express their beliefs in explicitly racist terms, but there is really no other way to interpret Karadzic's gibberish about collective memories and achieving "that level of development to become Serbs while also having the Islamic past of their families." These are the words of a man described with no little warmth by the 39th President of the United States as I noted last fall.
Cigar's analysis is keen, but it is difficult to do this essay full credit without all the quotes he includes; the above passages are typical, but hardly exhaust the range of crackpot theorizing, pseudo-science, mytho-romantic pontificating, and sheer psychopathic lunacy on display here. Cigar convincingly demonstrates that among Serbia's intellectual elite there was a strong tendency to portray Islam as a corrosive, and thoroughly evil force which fully defines all followers of that faith; Muslims are at all places and all times defined primarily if not exclusively as members of a vicious, violent, and implacably anti-Western (and anti-Serb) movement. No wonder Samuel Huntington was so popular among them.
The gist of Cigar's essay is most likely familiar to most readers of this blog, as the influence of Serbian intellectuals and writers like Cosic, Draskovic, Karadzic, Raskovic, Plavsic, and many others is well-known to even a casual student of the last Balkan wars. Here (in line with the theme of the book), Cigar focuses on the demonization of Islam and ethnic Muslims by Serb nationalists; the opening sentences of his essay:
"Recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina provide significant material for a case study on the impact that external images of Islam can have on Muslims as a community and as individuals. Perhaps there was no more striking aspect in this process of creating images than the role that Serb intellectuals played as they exercised their craft of developing and disseminating knowledge and engaged in political activity."
Cigar goes on to show that Serb nationalist intellectuals were consistent in creating an "in-group/out-group" mentality regarding the Serbs versus the "others." What is of note in the context of this book is how Serbs tried to play to outside (particularly Western) sensibilities by playing off stereotypes about and fears of Muslims and Islam. What is also striking is how ridiculously crude and irrational much of this "intellectual" rhetoric was. Consider this quote from writer Dragos Kalajic, speaking of the allegedly "unmanly" nature of the (allegedly "Serb") converts to Islam after the Ottoman conquest:
"..it is appropriate to point out that effeminacy and symbolic or actual homosexuality are not the only means by which to escape from a manly nature that is threatened with violence, terror, or death. The Serbian experience shows that there are many other ways of avoiding duty and responsibility stemming from too onerous a fate, which history has imposed on the Serbs. Historically, the first and easiest path of avoidance from unavoidable fate was actually opened up by the Ottoman occupation...[and] drove many Serbs along the road to treachery"
This is, of course, a load of nonsense, but it's the sort of nonsense that people like Diana Johnstone and Julia Gorin take very seriously. To say nothing of the quote from Radovan Karadzic wherein he tries to distinguish which Muslims could still be converted to Orthodoxy--apparently, religious conversion is a matter of genetics:
"When it is a question of the Serbs of the Islamic faith, there was always a great divide that determined whether they were to be more Muslim or more Serb. Those in whom the religious element predominated, and orientation toward Islam's fundamentals, were lost forever to the Serbian nation."
It goes on, but even that short quote is enough to make the obvious parallels to the Nazi efforts to determine which people in the occupied East had sufficiently "Aryan" characteristics; Cigar rightly notes that in this day and age nationalist extremists know better than to express their beliefs in explicitly racist terms, but there is really no other way to interpret Karadzic's gibberish about collective memories and achieving "that level of development to become Serbs while also having the Islamic past of their families." These are the words of a man described with no little warmth by the 39th President of the United States as I noted last fall.
Cigar's analysis is keen, but it is difficult to do this essay full credit without all the quotes he includes; the above passages are typical, but hardly exhaust the range of crackpot theorizing, pseudo-science, mytho-romantic pontificating, and sheer psychopathic lunacy on display here. Cigar convincingly demonstrates that among Serbia's intellectual elite there was a strong tendency to portray Islam as a corrosive, and thoroughly evil force which fully defines all followers of that faith; Muslims are at all places and all times defined primarily if not exclusively as members of a vicious, violent, and implacably anti-Western (and anti-Serb) movement. No wonder Samuel Huntington was so popular among them.
Labels:
Bosnia,
Islam,
Muslim,
Nationalism,
Norman Cigar,
racism,
Religion,
Serbian Nationalism
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Said, Trumpbour, and others on Huntington and Lewis
In order to take the time to do justice to the arguments gathered against the Huntington/Lewis "Clash of Civilizations" thesis in the volume The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy edited by Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells, I would first need to spend a considerable amount of time considering the questionable thesis that Huntington and others have laid out. While that might take me quite far afield from Bosnia, I don't think it would be at all irrevelant to some of the larger topics this blog hopefully touches on from time to time.
