I've been so remiss in keeping this blog up (I'm an avid soccer fan, but haven't even posted about Bosnia's first-ever trip to the World Cup next summer!) that I haven't been posting Peter Lippman's travel journal entries as he sends them out. His latest series, recounting his most recent trip to the region, is up to entry #8. Given that he started sending these out in September, rather than reposting all eight of them now I'm just going to share the link for them at the great Balkan Witness blog:
Peter Lippman: Reports from Kosovo and Bosnia
Thanks as alwasy to Peter for sharing these; I strongly encourage anyone reading this to go to the link above and read all of Peter's excellent reports.
Showing posts with label Kosovo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kosovo. Show all posts
Thursday, November 21, 2013
Saturday, January 12, 2013
Peter Lippman Bosnia Travel Journal: Entry # 12
Hello folks,
In mid-November, while in Kosovo, I had the chance to meet with Džafer Buzoli, local activist for the rights of the Roma of Kosovo. It happened that I was on my way to Germany to speak for the Society for Threatened Peoples (see http://www.gfbv.de/index.php?change_lang=english). Since I was stopping in Kosovo, the Society recommended that I meet with Džafer, who represents that organization in Kosovo. There, he monitors conditions for the beleaguered Roma population, most of which was displaced during and after the 1998-99 war.
It was good to meet Džafer and talk to him, and I will share his thoughts here. Our meeting inspired me to compile this report, starting with some background about the Roma in Europe, as follows: some general history; what happened in Kosovo in the late 1990s and the expulsion of the Roma from there; the treatment of displaced Roma; and conditions for the Roma back in Kosovo today.
BACKGROUND: RACISM
Where human rights and standard of living are concerned, the Roma are at or near the bottom of society in every country where they reside in Europe. Discrimination against the Roma populations and the forced migration of their communities have been as common in the last couple of decades as they ever were. Compounding these injuries is the widespread racism against Roma, something I would compare to the racism against African Americans, Native Americans, and Latinos that exists in the United States. That is, that racism is both an attitude and a systemic problem.
The image of the Roma, so often tied up with the word "Gypsy," is something that is romanticized and trivialized. If the essence of racism as an attitude is to generalize a given population as less human than oneself, then evoking the Roma as "wanderers," "exotic," and a host of other insulting categories is just as racist a practice as any other.
Šani Rifati, Kosovo Rom and activist leader of the organization Voice of Roma, says it better:
"I won't play you a sad song on my violin. I do not have a bandana. I do not have a golden tooth. I do not have long hair or a golden hoop in my ear. I am just trying to speak up for my people:
to tell you about their suffering and the persecution they've endured throughout the centuries
to ask you to fight against ignorance, prejudice and stereotypes
Simply put, as a place to start: please call me Rom."
(See http://www.voiceofroma.com/ and http://www.facebook.com/pages/Voice-of-Roma/7291211537?ref=hl.)
So, for starters, I propose that we recognize that the word "Gypsy" is an insensitive word, and that we avoid it - or if it must be used, that we put it in quotation marks. I also suggest that we let people who name their stores, bands, or other outfits using the word "Gypsy" know that they are employing a denigrating term that calls up a caricature of a people who have just the same hopes, needs, and ambitions as everyone else.
Here's more on this from Šani: "The first basic step in separating myths and stereotypes from facts and authenticity is in the use of our terminology. Rom means a human being, person or man in the Romani language. The Roma do not call themselves Gypsies. Historically, the term 'Gypsy' came from the mistaken assumption on the part of Anglo-Europeans that Roma originated in Egypt. In fact, the Roma are a distinct ethnic minority, distinguished at least by Rom blood and the Romani, or Romanes, language, whose origins began in the Punjab region of India. Their migration began in the 2nd century, when they traveled through the Persian Gulf, Egypt, and Turkey, eventually spreading all over Europe. While Roma are Europe's largest ethnic minority, they remain the least integrated and the most persecuted people of Europe today. .Using the word "Gypsy" is not only inaccurate but perpetuates the continuation of stereotypes that portray Roma as beggars, swindlers, and thieves."
(http://www.voiceofroma.com/culture/gyp_vs_rom.shtml)
In any discussion of the Roma, a number of different names of Romani communities come up: Sinti, Ashkali, "Egyptians," and many more. Some of these names came from the outside, either as a result of political manipulation or ignorance. Others arose organically over the generations because they are what people call themselves. Some Roma do not call themselves Roma, but are looked upon as such by outsiders. Some Western bureaucrats and other outside commentators have referred to the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians of Kosovo as "RAE." While hoping to be fair, I will stick with the name "Roma."
It should be noted that, contrary to the stereotype, the vast majority of European Roma have lived in settled communities for many generations. And there are communities of Roma who have for the most part ceased speaking the Romani language, but they still hold to Romani traditions. There are others who have partially assimilated - for example, some Roma in Kosovo have gravitated towards an Albanian identity.
SOME HISTORY
Any discussion of Roma history in Europe should note that the biggest disaster in that history was the World War II Holocaust, in which the Jews were not the only victims. This history, as so much with the Roma, is usually forgotten. Genocide was committed against the Roma as well; Roma communities throughout the lands occupied by the Nazis were forced into ghettoes, and many of these people were sent to concentration camps or simply murdered where they had lived. Others were subjected to long imprisonment. It is difficult to cite accurate figures, but one report holds that of Europe's pre-war Roma population of one million, approximately twenty percent, or around 220,000, perished. (See http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005219.)
Since World War II Roma have struggled to integrate themselves into the economies of the countries in which they live, while proudly upholding their traditional cultures. This has been an uphill battle. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, an estimated 50,000 Roma live at the margins; in any given municipality it is common to hear that perhaps one percent of the Roma population holds a steady job. Bosnians do not generally openly admit racism towards the Roma, but neither do they bother to hide it. Once, in 2000, I had been in contact with a Romani organization in Sarajevo, and I mentioned their struggle to improve their conditions to a human rights activist in a completely different field, off in central Bosnia. He commented to me, "You know, they don't really even care whether they have toilets in their homes."
The situation is worse in central Europe, in such places as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, where the Romani population is much larger. In those countries discrimination is at times organized, and there are periodic incidents of violence against the Roma. Just last August a thousand neo-Nazis descended upon a mixed Romani and Hungarian village in western Hungary, shouting at Romani inhabitants, "You are going to die here." (http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/08/hungarian-anti-roma-marches) In the same country, in the northern village of Rimóc, it was determined last month that nearly all of the people who were being fined for bicycling infractions were Roma. (See "Fined for being Roma."http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/fined-being-roma-while-cycling)
A particularly notorious violation of Roma rights took place in France in 2010, when President Sarkozy ordered Roma from Bulgaria and Romania - that is, fellow EU citizens - to leave the country. Repeated police raids on Roma communities resulted in the eviction and expulsion of nearly fifteen thousand Roma from France in 2010 and 2011. Sarkozy's law permitted French authorities to expel people from the country if they were suspected of immigration simply for the purpose of "benefiting from the social assistance system" (See http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/29/france-one-year-new-abuses-against-roma.) Last year, after Sarkozy was replaced, the French government took steps to ameliorate the abuses against the Roma, but much damage had been done.
While human rights abuses against the Roma occur on a wide scale in various parts of Europe, the EU itself has taken a stance in favor of the rights of the Roma, and has attempted to promote more favorable policies. An article by the Roma Education Fund reports that the European Commission is working to help with integration of the Roma thus: "The social and economic inclusion of Roma is a priority for the EU and needs the commitment and joint efforts of national and local authorities, civil society and EU institutions. The European Commission is committed to taking the necessary steps to improve the situation of Roma people and their social and economic integration in society. On 7 April 2010 the Commission adopted a Communication on the social and economic integration of Roma in Europe (IP/10/407; MEMO/10/121) - the first ever policy document dedicated specifically to Roma. It outlines an ambitious programme to help making policies for Roma inclusion more effective and defines the main challenges ahead."
This same article notes, "There are between 10 million and 12 million Roma in the EU, in candidate countries and potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans. Roma people living in the European Union are EU citizens and have the same rights as any other EU citizen. A significant number of Roma live in extreme marginalisation in both rural and urban areas and in very poor social-economic conditions. They are disproportionally affected by discrimination, violence, unemployment, poverty, bad housing and poor health standards." (Seehttp://www.romaeducationfund.hu/frequently-asked-questions-european-roma-population)
In early 2005, eight European governments (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and the Slovak Republic) launched the "Decade of Roma Inclusion," in a bid to promote national action plans that would help end discrimination against the Roma populations in their respective countries. However, in the same period, evictions of Roma were ongoing in the UK, Lithuania, Albania, Greece, Ireland, Kosovo, and Italy. (See "Roma Evictions Erupt Across Europe." http://advocacynet.org/resource/759.)
KOSOVO
Over the last century Kosovo has been marked by periodic conflict between the (erstwhile) Serbian regime and the majority Albanian population, with Serbia holding the upper hand until the regime's defeat and expulsion at the hands of NATO in 1999.
And as in the rest of Europe, over the decades the Roma in Kosovo were at the bottom of society, subject to discrimination from both directions. Many Roma adopted the Albanian language and gravitated towards the Albanian culture, sometimes taking on Albanian surnames. To some extent the fact that in this region the two populations shared a common religion, Islam, facilitated this assimilation.
In the 1990s, under the increasingly harsh Milošević regime, many Roma tended to identify with the Albanians in their struggle for independence. However, to their great misfortune during and after the 1998-99 war, Roma were caught between two parties in a fight that was not really theirs. Romani men were sometimes abused, and sometimes drafted to fight, both by the Serbian side and by the Kosovar Albanian side. It happened that relatives even found themselves looking through their gun sights at each other.
In 1998 and during the 78-day NATO intervention in the spring of 1999, as many as 800,000 Albanians were driven out of Kosovo. In an attempt to rid Kosovo - then a province of Serbia - of a large proportion of the Albanian population, Serbian forces destroyed hundreds of their villages, and killed at least 10,000 Albanians.
It was the disaster of the Kosovo Roma community that its members were caught in an impossible position, not only during the war, but afterwards as well. Immediately upon the end of the NATO intervention, hundreds of thousands of Albanians came streaming back from exile to their (often destroyed) homes. For the first time since Serbia took over the province upon the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, Albanians had relative freedom and self-determination in Kosovo, and they were bound to use that self-determination to set up a new state that was free of Serbian domination. Unfortunately, there were Albanians who wished to take revenge for their brush with genocide, and these people were not particular about their targets. Those Serbs, Roma, and other minorities who did not flee Kosovo immediately were at risk.
Revenge attacks by Albanians were widespread. It is hard for me to know whether the attacks that occurred were the result of a policy by Albanian leaders, or simply the actions of criminals who had no regard for law, order, or the rights of the minorities. It was my impression at the time that the latter was the case - that a criminal element took advantage of the chaos to make profit. I personally witnessed Albanian gangsters taking over apartments owned by non-Albanians in order to rent or sell them. I heard that they were even taking over apartments owned by Albanians who had not yet returned. As possible motivations, presumably a mixture of revenge and profiteering played into the attacks on the Roma.
I personally found a near-unanimous belief among Albanians that Roma had collaborated with Serbian forces during the war. This belief apparently contributed to the subsequent mistreatment of the Roma. On the other hand, I believe - based on what I saw and heard - that, while Albanians may have held enduring prejudices against the Roma, most Albanians, having survived a brutal war, just wanted to move ahead peacefully and get on with their lives.
In 2010 Human Rights Watch reported, "The armed confrontation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) with Yugoslav government forces and Serbian police and paramilitary units, the subsequent NATO bombing and mass expulsion of ethnic Albanians by Yugoslav and Serb forces, and the wave of retaliatory ethnic violence by Albanians at the start of international rule in Kosovo in 1999, resulted in large numbers of RAE [Roma, Ashkali, and "Egyptians"] fleeing and being forcibly expelled from Kosovo. Many fled to elsewhere in the Balkans, mostly to Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Others went to Western Europe, while some were displaced within Kosovo. [.]Roma have historically been perceived by some Albanians as 'Serb collaborators,' and were targets of retaliatory violence in the aftermath of the war.
"[.] According to UNHCR estimates, in 2010 around 22,000 RAE displaced persons remain in Serbia, around 4,000 in Montenegro, around 1,700 in Macedonia, and around 130 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are no reliable estimates for the number of RAE from Kosovo living in Western Europe, or for the numbers of RAE displaced inside Kosovo." (See "Rights Displaced - Forced Returns of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians from Western Europe to Kosovo." Human Rights Watch 2010,http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/10/28/rights-displaced-0.)
I was in Kosovo at the beginning of the war in the spring of 1998, and I returned immediately upon the end of the NATO intervention in July of 1999. Here is an excerpt from a report that I wrote at that time:
I went to a collective center for displaced Roma at Kosovo Polje, on the outskirts of Prishtina. Approximately 8,000 Roma moved into a high school in this town in late June when they left Prishtina and other nearby localities under pressure from returning Albanians. The Roma were about to be moved from the school to a nearby tent camp set up by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Some UNHCR moving vans and some KFOR soldiers were placed at the entrance. There were around two hundred Roma sitting outside the school building, with piles of bedding, cradles, and other belongings waiting to be loaded. The women and children had already left.
As I walked onto the school grounds, a Romani man was telling a KFOR soldier that two Albanian youths had just come up behind a fence and thrown rocks at the school windows. The KFOR soldier promised to look for them. I took the opportunity to introduce myself to the Roma and ask for an interview. We took two chairs and sat against a wall, and immediately there were a dozen curious Roma gathered around to participate in the interview. Two men explained to me why they and their families had left Prishtina:
"We came to Kosovo Polje because Albanians started threatening us as soon as they came back from Macedonia. They were entering our houses, stealing from us, and beating us. Their goal is the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, nothing else. We were driven out of our houses. We arrived in Kosovo Polje on foot in columns, on June 20th. Along the way we were mistreated and stoned by Albanians. Then people arrived from all over this part of Kosovo. There were around 8,000 people. Now about half of those have left for Macedonia, Montenegro, or countries in Europe."
One man described his experiences in Prishtina during the NATO bombing. He said, "We weren't able to go outside during the bombing. It was a big problem for those of us whose main language is Albanian. The Serbian police would ask us, 'What are you?' I would say, 'I'm a Rom, and my mother tongue is Albanian.' Then the police would say, 'No, you are Albanian, and you must have a green card' (identification card for Albanians). They treated us like Albanians.