Much of the debate on the Balkan wars was framed in just such false dialectics--indeed, Huntington's book was publicly embraced by Franjo Tudjman and at least some Serbian nationalists. In the hands of such theorists seeking to fit events into predetermined grand narratives, the Bosnian war was removed entirely from its specific, local context (which was, more often than not, distorted beyond recognition at any rate through the lens of "ancient hatreds") and interpreted purely as yet another enactment of a largner, ongoing 'struggle' or 'clash.' Reductive theorists like Huntington allow Western elites to justify a dispassionate, removed approach to atrocity situations because the tragic particulars of a genocide in Bosnia or Rwanda or Sudan, while painful to watch, are little more than the inevitable symptoms of a global conflict. And Huntington and his ilk tend to regard the victims of Bosnia, for example, as being on the 'wrong side' of that greater war.
If I someday find the time, I will most certainly consider a more extended consideration of, at the very least, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Huntington. In the meantime, it was important to acknowledge the larger debate Qureshi and Sells' book represents before going on to review to the two or three essays which are more explicitly concerned with Bosnia.
Much of the debate on the Balkan wars was framed in just such false dialectics--indeed, Huntington's book was publicly embraced by Franjo Tudjman and at least some Serbian nationalists. In the hands of such theorists seeking to fit events into predetermined grand narratives, the Bosnian war was removed entirely from its specific, local context (which was, more often than not, distorted beyond recognition at any rate through the lens of "ancient hatreds") and interpreted purely as yet another enactment of a largner, ongoing 'struggle' or 'clash.' Reductive theorists like Huntington allow Western elites to justify a dispassionate, removed approach to atrocity situations because the tragic particulars of a genocide in Bosnia or Rwanda or Sudan, while painful to watch, are little more than the inevitable symptoms of a global conflict. And Huntington and his ilk tend to regard the victims of Bosnia, for example, as being on the 'wrong side' of that greater war.
If I someday find the time, I will most certainly consider a more extended consideration of, at the very least, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Huntington. In the meantime, it was important to acknowledge the larger debate Qureshi and Sells' book represents before going on to review to the two or three essays which are more explicitly concerned with Bosnia.
Labels:
Bernard Lewis,
Bosnia,
Huntington,
Islam,
Muslim,
Qureshi,
Sells
Sunday, June 22, 2008
Bosnia as a Battlefield of the "Clash of Civilizations"
I am currently browsing through some of the essays in The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy edited by Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells. The book is a multi-faceted rebuttal to the collective body of voices pushing some variation of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilization" thesis, including V.S. Naipaul and of course Bernard Lewis.
The influence of this strain of political/cultural thought on Western responses (and non-responses) to the Bosnian crisis has certainly not been overlooked, but it certainly merits continued attention. Earlier Serb and Croat nationalist claims about the "Islamic menace" coming from Bosnia and Kosova certainly did not fall on deaf ears, but after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 Balkan revisionists and Serb nationalist apologists seem to have sensed that the audience for such rhetoric has broadened. Therefore, those of us who wish to defend the historical record cannot afford to ignore the "Islam versus the West" theorists, no matter how much we might wish to dismiss such gross simplifications as irrelevant to the struggles of the largely secular Bosniak and Kosovar Albanian populations.
A couple of the essays in this book--one by Michael Sells; the other by Norman Cigar--deal specifically with the Muslims of Bosnia, and I will consider them in some detail; first, however, I will briefly consider some of the other essays, some of which touch on issues in the former Yugoslavia, and all of contribute to the larger discussion which Sells and Cigar are participating in.
I apologize for my infrequent (and abbreviated) posting as of late; I will make a sincere effort to be more consistent and prompt in my consideration of this book.
The influence of this strain of political/cultural thought on Western responses (and non-responses) to the Bosnian crisis has certainly not been overlooked, but it certainly merits continued attention. Earlier Serb and Croat nationalist claims about the "Islamic menace" coming from Bosnia and Kosova certainly did not fall on deaf ears, but after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 Balkan revisionists and Serb nationalist apologists seem to have sensed that the audience for such rhetoric has broadened. Therefore, those of us who wish to defend the historical record cannot afford to ignore the "Islam versus the West" theorists, no matter how much we might wish to dismiss such gross simplifications as irrelevant to the struggles of the largely secular Bosniak and Kosovar Albanian populations.
A couple of the essays in this book--one by Michael Sells; the other by Norman Cigar--deal specifically with the Muslims of Bosnia, and I will consider them in some detail; first, however, I will briefly consider some of the other essays, some of which touch on issues in the former Yugoslavia, and all of contribute to the larger discussion which Sells and Cigar are participating in.
I apologize for my infrequent (and abbreviated) posting as of late; I will make a sincere effort to be more consistent and prompt in my consideration of this book.
Friday, February 29, 2008
"Muslim Identity and the Balkan State" ed. by Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki
I have read most of the collected essays in this fine collection:
Muslim Identity and the Balkan State
Published in 1997, no doubt some of the data and interpretations are now dated; also, because the status of Bosnia was very much in doubt in late 1996 when this volume was being prepared for publication, the editors chose not to discuss the Muslims of Bosnia. Rather, this book looks at the Pomaks of Bulgaria and Greece, ethnic Turks throughout the Balkans, the Slavic Muslims of Macedonia, ethnic Albanian Muslims in Macedonia, Kosova, and Albania proper, and the Slavic Muslims of the Sandzak.
The book can be read in its entirety, or individual essays can be read independently. For a general reader intersted in gaining a broader perspective on the complexities and varieties of different Muslim communities throughout the region, this book is an easily readable resource.
Muslim Identity and the Balkan State
Published in 1997, no doubt some of the data and interpretations are now dated; also, because the status of Bosnia was very much in doubt in late 1996 when this volume was being prepared for publication, the editors chose not to discuss the Muslims of Bosnia. Rather, this book looks at the Pomaks of Bulgaria and Greece, ethnic Turks throughout the Balkans, the Slavic Muslims of Macedonia, ethnic Albanian Muslims in Macedonia, Kosova, and Albania proper, and the Slavic Muslims of the Sandzak.
The book can be read in its entirety, or individual essays can be read independently. For a general reader intersted in gaining a broader perspective on the complexities and varieties of different Muslim communities throughout the region, this book is an easily readable resource.
Saturday, February 23, 2008
Troubling Sign of Sectarianism
On February 12 of this year, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia released what, in a liberal secular society, should be a thoroughly uncontroversial press statement:
Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina Should Be Inclusive, Not Exclusive
Anyone familiar with the multi-confessional composition of Bosnian society and of the need to nurture a shared civic culture, regardless of his or her own beliefs or affiliation.
Unfortunately, the The Cabinet of Reisu-l-ulema in Sarajevo opted to respond with shrill, disingenuous hysteria:
We Are Sorry the OSCE Has Joined General Anti-Islamic Histeria
This is both frustrating--because it is so patently false, a rather severe mischaracterization of the actual text of the original statement designed to muddy the waters of discourse--and dangerous, because the last thing Bosnia needs is any prominent representatives of any of the three main ethnorelgious groups reverting to tactics of outraged victimhood.
Fortunately, the OSCE is sticking to their guns:
DANI Barometer - Religious Classes in Kindergartens
I'm glad to see that the OSCE didn't allow any undue "sensitivity" to distract from the central issue--the introduction of explicitly religious instruction into public schools.
Fortunately,
Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina Should Be Inclusive, Not Exclusive
Anyone familiar with the multi-confessional composition of Bosnian society and of the need to nurture a shared civic culture, regardless of his or her own beliefs or affiliation.
Unfortunately, the The Cabinet of Reisu-l-ulema in Sarajevo opted to respond with shrill, disingenuous hysteria:
We Are Sorry the OSCE Has Joined General Anti-Islamic Histeria
This is both frustrating--because it is so patently false, a rather severe mischaracterization of the actual text of the original statement designed to muddy the waters of discourse--and dangerous, because the last thing Bosnia needs is any prominent representatives of any of the three main ethnorelgious groups reverting to tactics of outraged victimhood.
Fortunately, the OSCE is sticking to their guns:
DANI Barometer - Religious Classes in Kindergartens
I'm glad to see that the OSCE didn't allow any undue "sensitivity" to distract from the central issue--the introduction of explicitly religious instruction into public schools.
Fortunately,
Labels:
Bosnia,
Islam,
Kindergarten,
Religious Instruction,
Sarajevo
Wednesday, January 16, 2008
Islamic Fundamentalism in the Balkans
The latest development in a disturbing story:
Trial of Wahhabi Extremists in Serbia Begins
Before I go on, a disclaimer: I do not believe that most Muslims in southeast Europe are fundamentalists, or radical Islamists, or nascent jihadists. Not even close. Nor do I for a second believe there was any credence to Serb nationalist claims that they were fighting a defensive war against a revived caliphate inside Europe's own borders.
However, the danger from the ongoing presence of even a small group of militant Wahhabi fanatics in the region is greater than simply giving Balkan revisionists and anti-Muslim nationalists some post de facto justifications for the crazed rhetoric and worse of over a decade ago. The specter of radical Islam in the Sandzak and/or Bosnia could not only provide ammunition for Orthodox and Catholic nationalists, but could feed very real--and justifiable--fears among ordinary Christians who might not otherwise engage in or be responsive to nationalist hate-mongering.
And it is worth noting that these bearded thugs are, after all, on trial at least partially because they threatened to kill the mufti in the area. As always, the majority of the victims of Islamist violence are other Muslims. The rise of Wahhabi Islam in the region would only be bad for Slavic Muslims there.
So a thorough and unforgiving crackdown on these religious fanatics on the part of local Muslim authorities wherever they appear would not only send a strong, and comforting, signal to Serb, Croat, Macedonian, and other non-Muslims in the Balkans; it would also be doing their own societies a big favor. Violent religious extremists are simply outside the pale; it does a secular, liberal civil society no favors to attempt to compromise or negotiate with medieval fundamentalists. A fragile and vulnerable civil society like in Bosnia or the Sandzak simply cannot afford to waste too much time learning this lesson the hard way.