"This conflict is between the Serbs and the Albanians," continued another man. "We are in the middle, the victims of both sides. The KLA has kidnapped Roma after the return of the Albanian refugees. Now we are moving to a new camp. There is dust there, and it is unhealthy for the children. We have told the UNHCR that we feel there is no future for us in Kosovo, and that we want to leave for a third country. We have received no answer from them about this. We are to live in the new camp for four weeks. What will happen after that, I don't know. Others will decide that."
I was asked for whom I was writing. One man said to me, "Many people have come and written different things from what they actually saw. They wrote that we were thieves. Deutsche Welle said in a broadcast that we are used to this kind of life. That's not true. We are used to living in houses. You should see the houses we used to live in, where we came from." (end of excerpt)
Local Albanians, in my conversations with them at this time, were nearly unanimous in their accusations of Roma involvement in various crimes. I would not be able to sort that out here, but it is clear that at this point, during and after the war, the Roma of Kosovo were in a dire position. Thousands of Roma left Kosovo along with the fleeing Serbs; in some cases they fled under attack. In Prishtina, I personally witnessed the burning of houses owned by Roma. There were reports of the abduction and murder of Roma in this period.
TOXIC DP CAMPS
As the international protectorate was established, several camps for displaced persons were set up to receive those Roma who had not left Kosovo. A large number of Roma found themselves in four camps near Mitrovica in the north of Kosovo. They were out of the frying pan, but into the fire; these camps were terribly polluted by contamination from a former lead smelter. Tests in 2005 revealed that residents of the camps were subject to lead concentration levels upwards of twenty times the recommended tolerance, and for some children, exposure was far higher. (See "Kosovo: The last lead contaminated refugee camp was closed," http://www.gfbv.de/pressemit.php?id=3336.)
People in the camps were dying from lead poisoning, according to a report by Paul Polansky for the Society for Threatened Peoples (see link below). Women were suffering spontaneous abortions. The report states, "Despite repeated appeals to help the Gypsies [sic], especially those living in the three camps in the area of north Mitrovica, the UN did just the opposite. All food aid was suspended in 2002 saying it was time for the Gypsies to find their own supplies. In the Žitkovac camp the running water was cut off for up to six months at a time because the camp administer, Churches Working Together, felt the Gypsies were using too much water. In the end, the Žitkovac Gypsies had to walk four kilometers twice a day to get their drinking water. In all three camps, most of the Gypsies had to go through the local garbage cans to find their food.
"In the summer of 2004, WHO made a special investigation of lead poisoning in the three camps after Jenita Mehmeti, a four-year-old girl, died of lead poisoning. She was not the first. Up to that point 28 people (mainly children and young adults) had died in the three camps, but Jenita was the first one to be treated for lead poisoning before she died. New blood samples taken by WHO showed that many children, the most vulnerable to lead poisoning, had lead levels higher than the WHO analyzer could register." (See "Roma Children Dying of Lead Poisoning," by Paul Polansky,http://www.newkosovareport.com/200811171411/Views-and-Analysis/roma-children-dying-of-lead-poisoning.html.)
The camps were maintained for a decade, with one shut down in 2010, and another only in late 2012. Residents were moved to newly-constructed houses near Mitrovica.
Estimates of the Roma population in Kosovo vary wildly; I have seen figures ranging from 100,000 to 300,000. A more realistic estimate may be somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000. The Human Rights Watch report cited above estimated that the population of Roma remaining in Kosovo by 2010 was approximately 38,000. Meanwhile, compounding the many injuries to what was left of the Roma community in Kosovo, in 2004 widespread riots broke out among the Albanians, who were attacking remnants of the Serbian population, and targeting some Roma as well. More Roma left Kosovo at this time.
KOSOVAR ROMA IN EXILE
At least 100,000 Roma were exiled from Kosovo to the surrounding former republics of Yugoslavia, especially to neighboring Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia; many also ended up in central Europe, especially Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Scandinavia. Their living conditions in those places of refuge were sub-standard. They lacked employment and often ended up living at the poorest margins of the cities, sometimes on or near landfill. Many people lacked basic identification, and as such were not registered as refugees. A 2011 report for the institution of the "Decade of Roma Inclusion" noted that most displaced Romani children did not attend school. Most of the Roma are unemployed; if they have any work, it is off the books. (See "Blindspot: Kosovo Roma and the Decade", by Mensur Haliti, January 2011, at http://www.romadecade.org/files/downloads/General%20Resources/Blindspot-final.pdf.)
Camps where Roma were settled often lacked medical assistance, hygiene, restrooms, and sufficient food supplies. Added to these ills has been the constant threat of eviction of Romani refugees in their "host" countries. Similar to the case of France mentioned above, host governments seem to have made a conscious policy of tormenting the displaced Kosovo Roma by forcing them to uproot regularly. The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center protested evictions of Roma in Montenegro in 2003 and 2004. In 2006 advocates sued the Danish government for requiring whole families of displaced Roma to live in one-room shelters. And between 2009 to 2012, Roma faced repeated evictions from their temporary settlements in Belgrade.
(See http://groups.yahoo.com/group/balkanhr/message/5751, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/balkanhr/message/6678, and http://www.amnestyusa.org/actioncenter/actions/uaa32311.pdf)
Besides the difficult conditions facing Roma refugees wherever they have arrived, another grave problem is the ongoing threat of forced deportation and return to Kosovo. Some tens of thousands of Roma live in Germany, and many only have "tolerated" status. This means that they are not accorded the civil rights of legitimized residents, and can be subject to deportation at any time. Roma have been reluctant to return to Kosovo because of the discrimination and violence mentioned above, and the fact that, most likely, unemployment and poverty await them if they do return.
The compulsive return of Roma to Kosovo against their will has become a widespread practice in several countries in central and northern Europe. The 2010 Human Rights Watch report estimated that between 1999 and 2010, over 50,000 Roma had been deported to Kosovo. It gave a figure of 12,000 holders of the "toleration permit" in Germany.
The same report noted that deported Roma arriving in Kosovo face serious problems of integration. Often their children, born and raised in another country, do not speak a local language. Families arrive without citizenship documentation enabling them to receive social assistance. Husbands or wives arrive without a spouse or separated from their children who have not been deported. It has been difficult for Roma to repossess property that they owned in Kosovo before the war or to reclaim employment that they previously had. Health care has often been unavailable to returnees. Some returning Roma have experienced threats or violence from Albanians, and have left Kosovo a second time.
Given these conditions, international human rights organizations have called upon the governments of Europe to refrain from deporting the displaced Roma, and to afford them decent living conditions. The response to this call so far has been poor, and abusive deportation practices have continued. For example, nighttime raids have been practiced in Germany, pulling Roma out of their homes without warning and sending them to the airport with one-way tickets. This treatment is much harsher than what Bosnian refugees in Germany received in the mid- to late-1990s.
I will leave other details about this distressing situation to Džafer's words below. But for people interested in the problem of deportation, I recommend the film "Uprooted - RAE communities' perspectives on Western Europe's Repatriation Policies,"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFbZx-Qzg2M.)
Not all is hopeless. While the displaced Roma struggle in their host countries or, deported, try to adjust to changed circumstances back home, there are initiatives and organizations trying to help. The Kosovo Foundation for Open Society advocates in the EU for the rights of minorities in Kosovo. RomaReact fights stereotypes about the Roma. The Roma Education Fund promotes education in Romani communities. The Society for Threatened Peoples monitors the state of human rights for the Roma in Kosovo. And Voice of Roma, based in California, works to educate the public about the rights of the Roma, and presents Romani culture and traditions in order to fight stereotypes. See below for some pertinent links.
DŽAFER BUZOLI
Džafer Buzoli lives in Kosovo and works there for the Society for Threatened Peoples. He monitors and reports on the state of human rights for the Roma in Kosovo, and advocates for their improvement. I met with him in mid-November and he brought me up to date on the situation of the Roma.
Džafer told me, "At the end of the NATO intervention, there were some 8,000 Roma who found themselves in the area of Mitrovica. [During and after the war, Mitrovica became a divide city, with the northern part controlled by Serbs, and the southern part controlled by Albanians.] At that time, the UN established four camps for the displaced Roma in lead-polluted areas, in North Mitrovica. There was lead dust in the soil and the water. People lived there for ten years, until 2008 and 2009. Then they were removed to a French NATO base. But it was not clean.
"In ten years, around 90 Roma died from lead poisoning. Now some Roma have returned to the south Mahala [traditional Roma neighborhood in the section of Mitrovica controlled by Kosovo Albanians]. Most of the others fled to Macedonia, Germany, or Switzerland. The Roma in Kosovo are no longer living in the polluted camps, but in that area where they now live, there is still lead dust in the air."
Q: What is the population of Roma in Kosovo?
A: "In the 1991 census it was around 220,000. Now it is around 33,000.
"There is an agreement with the EU, whereby Kosovo is willing to receive all its citizens back. But, unfortunately, this is equivalent to a green light to deport them from their host countries. Roma are being sent back to Kosovo without support. They are being expelled from Germany and other countries."
Q: What obstacles are there to return for the Roma?
A: "It is difficult. If they are coming back from Macedonia, Serbia, or Montenegro, then there is a support package for their return. But if they are coming back from Europe, there is no support. And it is a problem when the children do not know the local language.
"In Germany, in advance of sending Roma back to Kosovo, the German government does not undertake any research, for example, as to whether the people being returned even have a place to live; whether they have a family or other people to receive them; whether there is health coverage for them in Kosovo; and what kind of treatment generally they will receive in Kosovo. Conditions in Kosovo for returning Roma are such that some come back, and then they leave again after two or three weeks.
"In the period after 1999, many Roma left Kosovo and this became a 'role model' for others. So people were selling their houses. Then, if they were returned from Germany or elsewhere, they would find themselves without a place to live. For example, there is a returned family in Shtime near Suha Reka, that is literally without a roof over their heads."
Q: What is the situation for Roma children in school?
A: "There has been a kind of segregation. The Roma children are placed in the back of the classroom. However, now that situation has been improving as a result of the state's educational strategy."
Q: How is the process of return to Mahala South developing?
A: "The way that return management is taking place is not good. People are being returned to apartments where, before, they lived in houses. The people do not like the apartments, even though they are new and decently built. And there were only a few houses built, just a symbolic number.
"We want to make sure that everyone, all the Roma in Germany who are potential targets of deportation, are informed about the possible scheduling of their return. To date, this has not been happening. For example, there was one man who had been in Germany since he was six months old, and he lived there until he was twenty. Then he was deported to Kosovo.
"There is a lawyer working for the displaced Roma in Germany, but he does not have the necessary information about potential deportations. People simply do not have advance notice about their deportations. If they had this, it would help them to avoid bad treatment by the police. There are times when the deportations happen and people are not even allowed to collect their belongings. Recently there was a girl, about sixteen, who arrived in Kosovo with her family. She was still wearing her pajamas, and she was obviously traumatized by an eviction in the middle of the night.
"There is no economic development taking place in Kosovo, and there is little or no work here for the Roma. Some of them collect scraps. It is easier for the people who live in villages (there are mixed villages of Roma/Albanians), where at least they can plant a garden.
"As to our work here, we collaborate in advocacy with the respected people in the local communities. Those respected people are rich, but they are passive. We are working to train the youth to be more active. We have written letters of protest about local conditions, but there has been no response."
Referring to the present international force in Kosovo, Džafer said, "KFOR is now composed of 15,000 troops, and it has been reducing its number. If KFOR were to leave, then many remaining members of the minorities would leave. The ICO [International Civilian Office] has left, and that was the only body that was advocating for the minorities.
"We have to be optimistic - but not too optimistic."
LINKS TO MORE INFORMATION ON ROMA
Amnesty International:
http://www.amnesty.org/ (enter "Roma")
European Roma Rights Centre - International legal advocacy center:
http://www.errc.org/
Human Rights Watch:
http://www.hrw.org/ (enter "Roma")
Kosovo Foundation for Open Society - Prishtina-based minority advocacy organization:
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/offices-foundations/kosovo-foundation-open-society
Rroma Foundation - history, book reviews, links, reports:
www.rroma.org/
RomaReact - Interactive multimedia site for news and advocacy:
http://www.romareact.org/
I strongly recommend the flash mob video at the front of this site!
Roma Education Fund - Hungary-based educational foundation:
http://www.romaeducationfund.hu
Society for Threatened Peoples:
Humanitarian project: http://www.gfbv.de/inhaltsDok.php?id=2337&stayInsideTree=1
Press releases:
--"Germany must ensure detox measures for Roma refugees from camp 'Osterode'"
http://www.gfbv.de/pressemit.php?id=3336
--"[Berlin memorial] must be an initial step to establish a European integration project for Romani peoples
http://www.gfbv.de/pressemit.php?id=3270
--The Society's work in Kosovo:
"Empowering Roma Youth in Kosovo" (Includes footage from Kosovo. In German) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jnuPXRuIsKg
Voice of Roma, California-based advocacy and cultural association: http://www.voiceofroma.com/
Facebook page: http://www.facebook.com/pages/Voice-of-Roma/7291211537?ref=hl
REPORTS:
"Silent Harm," Verena Knaus et al. Silent Harm - A UNICEF-sponsored report assessing the situation of the psycho-social health of children repatriated to Kosovo. In cooperation with the Kosovo Health Foundation, 2012.
http://www.unicef.org/kosovo/SILENT_HARM_Eng_Web.pdf
"Dossier of Evidence: Lead contaminated camps of internally displaced Roma, Ashkali and Kosovan-Egyptian families in North Mitrovica, Kosovo"
Society for Threatened Peoples, July, 2009
http://www.toxicwastekills.com/downloads/Dossier%20of%20Evidence.pdf
Memorandum of the Society for Threatened People: Lead Poisoning of Roma in IDP Camps in Kosovo
http://www.gfbv.de/show_file.php?type=download&property=download&id=14
"Until the Very Last Gipsy Has Fled the Country: The Mass Expulsion of Roma and Ashkali from Kosovo"
Society for Threatened Peoples International
Human Rights Report No. 21 September 1999
http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/STP-Roma.PDF
BOOK
Romani Routes: Cultural Politics and Balkan Music in Diaspora
Oxford University Press, 2012
by Carol Silverman, Professor of Cultural Anthropology and Folklore at the University of Oregon.
"Romani Routes provides a timely and insightful view into Romani communities both in their home countries and in the diaspora."