And while this story is from the Sandzak, not Bosnia, we should not ignore the stronger communal sense of "Muslimness" which was tempered in the fire of genocide over a decade ago. The ties between the two regions and two populations are not insignificant.
As the years pass, the foolishness and recklessness of the decision to allow foreign jihadists enter the country and fight for Islam during the darkest days of the Bosnian war becomes tragically clearer. It is true that the number of mujahideen and their military importance has been inflated by Serb nationalists and some Balkan revisionists; it is true that they often clashed with native Bosnian Muslims who were too secular and not properly "Islamic" enough to suit their jihadist guests; and it is true that their attempt to take over and remake Bosnian culture essentially failed. However, they managed to establish a small foothold. Now it appears that that small foothold is still holding on.
Bosnia's Muslims paid a dear price in their valiant struggle to preserve a secular, liberal, cosmopolitan democracy against a vicious assault by ethnoreligious fundamentalist fanatics. How cruelly ironic it would for their society to be corrupted by a religious fundamentalist movement from within.
Trial of Wahhabi Extremists in Serbia Begins
Before I go on, a disclaimer: I do not believe that most Muslims in southeast Europe are fundamentalists, or radical Islamists, or nascent jihadists. Not even close. Nor do I for a second believe there was any credence to Serb nationalist claims that they were fighting a defensive war against a revived caliphate inside Europe's own borders.
However, the danger from the ongoing presence of even a small group of militant Wahhabi fanatics in the region is greater than simply giving Balkan revisionists and anti-Muslim nationalists some post de facto justifications for the crazed rhetoric and worse of over a decade ago. The specter of radical Islam in the Sandzak and/or Bosnia could not only provide ammunition for Orthodox and Catholic nationalists, but could feed very real--and justifiable--fears among ordinary Christians who might not otherwise engage in or be responsive to nationalist hate-mongering.
And it is worth noting that these bearded thugs are, after all, on trial at least partially because they threatened to kill the mufti in the area. As always, the majority of the victims of Islamist violence are other Muslims. The rise of Wahhabi Islam in the region would only be bad for Slavic Muslims there.
So a thorough and unforgiving crackdown on these religious fanatics on the part of local Muslim authorities wherever they appear would not only send a strong, and comforting, signal to Serb, Croat, Macedonian, and other non-Muslims in the Balkans; it would also be doing their own societies a big favor. Violent religious extremists are simply outside the pale; it does a secular, liberal civil society no favors to attempt to compromise or negotiate with medieval fundamentalists. A fragile and vulnerable civil society like in Bosnia or the Sandzak simply cannot afford to waste too much time learning this lesson the hard way.
And while this story is from the Sandzak, not Bosnia, we should not ignore the stronger communal sense of "Muslimness" which was tempered in the fire of genocide over a decade ago. The ties between the two regions and two populations are not insignificant.
As the years pass, the foolishness and recklessness of the decision to allow foreign jihadists enter the country and fight for Islam during the darkest days of the Bosnian war becomes tragically clearer. It is true that the number of mujahideen and their military importance has been inflated by Serb nationalists and some Balkan revisionists; it is true that they often clashed with native Bosnian Muslims who were too secular and not properly "Islamic" enough to suit their jihadist guests; and it is true that their attempt to take over and remake Bosnian culture essentially failed. However, they managed to establish a small foothold. Now it appears that that small foothold is still holding on.
Bosnia's Muslims paid a dear price in their valiant struggle to preserve a secular, liberal, cosmopolitan democracy against a vicious assault by ethnoreligious fundamentalist fanatics. How cruelly ironic it would for their society to be corrupted by a religious fundamentalist movement from within.
Wednesday, January 02, 2008
"The Bridge Betrayed" by Michael Sells [11]
CHAPTER FOUR: MASKS OF OTHERNESS [continued]
The Serb Church and the Stepanic Syndrome
In Bosnia, the Serb Orthodox Church made the same mistake the Catholic Church made in Croatia during World War II; it became a servant of religious nationalist militancy. In many instances, Christian Serb clergy have supported the extremists who carried out the genocide in Bosnia and have given ritual and symbolic support to the programs of ethnic expulsion and destruction of mosques."This section goes on to verify this strong opening statement for a very depressing and enraging several pages. Any student of the Bosnian war will know that the list of incidents and statement Sells provides--Orthodox clergy making racist claims about the true nature of Muslims, blessing troops after they had committed atrocities, visiting the sites of destroyed mosques, etc.--will be all too aware of similar incidents. Then again, this book was written in 1996; in 2008, no honest person can deny the involvement of the Serb Orthodox Church in Bosnia.
Sells closes this section by noting that Patriarch Pavle waited until very late in the war to speak out against human rights abuses committed by Serb forces, and then only in a very qualified manner, using the all-too-familiar "all sides are guilty" excuse. Sells wonders if this line of reasoning is somewhat based on the Christian notion of original sin, and if so, he posits this question:
"...if everyone is guilty, is anyone really guilty of anything specific? If everyone is guilty, is anything done to any person that is undeserved? Generalized guilt allows a convenient avoidance of the stubborn fact that in genocide, innocents suffer and their suffering is inflicted upon them deliberately."