--Companion site for book: http://www.oup.com/us/companion.websites/9780195300949/
--Article: "University professor shows folklore is more than just fairy tales"
http://dailyemerald.com/2012/06/07/folklore-more-than-just-fairy-tales/
UPDATE ON SREBRENICA AND THE MARCH 1st COALITION
In recent months I have covered the campaign of the "Glasaću za Srebrenicu" organization and its political heir, the March 1st Coalition, introduced in my last report on Bosnia. (Seehttp://balkanwitness.glypx.com/journal2012-10.htm.) In the last few weeks, the Dodik regime in the Republika Srpska has responded aggressively to its delayed defeat in the Srebrenica municipal elections and to the perceived threat of the March 1st Coalition. In Srebrenica, the District Prosecutor (based in Bijeljina) has been hauling activists to the police station for interrogation, and conducting some night-time raids in search of other activists.
The Prosecutor and other RS officials, all the way up to President Dodik, have alleged that the activists had pressured those who voted for Mayor Ćamil Duraković to register their residence in Srebrenica and to vote there; there have been insinuations that the campaign paid people to do so. In the course of all this repression, there has been no mention of the real electoral engineering and malversation, which I witnessed, of people being brought in from Serbia to vote against Duraković, using very flimsy identification papers or none at all.
As part of this campaign of repression, RS inspectors have informed a Srebrenica student association that it will be subject to a tax inspection.Meanwhile, in recent days Dodik and other high RS officials have repeatedly announced that the March 1st Coalition shall not be allowed to do on the scale of the RS what it did in Srebrenica municipality - that is, to assist the displaced former inhabitants of that territory in returning and voting where they please. The right to do these things is guaranteed in Annex 7 of the Dayton Constitution, but Dodik et al, who swear by Dayton, also effectively swear against its full implementation. On top of everything else, Dodik recently accused unspecified "foreign sources" of financing a rebellion meant to destroy the RS.
As I wrote before, the March 1st Coalition is a campaign to watch and to support. For those who read Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian, the Coalition recently opened up its web site:http://www.prvimart.ba/
And while I'm mentioning web sites, see also the web site of Hikmet Karčić's organization, Ćuprija (mentioned in an earlier posting - see http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/journal2012-4.htm). The web site is here: http://www.cuprija.org.ba/ and Ćuprija's Facebook page is here: http://www.facebook.com/udruzenje.cuprija.1?ref=ts&fref=ts
In mid-November, while in Kosovo, I had the chance to meet with Džafer Buzoli, local activist for the rights of the Roma of Kosovo. It happened that I was on my way to Germany to speak for the Society for Threatened Peoples (see http://www.gfbv.de/index.php?change_lang=english). Since I was stopping in Kosovo, the Society recommended that I meet with Džafer, who represents that organization in Kosovo. There, he monitors conditions for the beleaguered Roma population, most of which was displaced during and after the 1998-99 war.
It was good to meet Džafer and talk to him, and I will share his thoughts here. Our meeting inspired me to compile this report, starting with some background about the Roma in Europe, as follows: some general history; what happened in Kosovo in the late 1990s and the expulsion of the Roma from there; the treatment of displaced Roma; and conditions for the Roma back in Kosovo today.
BACKGROUND: RACISM
Where human rights and standard of living are concerned, the Roma are at or near the bottom of society in every country where they reside in Europe. Discrimination against the Roma populations and the forced migration of their communities have been as common in the last couple of decades as they ever were. Compounding these injuries is the widespread racism against Roma, something I would compare to the racism against African Americans, Native Americans, and Latinos that exists in the United States. That is, that racism is both an attitude and a systemic problem.
The image of the Roma, so often tied up with the word "Gypsy," is something that is romanticized and trivialized. If the essence of racism as an attitude is to generalize a given population as less human than oneself, then evoking the Roma as "wanderers," "exotic," and a host of other insulting categories is just as racist a practice as any other.
Šani Rifati, Kosovo Rom and activist leader of the organization Voice of Roma, says it better:
"I won't play you a sad song on my violin. I do not have a bandana. I do not have a golden tooth. I do not have long hair or a golden hoop in my ear. I am just trying to speak up for my people:
to tell you about their suffering and the persecution they've endured throughout the centuries
to ask you to fight against ignorance, prejudice and stereotypes
Simply put, as a place to start: please call me Rom."
(See http://www.voiceofroma.com/ and http://www.facebook.com/pages/Voice-of-Roma/7291211537?ref=hl.)
So, for starters, I propose that we recognize that the word "Gypsy" is an insensitive word, and that we avoid it - or if it must be used, that we put it in quotation marks. I also suggest that we let people who name their stores, bands, or other outfits using the word "Gypsy" know that they are employing a denigrating term that calls up a caricature of a people who have just the same hopes, needs, and ambitions as everyone else.
Here's more on this from Šani: "The first basic step in separating myths and stereotypes from facts and authenticity is in the use of our terminology. Rom means a human being, person or man in the Romani language. The Roma do not call themselves Gypsies. Historically, the term 'Gypsy' came from the mistaken assumption on the part of Anglo-Europeans that Roma originated in Egypt. In fact, the Roma are a distinct ethnic minority, distinguished at least by Rom blood and the Romani, or Romanes, language, whose origins began in the Punjab region of India. Their migration began in the 2nd century, when they traveled through the Persian Gulf, Egypt, and Turkey, eventually spreading all over Europe. While Roma are Europe's largest ethnic minority, they remain the least integrated and the most persecuted people of Europe today. .Using the word "Gypsy" is not only inaccurate but perpetuates the continuation of stereotypes that portray Roma as beggars, swindlers, and thieves."
(http://www.voiceofroma.com/culture/gyp_vs_rom.shtml)
In any discussion of the Roma, a number of different names of Romani communities come up: Sinti, Ashkali, "Egyptians," and many more. Some of these names came from the outside, either as a result of political manipulation or ignorance. Others arose organically over the generations because they are what people call themselves. Some Roma do not call themselves Roma, but are looked upon as such by outsiders. Some Western bureaucrats and other outside commentators have referred to the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians of Kosovo as "RAE." While hoping to be fair, I will stick with the name "Roma."
It should be noted that, contrary to the stereotype, the vast majority of European Roma have lived in settled communities for many generations. And there are communities of Roma who have for the most part ceased speaking the Romani language, but they still hold to Romani traditions. There are others who have partially assimilated - for example, some Roma in Kosovo have gravitated towards an Albanian identity.
SOME HISTORY
Any discussion of Roma history in Europe should note that the biggest disaster in that history was the World War II Holocaust, in which the Jews were not the only victims. This history, as so much with the Roma, is usually forgotten. Genocide was committed against the Roma as well; Roma communities throughout the lands occupied by the Nazis were forced into ghettoes, and many of these people were sent to concentration camps or simply murdered where they had lived. Others were subjected to long imprisonment. It is difficult to cite accurate figures, but one report holds that of Europe's pre-war Roma population of one million, approximately twenty percent, or around 220,000, perished. (See http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005219.)
Since World War II Roma have struggled to integrate themselves into the economies of the countries in which they live, while proudly upholding their traditional cultures. This has been an uphill battle. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, an estimated 50,000 Roma live at the margins; in any given municipality it is common to hear that perhaps one percent of the Roma population holds a steady job. Bosnians do not generally openly admit racism towards the Roma, but neither do they bother to hide it. Once, in 2000, I had been in contact with a Romani organization in Sarajevo, and I mentioned their struggle to improve their conditions to a human rights activist in a completely different field, off in central Bosnia. He commented to me, "You know, they don't really even care whether they have toilets in their homes."