Only Unity Saves the Serbs
Sells notes the revival of the symbol of the Orthodox cross with the four Cyrillic 'S's ('C') representing the slogan "Samo sloga Srbina spasava"; "revival" in the sense that the symbol became used more prominently and much more frequently than it had for many, many years. Sells notes that it was"...natural for a former communist official, raised in the personality cult surrounding Marshal Tito, to move easily into another kind of personality cult."
Milosevic presented himself as the spokesman of Serb "unity"; in Serbian ultranationalism, "unity" means for one ethnic group to remain apart from and opposed to neighboring national groups, all of whom are out to get the Serbs. Rather than appealing to what is noble and expansive and welcoming in Serb culture, this slogan appeals to paranoia, fear, and hostility.
Sells rightly notes that while Milosevic later abandoned nationalist and ethnoreligious iconography and rhetoric, it most certainly does not follow that he had not tapped into genuine religious sentiments before. What follows is a short discussion of the nature of religiosity in the context of this book and ethnoreligious nationalism; as well as the varieties of modern fundamentalism and a consideration of how Serb and Croat nationalism would fit within any possible definition of fundamentalism.
Some of the "explicitly religious ideology of the violence", as he puts it, is detailed; including some of the songs Muslim prisoners were forced to sing. Sells concludes by soberly noting that we Americans--with our history of "ethnic cleansing" against American Indians, living in a country where much of the wealth was originally generated with slave labor, are in no position to claim moral superiority to Bosnian Serbs. I would like to believe that this qualification is unnecessary--it is the ideology hostile nationalism and the specific perpetrators of war crimes and genocide we are concerned with, not an entire people or a culture. Sells wants to close his chapter by returning to the example he began with--the Oklahoma City bombing by Christian white supremists. Bosnia, he implies, is what happens when civil order breaks down and the forces of tolerance, secularism, and reason are swept away by violent sectarianism, religious fanaticism, and irrationality.
Friday, November 09, 2007
"Balkan Idols" by Vjekoslav Perica [21]
CHAPTER TEN: RELIGION AS A HALLMARK OF NATIONHOOD [continued]
The Politics of Saint-Making
The Croatian Catholic Church never gave up on the campaign to legitimize and elevate Cardinal Stepinac. This section details various political moves made by members of the hierarchy to reinvent the Cardinal as a hero of the anti-fascist (and anti-Holocaust) cause. The Church attempted to reach out to Jews by simultaneously canonizing Edith Stein, a nun of Jewish descent who died at Auschwitz. However, the request to have Stepinac made a "righteous Gentile" was rejected.In the meantime, the Serbian Church, in 1998, announced the canonization of new saints in response to the Stepanic campaign; these saints were from the World War II era and represented an effort to counter the Croat myth of Stepanic with a Serb myth of Jasenovac. The Tito-era of Brotherhood and Unity was recast by both churches as a historical aberration.
Religious Organizations and the International Peace Process
This section essentially documents one phenomena--attempts by religious leaders to play peacemakers and act as conciliatory actors in response to western pressure, especially peace activism by western (oftentimes Protestant) religious groups. A great deal of noise was made, and many leading clerics from all three of the main national churches said many of the "right" things. Yet, Perica concludes pessimistically that little came of such dialogue, and little should be expected in the immediate future. These proclamations were long on abstractions and short on concrete proposals. Lots of sweeping calls for "peace in the Balkans" without the specific language needed to promote such a peace.Perica does note that many individual cleric from all three churches took early, principled stands against nationalist rhetoric and against the war itself; later, many others made sincere efforts towards reconciliation and ecumenical dialogue. However, they generally did so as individuals. The national churches as institutions, and groups within those churches (as well as the leaders of each church) either remained silent at best, or either actively supported nationalist politics or helped encourage fear and intolerance.
Perica concludes this chapter with the gloomy quote (from Sarajevo author Ivan Lovrenovic):
"The 1992-1995 Bosnian war may not have been a religious war. But the next one will be for sure."
Labels:
"Balkan Idols",
Bosnia,
Catholic Church,
Catholicism,
Croatia,
Islam,
Muslim,
Orthodoxy,
Perica,
Serbia
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
"Balkan Idols" by Vjekoslav Perica [19]
CHAPTER TEN: RELIGION AS HALLMARK OF NATIONHOOD
The war in Bosnia not only took the lives of many people (mostly civilians) and left many more injured and approximately half the population displaced; it was also characterized by the destruction of religious buildings. The destruction was rather one-sided--over 1,000 mosques were destroyed, while nearly 200 Catholic churches and 28 Orthodox churches were also destroyed.