The situation is worse in central Europe, in such places as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, where the Romani population is much larger. In those countries discrimination is at times organized, and there are periodic incidents of violence against the Roma. Just last August a thousand neo-Nazis descended upon a mixed Romani and Hungarian village in western Hungary, shouting at Romani inhabitants, "You are going to die here." (http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/08/hungarian-anti-roma-marches) In the same country, in the northern village of Rimóc, it was determined last month that nearly all of the people who were being fined for bicycling infractions were Roma. (See "Fined for being Roma."http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/fined-being-roma-while-cycling)
A particularly notorious violation of Roma rights took place in France in 2010, when President Sarkozy ordered Roma from Bulgaria and Romania - that is, fellow EU citizens - to leave the country. Repeated police raids on Roma communities resulted in the eviction and expulsion of nearly fifteen thousand Roma from France in 2010 and 2011. Sarkozy's law permitted French authorities to expel people from the country if they were suspected of immigration simply for the purpose of "benefiting from the social assistance system" (See http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/29/france-one-year-new-abuses-against-roma.) Last year, after Sarkozy was replaced, the French government took steps to ameliorate the abuses against the Roma, but much damage had been done.
While human rights abuses against the Roma occur on a wide scale in various parts of Europe, the EU itself has taken a stance in favor of the rights of the Roma, and has attempted to promote more favorable policies. An article by the Roma Education Fund reports that the European Commission is working to help with integration of the Roma thus: "The social and economic inclusion of Roma is a priority for the EU and needs the commitment and joint efforts of national and local authorities, civil society and EU institutions. The European Commission is committed to taking the necessary steps to improve the situation of Roma people and their social and economic integration in society. On 7 April 2010 the Commission adopted a Communication on the social and economic integration of Roma in Europe (IP/10/407; MEMO/10/121) - the first ever policy document dedicated specifically to Roma. It outlines an ambitious programme to help making policies for Roma inclusion more effective and defines the main challenges ahead."
This same article notes, "There are between 10 million and 12 million Roma in the EU, in candidate countries and potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans. Roma people living in the European Union are EU citizens and have the same rights as any other EU citizen. A significant number of Roma live in extreme marginalisation in both rural and urban areas and in very poor social-economic conditions. They are disproportionally affected by discrimination, violence, unemployment, poverty, bad housing and poor health standards." (Seehttp://www.romaeducationfund.hu/frequently-asked-questions-european-roma-population)
In early 2005, eight European governments (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and the Slovak Republic) launched the "Decade of Roma Inclusion," in a bid to promote national action plans that would help end discrimination against the Roma populations in their respective countries. However, in the same period, evictions of Roma were ongoing in the UK, Lithuania, Albania, Greece, Ireland, Kosovo, and Italy. (See "Roma Evictions Erupt Across Europe." http://advocacynet.org/resource/759.)
KOSOVO
Over the last century Kosovo has been marked by periodic conflict between the (erstwhile) Serbian regime and the majority Albanian population, with Serbia holding the upper hand until the regime's defeat and expulsion at the hands of NATO in 1999.
And as in the rest of Europe, over the decades the Roma in Kosovo were at the bottom of society, subject to discrimination from both directions. Many Roma adopted the Albanian language and gravitated towards the Albanian culture, sometimes taking on Albanian surnames. To some extent the fact that in this region the two populations shared a common religion, Islam, facilitated this assimilation.
In the 1990s, under the increasingly harsh Milošević regime, many Roma tended to identify with the Albanians in their struggle for independence. However, to their great misfortune during and after the 1998-99 war, Roma were caught between two parties in a fight that was not really theirs. Romani men were sometimes abused, and sometimes drafted to fight, both by the Serbian side and by the Kosovar Albanian side. It happened that relatives even found themselves looking through their gun sights at each other.
In 1998 and during the 78-day NATO intervention in the spring of 1999, as many as 800,000 Albanians were driven out of Kosovo. In an attempt to rid Kosovo - then a province of Serbia - of a large proportion of the Albanian population, Serbian forces destroyed hundreds of their villages, and killed at least 10,000 Albanians.
It was the disaster of the Kosovo Roma community that its members were caught in an impossible position, not only during the war, but afterwards as well. Immediately upon the end of the NATO intervention, hundreds of thousands of Albanians came streaming back from exile to their (often destroyed) homes. For the first time since Serbia took over the province upon the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, Albanians had relative freedom and self-determination in Kosovo, and they were bound to use that self-determination to set up a new state that was free of Serbian domination. Unfortunately, there were Albanians who wished to take revenge for their brush with genocide, and these people were not particular about their targets. Those Serbs, Roma, and other minorities who did not flee Kosovo immediately were at risk.
Revenge attacks by Albanians were widespread. It is hard for me to know whether the attacks that occurred were the result of a policy by Albanian leaders, or simply the actions of criminals who had no regard for law, order, or the rights of the minorities. It was my impression at the time that the latter was the case - that a criminal element took advantage of the chaos to make profit. I personally witnessed Albanian gangsters taking over apartments owned by non-Albanians in order to rent or sell them. I heard that they were even taking over apartments owned by Albanians who had not yet returned. As possible motivations, presumably a mixture of revenge and profiteering played into the attacks on the Roma.
I personally found a near-unanimous belief among Albanians that Roma had collaborated with Serbian forces during the war. This belief apparently contributed to the subsequent mistreatment of the Roma. On the other hand, I believe - based on what I saw and heard - that, while Albanians may have held enduring prejudices against the Roma, most Albanians, having survived a brutal war, just wanted to move ahead peacefully and get on with their lives.
In 2010 Human Rights Watch reported, "The armed confrontation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) with Yugoslav government forces and Serbian police and paramilitary units, the subsequent NATO bombing and mass expulsion of ethnic Albanians by Yugoslav and Serb forces, and the wave of retaliatory ethnic violence by Albanians at the start of international rule in Kosovo in 1999, resulted in large numbers of RAE [Roma, Ashkali, and "Egyptians"] fleeing and being forcibly expelled from Kosovo. Many fled to elsewhere in the Balkans, mostly to Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Others went to Western Europe, while some were displaced within Kosovo. [.]Roma have historically been perceived by some Albanians as 'Serb collaborators,' and were targets of retaliatory violence in the aftermath of the war.
"[.] According to UNHCR estimates, in 2010 around 22,000 RAE displaced persons remain in Serbia, around 4,000 in Montenegro, around 1,700 in Macedonia, and around 130 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are no reliable estimates for the number of RAE from Kosovo living in Western Europe, or for the numbers of RAE displaced inside Kosovo." (See "Rights Displaced - Forced Returns of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians from Western Europe to Kosovo." Human Rights Watch 2010,http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/10/28/rights-displaced-0.)
I was in Kosovo at the beginning of the war in the spring of 1998, and I returned immediately upon the end of the NATO intervention in July of 1999. Here is an excerpt from a report that I wrote at that time:
I went to a collective center for displaced Roma at Kosovo Polje, on the outskirts of Prishtina. Approximately 8,000 Roma moved into a high school in this town in late June when they left Prishtina and other nearby localities under pressure from returning Albanians. The Roma were about to be moved from the school to a nearby tent camp set up by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Some UNHCR moving vans and some KFOR soldiers were placed at the entrance. There were around two hundred Roma sitting outside the school building, with piles of bedding, cradles, and other belongings waiting to be loaded. The women and children had already left.