As Perica notes, religious institutions played an important role in fueling the ethnic conflicts which tore Yugoslavia apart:
"The three largest religious organizations, as impartial foreign and domestic analysts have agreed, were among the principal engineers of the crisis and conflict. Western analysts noticed religious insignia on the battlefield, prayers before the combat and during battles, religious salutes, clergy in uniforms and under arms; elite combat units labeled "the Muslim Army" or "Orthodox Army" accompanied by clergy; massive destruction of places of worship; forms of torture such as carving religious insignia into human flesh; and so on."
These obvious manifestations of religious influence only serve to illustrate the underlying reality--that the national churches bore a great deal of responsibility for defining and amplifying the fears which fueled the violence. Perica points out that Serb nationalists acknowledged that they struck first in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, but that they justified their actions as being proactive and defensive in nature, since they were reacting to the perceived threat of genocide at the hands of the "enemy nations" they lived among. And those threats were, by and large, articulated and justified by the Serbian Church. The same church that drew parallels between the fate of the Serbs and the Jews, between Kosovo and Jerusalem, and between Auschwitz and Jasenovac.
At the end of this short section, Perica adds that the Croats and the Muslim national churches also developed martyr-nation myths of their own.
Religion and Nationalism in the Successor States
Perica notes that:"In all the successor states of the former Yugoslavia except perhaps in Slovenia, religion became the hallmark of nationhood."
He illustrates this point in the next few sections, which I will summarize in my next post.
Labels:
Bosnia,
Catholic Church,
Catholicism,
Civil Religion,
Croatia,
Islam,
Muslim,
Orthodoxy,
Perica,
Religion,
Religious Institutions,
Serbia,
Yugoslavia
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
"Balkan Idols" by Vjekoslav Perica [17]
CHAPTER NINE: THE SECOND STRIFE [continued]
The War of the Churches
Relations between the Catholic and Orthodox churches by the late 1980s were at a level of mutual distrust and animosity reminiscent of the 1930s. Growing tensions in Kosovo and the rise of the Macedonian Church exacerbated the animosity between the Serb Church and the other two main national churches, as Serb religious leaders erroneously attributed Albanian separatism to Islamic fundamentalism, while the Vatican came out in support of autonomy for Kosovo while it also recognized and maintained ties with the Macedonian church.The Churches and the World War II Controversy
The death of Tito provided the opportunity to openly and vigorously questions the dogmatic version of history that underscored the civic religion of Brotherhood and Unity. The most prominent manifestation of this was the "new Serbian history," which refuted the notion that the Ustashe movement was an aberration in Croatian history imposed by outsiders. These historians believed that the NDH government was "above all a very efficient instrument of genocide against Serbs, conceived in Croatia several centuries before the genocide took place." Croats were portrayed as implacably hostile to Serbs, and that any independent Croatia would automatically be a threat to Serbs within its borders.Croat historians countered with their own version in which the genocidal nature of Ustashe crimes were downplayed and explained as reactions to Serb pressures. Tudjman, the preeminent historian of this school, also defended the role of the Catholic church during the war. The competing commemorations and other events of the 1980s can be seen as attempts by the Catholic and Orthodox churches of propagating these respective revisionist myths.
Forgive but Not Forget: Liturgy in the Concentration Camp
After Titos death, the Serb church attempted to lay claim to the legacy of Jasenovac, which under Tito had been interpreted as a memorial to the multiethnic Partisan struggle against fascism. The Serb church reinvented Jasenovac as one of the two centers of Serb spiritual life, the other being Kosovo--both were sites of martyrdom and victimization at the hands of hostile neighboring peoples.In mass ceremonies at Jasenovac, the parallel between Serbs and Jews was explicitly laid out, with Kosovo as the Serb Jerusalem and Jasenovac as their Auschwitz. The Serb version of events vastly exaggerated the number of Serbs killed at Jasenovac while omitting any mention of the many non-Serbs (including many anti-Ustashe Croats) who also died there, with the exception of Jews, with whom the Serbs claimed an affinity.
As these events at Jasenovac became yearly events, the Serb church expanded its campaign to rewrite history and began holding other commemorations to the victims of the "Serb genocide" at sites of Partisan military heroism and loss--the church was eliminating the complex reality of World War II and replacing it with a new myth in which the Serbs had been systematically hounded by enemies; and those enemies were all the other peoples of Yugoslavia.
A Battle of Myths: The Yugoslav Auschwitz versus the Martyr Cardinal
The battle of the numbers of Serbs killed at Jasenovac and in the war in total continued to wage, with Croat historians putting the numbers very low and Serb nationalists putting the numbers impossibly high. Serbs sought to win over the opinion of Yugoslavia's small Jewish community, which required the history of Nedic's wartime quisling Serbia to be completely ignored and forgotten.Some Yugoslav Jews took the bait, and did their part to help promote the Serb nationalist version of events. Meanwhile, "Archimandrite Jevtic accused Croat Catholic clergy and the Vatican of inciting a genocide against the Serbian people." Other Serb scholars and clerics echoed the belief that the Vatican either directed the genocide or had the power to stop it had it chosen to.
In response, the Croat Catholic church stepped up its defense of Cardinal Stepanic, arguing that he had actually opposed Ustashe atrocities and had saved many Serbs and Jews from death. This defense angered the Serb church, who believed that he had been made a saint because he was involved in genocide.
Disputes over Holy Places
Serb clergy laid claim to the ruins of churches and other religious buildings which had laid dormant for decades, and in some cases centuries. Services were held at various ruins in ethnically mixed areas, based on dubious or often unproven claims that this church or that monastery were "really" Orthodox. Doing so was a way of laying claim to an area both spiritually and historically, by way of showing that a given area has historically Serb.Many of the massacres and other acts of violence against Croats in Croatia at the beginning of the war happened in towns and villages where such commemorations had been held and claims had been made. And one of the first acts in newly "liberated" areas was the destruction of Catholic churches.
Similar confrontations were organized by Serbian nationalists--including Vojislav Seselj and his Radical party--at contested holy sites in Macedonia and Montenegro.
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In the interests of keeping this post at a manageable length, I will conclude my review of Chapter 9 next time.
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Monday, October 01, 2007
"Balkan Idols" by Vjekoslav Perica [10]
CHAPTER FIVE: THE BOSNIAN ULEMA AND MUSLIM NATIONALISM
For most of the Communist era, the leadership of the Islamic Community consisted of veterans of the WWII Partisans and were loyal to the regime and supportive of the official creed of Brotherhood and Unity.
During the sixties and seventies, challenges to traditional identification came from two sources--the government itself, which established a new Muslim national identity; and from a reinvigorated if still illegal Young Muslim, led by prominent Muslim dissident Alija Izetbegovic.
A Nationality with a Religious Name
When the Central Committee of the League of Commnunists of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared that Muslims be given national status by the Federal government, the response was immediate--many Muslims quickly adopted the new designation. But there were complications. Some traditionalists worried that the religious identification, which was not traditional, was premature and that Muslims needed more time to develop a separate cultural identity and history. The Young Muslims, on the other hand, insisted that the identification should be more, not less, explicitly religious. Izetbegovic was the leader of this push to "Islamicize" Slavic Muslims in Yugoslavia. This was the period when Izetbegovic produced the later infamous "Islamic Declaration," which provided much (decontextualized) ammunition for Serb nationalist intent on proving the existence of jihadists in Sarajevo.For its part, the Islamic Community--which had been known as the Islamic Religious Community, dropped the word "Religious" from the organizations title in an effort to emphasize the culturally secular aspects of the new national identity. Perica writes:
"Under the new name, the Islamic Community aspired to become a de facto Muslim national institution that would compensate for the lack of what were national academies of sciences and arts and cultural umbrella organizations (maticas) in Serbia and Croatia."
Rebuilding and Expansion
The communist years were good to the Islamic Community. Funds were allocated for rebuilding neglected or damaged religious buildings. Hundreds of new mosques and other religious institutions were constructed in the 1970s.This was possible because the Islamic Community remained supportive of the regime and, unlike the two main national churches, did not pose a threat to the multiethnic nature of Yugoslavia. While the regime continued to keep an eye on proselytizing activities and demonstrated concern when religious figures sought out explicit identification with other Muslim countries (such as revolutionary Iran), it also allowed clerics a great deal of freedom.
Unlike the main Christian denominations, the Islamic Community was pan-Yugoslav rather than being identified with a single republic. It was also decentralized, and the reis-ul-ulema lacked absolute authority. The mainly Albanian Sufi sect broke away from the Islamic Community, but this independent organization was also loyal to the regime.
While the regime was, on the whole, comfortable with these developments, they were viewed with suspicion and alarm by the Serbian press. The construction of Europe's third-largest mosque in Zagreb was criticized for being oversized in relation to its need and symptomatic of belligerent nationalism; these reports being published even as the Serb Orthodox Church was building an equally grand new church in Belgrade, and civic authorities there were blocking the construction of a mosque for Belgrade's Muslims.
Religious Nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina
The Islamic Revolution in Iran and the death of Tito triggered a revival of efforts by Izetbegovic and his allies. The resulting crackdown by Bosnian authorities ultimately backfired, harming the governments relations with other countries while fueling the rise of Muslim nationalism. Izetbegovic and others were released with reduced sentences, but the state found that the Islamic Community had lost credibility by standing with the government. At the same time, Izetbegovic had gained popularity, including among the clergy.The Islamic Community attempted many reforms, and even allowed for its first democratically elected reis-ul-ulema, Jakub Selimoski. At the same time, Serb politicians were raising the heat under the issue, using the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to incite fears of growing Muslim nationalism. The Serb press portrayed Selimoski--a moderate who worked hard to counter the influence of Izetbegovic--as a fundamentalist working to establish an Islamic dictatorship similar to Iran.