As I walked onto the school grounds, a Romani man was telling a KFOR soldier that two Albanian youths had just come up behind a fence and thrown rocks at the school windows. The KFOR soldier promised to look for them. I took the opportunity to introduce myself to the Roma and ask for an interview. We took two chairs and sat against a wall, and immediately there were a dozen curious Roma gathered around to participate in the interview. Two men explained to me why they and their families had left Prishtina:
"We came to Kosovo Polje because Albanians started threatening us as soon as they came back from Macedonia. They were entering our houses, stealing from us, and beating us. Their goal is the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, nothing else. We were driven out of our houses. We arrived in Kosovo Polje on foot in columns, on June 20th. Along the way we were mistreated and stoned by Albanians. Then people arrived from all over this part of Kosovo. There were around 8,000 people. Now about half of those have left for Macedonia, Montenegro, or countries in Europe."
One man described his experiences in Prishtina during the NATO bombing. He said, "We weren't able to go outside during the bombing. It was a big problem for those of us whose main language is Albanian. The Serbian police would ask us, 'What are you?' I would say, 'I'm a Rom, and my mother tongue is Albanian.' Then the police would say, 'No, you are Albanian, and you must have a green card' (identification card for Albanians). They treated us like Albanians.
"This conflict is between the Serbs and the Albanians," continued another man. "We are in the middle, the victims of both sides. The KLA has kidnapped Roma after the return of the Albanian refugees. Now we are moving to a new camp. There is dust there, and it is unhealthy for the children. We have told the UNHCR that we feel there is no future for us in Kosovo, and that we want to leave for a third country. We have received no answer from them about this. We are to live in the new camp for four weeks. What will happen after that, I don't know. Others will decide that."
I was asked for whom I was writing. One man said to me, "Many people have come and written different things from what they actually saw. They wrote that we were thieves. Deutsche Welle said in a broadcast that we are used to this kind of life. That's not true. We are used to living in houses. You should see the houses we used to live in, where we came from." (end of excerpt)
Local Albanians, in my conversations with them at this time, were nearly unanimous in their accusations of Roma involvement in various crimes. I would not be able to sort that out here, but it is clear that at this point, during and after the war, the Roma of Kosovo were in a dire position. Thousands of Roma left Kosovo along with the fleeing Serbs; in some cases they fled under attack. In Prishtina, I personally witnessed the burning of houses owned by Roma. There were reports of the abduction and murder of Roma in this period.
TOXIC DP CAMPS
As the international protectorate was established, several camps for displaced persons were set up to receive those Roma who had not left Kosovo. A large number of Roma found themselves in four camps near Mitrovica in the north of Kosovo. They were out of the frying pan, but into the fire; these camps were terribly polluted by contamination from a former lead smelter. Tests in 2005 revealed that residents of the camps were subject to lead concentration levels upwards of twenty times the recommended tolerance, and for some children, exposure was far higher. (See "Kosovo: The last lead contaminated refugee camp was closed," http://www.gfbv.de/pressemit.php?id=3336.)
People in the camps were dying from lead poisoning, according to a report by Paul Polansky for the Society for Threatened Peoples (see link below). Women were suffering spontaneous abortions. The report states, "Despite repeated appeals to help the Gypsies [sic], especially those living in the three camps in the area of north Mitrovica, the UN did just the opposite. All food aid was suspended in 2002 saying it was time for the Gypsies to find their own supplies. In the Žitkovac camp the running water was cut off for up to six months at a time because the camp administer, Churches Working Together, felt the Gypsies were using too much water. In the end, the Žitkovac Gypsies had to walk four kilometers twice a day to get their drinking water. In all three camps, most of the Gypsies had to go through the local garbage cans to find their food.
"In the summer of 2004, WHO made a special investigation of lead poisoning in the three camps after Jenita Mehmeti, a four-year-old girl, died of lead poisoning. She was not the first. Up to that point 28 people (mainly children and young adults) had died in the three camps, but Jenita was the first one to be treated for lead poisoning before she died. New blood samples taken by WHO showed that many children, the most vulnerable to lead poisoning, had lead levels higher than the WHO analyzer could register." (See "Roma Children Dying of Lead Poisoning," by Paul Polansky,http://www.newkosovareport.com/200811171411/Views-and-Analysis/roma-children-dying-of-lead-poisoning.html.)
The camps were maintained for a decade, with one shut down in 2010, and another only in late 2012. Residents were moved to newly-constructed houses near Mitrovica.
Estimates of the Roma population in Kosovo vary wildly; I have seen figures ranging from 100,000 to 300,000. A more realistic estimate may be somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000. The Human Rights Watch report cited above estimated that the population of Roma remaining in Kosovo by 2010 was approximately 38,000. Meanwhile, compounding the many injuries to what was left of the Roma community in Kosovo, in 2004 widespread riots broke out among the Albanians, who were attacking remnants of the Serbian population, and targeting some Roma as well. More Roma left Kosovo at this time.
KOSOVAR ROMA IN EXILE
At least 100,000 Roma were exiled from Kosovo to the surrounding former republics of Yugoslavia, especially to neighboring Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia; many also ended up in central Europe, especially Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Scandinavia. Their living conditions in those places of refuge were sub-standard. They lacked employment and often ended up living at the poorest margins of the cities, sometimes on or near landfill. Many people lacked basic identification, and as such were not registered as refugees. A 2011 report for the institution of the "Decade of Roma Inclusion" noted that most displaced Romani children did not attend school. Most of the Roma are unemployed; if they have any work, it is off the books. (See "Blindspot: Kosovo Roma and the Decade", by Mensur Haliti, January 2011, at http://www.romadecade.org/files/downloads/General%20Resources/Blindspot-final.pdf.)
Camps where Roma were settled often lacked medical assistance, hygiene, restrooms, and sufficient food supplies. Added to these ills has been the constant threat of eviction of Romani refugees in their "host" countries. Similar to the case of France mentioned above, host governments seem to have made a conscious policy of tormenting the displaced Kosovo Roma by forcing them to uproot regularly. The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center protested evictions of Roma in Montenegro in 2003 and 2004. In 2006 advocates sued the Danish government for requiring whole families of displaced Roma to live in one-room shelters. And between 2009 to 2012, Roma faced repeated evictions from their temporary settlements in Belgrade.
(See http://groups.yahoo.com/group/balkanhr/message/5751, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/balkanhr/message/6678, and http://www.amnestyusa.org/actioncenter/actions/uaa32311.pdf)
Besides the difficult conditions facing Roma refugees wherever they have arrived, another grave problem is the ongoing threat of forced deportation and return to Kosovo. Some tens of thousands of Roma live in Germany, and many only have "tolerated" status. This means that they are not accorded the civil rights of legitimized residents, and can be subject to deportation at any time. Roma have been reluctant to return to Kosovo because of the discrimination and violence mentioned above, and the fact that, most likely, unemployment and poverty await them if they do return.
The compulsive return of Roma to Kosovo against their will has become a widespread practice in several countries in central and northern Europe. The 2010 Human Rights Watch report estimated that between 1999 and 2010, over 50,000 Roma had been deported to Kosovo. It gave a figure of 12,000 holders of the "toleration permit" in Germany.
The same report noted that deported Roma arriving in Kosovo face serious problems of integration. Often their children, born and raised in another country, do not speak a local language. Families arrive without citizenship documentation enabling them to receive social assistance. Husbands or wives arrive without a spouse or separated from their children who have not been deported. It has been difficult for Roma to repossess property that they owned in Kosovo before the war or to reclaim employment that they previously had. Health care has often been unavailable to returnees. Some returning Roma have experienced threats or violence from Albanians, and have left Kosovo a second time.