The Islamic Community also increasingly turned to public displays of religiosity to rival those of the Croat and Serb churches; these explicitly religious events, in reaction to the climate of aggressive nationalism being promoted by Serbs, Croats and Albanians, increasingly took on a nationalist aspect.
Efforts by the Islamic Community to moderate tensions were complicated because not only was it facing a challenge from Izetbegovic, there were growing anti-Muslim sentiments coming from Serbia. Izetbegovic secretly founded the Muslim Patriotic League, an underground militia; around the same time, he also founded the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which was an explicitly Muslim party. Izetbegovic cleverly positioned himself a mediator between the secular Muslims and his own party's fundamentalist wing.
The SDA's policies had a strongly religious tone from the beginning. Its appeal was largely rural, so the party was reliant on clerics to organize mobilization at the local level. Ultimately, the SDA would depose the moderate Selimoski and bring the Islamic Community under its wing. The Islamic Community was becoming another "national church."
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Saturday, February 03, 2007
"Fools' Crusade" Chapter Three [32]
CHAPTER THREE: COMPARATIVE NATIONALISMS
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE INTERVENTION
With the finish line in sight, Johnstone decides to spend the final three pages of Chapter Three going for broke. For some reason, even though this section is in part 3, ostensibly a discussion of Croatian nationalism, we're no longer talking about Croatian nationalism, or Croats, or nationalism. Johnstone has chosen to end this chapter with the previously discussed Islamic menace that Bosnia allegedly represented. This is standard Serb nationalist propaganda from the war. Johnstone puts a novel twist on it, however, arguing that US support for Muslim support for Bosnia was designed to legitimize US support for Israel.
Well, when you think about it, isn't it crystal clear?
She also manages to throw Hitler into the mix--US support for the Bosnian Muslims was a way of demonstrating US sympathy for Muslims to oil-rich Muslim countries just like Hitler during WWII:
"In 1942, Hitler sought to extend the power of the Third Reich eastward to the oilfields of Baku and the Middle East by exploiting Arab Muslim resentment of British imperialism in the Middle East, which had favored Jewish settlement in Palestine. The Bosnian Muslims appeared to be a useful pawn in the game of gaining Muslim support for Hitler's war aims. In 1992, U.S. support to the Bosnian Muslims helped solidify Washington's geostrategic alliance with rich oil-producing Muslim states."
If you ever read any of Johnstone's writings on Srebrenica, take note of how scornful she is of parallels between the genocide there and the Holocaust. She never tires of lecturing Westerners about lazy comparisons and knee-jerk references to Hitler and the Holocaust when discussing Bosnia. Remember the above-quoted passage, if you ever do come across such a statement. The hypocrisy is blatant, and shameless.
And so she is off, protesting blatant violations of the arms embargo by wealthy Muslim states as they armed their co-religionists clandestinely while oil-whore Americans pretended not to notice. She gives no numbers, of course, nor does she mention that smuggled small arms and a few hundred (or even a few thousand) mujahideen could never fully address the military imbalance that a landlocked rebublic building a military from scratch while surrounded by hostile or at least mercenary nations, one of which had inherited the heavy weapons, supplies, and infrastructure of the fourth-largest army in Europe.
It scarcely matters. She gives one example of rich Saudis voicing support for Bosnia's Muslims by nixing a deal to buy aircraft from a French company. And the Saudis provided financial support for Bosnia, she points out. This is neither surprising nor interesting; the Saudis have lots of money, and nobody should be surprised that they took the opportunity to proselytize and lobby for greater influence in a Muslim community previously not very open to Wahhabi fundamentalism. Building mosques and sending money certainly indicates an attempt to broker influence; Johnstone fails to address the short-term or long-term effects of Saudi support. But, as I said in the previous post, she is not presenting an argument, but rather a vague implication fueled by thinly veiled bigotry.
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And so Chapter Three sputters to a halt, after an obligatory dig at the US government for allowing the war to go on for four years solely so an eventual partition of the country to its liking could be imposed. The implication being that the US didn't allow the partition by "local leaders" in 1992 solely because the balance of power wasn't to Washington's liking. Also, this allowed the creation of a non-sovereign state run by international organizations, the IMF as well as the OSCE. This, apparently, was the US plan all along.
Why the US would want to have control over relatively poor Bosnia is a question she doesn't address. Her elaborate theories about the destruction of sovereignty in the name of globalization only sound plausible if one ignores that fundamental question--why would Washington desire such a situation? Twin paranoias are at work here; not only has Johnstone sold herself on the messianic martyr complex of hardline Serb nationalism, she demonstrates again that she meant what she said way back at the beginning of this book. Western involvement in the Balkans was a cleverly calculated tactic, intended to be a vanguard of a larger strategy of neoliberal globalization, the subjugation of small states to Western-dominated international organizations.
Yes, dear reader--all that stumbling and prevaricating by Western powers in Bosnia during those terrible four years were just a front. Behind the scenes, Washington had it all figured out.
And that bizarro conspiracy scenario is the note on which Johnstone chooses to end this tedious, unfocused chapter.
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