Given these conditions, international human rights organizations have called upon the governments of Europe to refrain from deporting the displaced Roma, and to afford them decent living conditions. The response to this call so far has been poor, and abusive deportation practices have continued. For example, nighttime raids have been practiced in Germany, pulling Roma out of their homes without warning and sending them to the airport with one-way tickets. This treatment is much harsher than what Bosnian refugees in Germany received in the mid- to late-1990s.
I will leave other details about this distressing situation to Džafer's words below. But for people interested in the problem of deportation, I recommend the film "Uprooted - RAE communities' perspectives on Western Europe's Repatriation Policies,"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFbZx-Qzg2M.)
Not all is hopeless. While the displaced Roma struggle in their host countries or, deported, try to adjust to changed circumstances back home, there are initiatives and organizations trying to help. The Kosovo Foundation for Open Society advocates in the EU for the rights of minorities in Kosovo. RomaReact fights stereotypes about the Roma. The Roma Education Fund promotes education in Romani communities. The Society for Threatened Peoples monitors the state of human rights for the Roma in Kosovo. And Voice of Roma, based in California, works to educate the public about the rights of the Roma, and presents Romani culture and traditions in order to fight stereotypes. See below for some pertinent links.
DŽAFER BUZOLI
Džafer Buzoli lives in Kosovo and works there for the Society for Threatened Peoples. He monitors and reports on the state of human rights for the Roma in Kosovo, and advocates for their improvement. I met with him in mid-November and he brought me up to date on the situation of the Roma.
Džafer told me, "At the end of the NATO intervention, there were some 8,000 Roma who found themselves in the area of Mitrovica. [During and after the war, Mitrovica became a divide city, with the northern part controlled by Serbs, and the southern part controlled by Albanians.] At that time, the UN established four camps for the displaced Roma in lead-polluted areas, in North Mitrovica. There was lead dust in the soil and the water. People lived there for ten years, until 2008 and 2009. Then they were removed to a French NATO base. But it was not clean.
"In ten years, around 90 Roma died from lead poisoning. Now some Roma have returned to the south Mahala [traditional Roma neighborhood in the section of Mitrovica controlled by Kosovo Albanians]. Most of the others fled to Macedonia, Germany, or Switzerland. The Roma in Kosovo are no longer living in the polluted camps, but in that area where they now live, there is still lead dust in the air."
Q: What is the population of Roma in Kosovo?
A: "In the 1991 census it was around 220,000. Now it is around 33,000.
"There is an agreement with the EU, whereby Kosovo is willing to receive all its citizens back. But, unfortunately, this is equivalent to a green light to deport them from their host countries. Roma are being sent back to Kosovo without support. They are being expelled from Germany and other countries."
Q: What obstacles are there to return for the Roma?
A: "It is difficult. If they are coming back from Macedonia, Serbia, or Montenegro, then there is a support package for their return. But if they are coming back from Europe, there is no support. And it is a problem when the children do not know the local language.
"In Germany, in advance of sending Roma back to Kosovo, the German government does not undertake any research, for example, as to whether the people being returned even have a place to live; whether they have a family or other people to receive them; whether there is health coverage for them in Kosovo; and what kind of treatment generally they will receive in Kosovo. Conditions in Kosovo for returning Roma are such that some come back, and then they leave again after two or three weeks.
"In the period after 1999, many Roma left Kosovo and this became a 'role model' for others. So people were selling their houses. Then, if they were returned from Germany or elsewhere, they would find themselves without a place to live. For example, there is a returned family in Shtime near Suha Reka, that is literally without a roof over their heads."
Q: What is the situation for Roma children in school?
A: "There has been a kind of segregation. The Roma children are placed in the back of the classroom. However, now that situation has been improving as a result of the state's educational strategy."
Q: How is the process of return to Mahala South developing?
A: "The way that return management is taking place is not good. People are being returned to apartments where, before, they lived in houses. The people do not like the apartments, even though they are new and decently built. And there were only a few houses built, just a symbolic number.
"We want to make sure that everyone, all the Roma in Germany who are potential targets of deportation, are informed about the possible scheduling of their return. To date, this has not been happening. For example, there was one man who had been in Germany since he was six months old, and he lived there until he was twenty. Then he was deported to Kosovo.
"There is a lawyer working for the displaced Roma in Germany, but he does not have the necessary information about potential deportations. People simply do not have advance notice about their deportations. If they had this, it would help them to avoid bad treatment by the police. There are times when the deportations happen and people are not even allowed to collect their belongings. Recently there was a girl, about sixteen, who arrived in Kosovo with her family. She was still wearing her pajamas, and she was obviously traumatized by an eviction in the middle of the night.
"There is no economic development taking place in Kosovo, and there is little or no work here for the Roma. Some of them collect scraps. It is easier for the people who live in villages (there are mixed villages of Roma/Albanians), where at least they can plant a garden.
"As to our work here, we collaborate in advocacy with the respected people in the local communities. Those respected people are rich, but they are passive. We are working to train the youth to be more active. We have written letters of protest about local conditions, but there has been no response."
Referring to the present international force in Kosovo, Džafer said, "KFOR is now composed of 15,000 troops, and it has been reducing its number. If KFOR were to leave, then many remaining members of the minorities would leave. The ICO [International Civilian Office] has left, and that was the only body that was advocating for the minorities.
"We have to be optimistic - but not too optimistic."
LINKS TO MORE INFORMATION ON ROMA
Amnesty International:
http://www.amnesty.org/ (enter "Roma")
European Roma Rights Centre - International legal advocacy center:
http://www.errc.org/
Human Rights Watch:
http://www.hrw.org/ (enter "Roma")
Kosovo Foundation for Open Society - Prishtina-based minority advocacy organization:
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/offices-foundations/kosovo-foundation-open-society
Rroma Foundation - history, book reviews, links, reports:
www.rroma.org/
RomaReact - Interactive multimedia site for news and advocacy:
http://www.romareact.org/
I strongly recommend the flash mob video at the front of this site!
Roma Education Fund - Hungary-based educational foundation:
http://www.romaeducationfund.hu
Society for Threatened Peoples:
Humanitarian project: http://www.gfbv.de/inhaltsDok.php?id=2337&stayInsideTree=1
Press releases:
--"Germany must ensure detox measures for Roma refugees from camp 'Osterode'"
http://www.gfbv.de/pressemit.php?id=3336
--"[Berlin memorial] must be an initial step to establish a European integration project for Romani peoples
http://www.gfbv.de/pressemit.php?id=3270
--The Society's work in Kosovo:
"Empowering Roma Youth in Kosovo" (Includes footage from Kosovo. In German) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jnuPXRuIsKg
Voice of Roma, California-based advocacy and cultural association: http://www.voiceofroma.com/
Facebook page: http://www.facebook.com/pages/Voice-of-Roma/7291211537?ref=hl
REPORTS:
"Silent Harm," Verena Knaus et al. Silent Harm - A UNICEF-sponsored report assessing the situation of the psycho-social health of children repatriated to Kosovo. In cooperation with the Kosovo Health Foundation, 2012.
http://www.unicef.org/kosovo/SILENT_HARM_Eng_Web.pdf
"Dossier of Evidence: Lead contaminated camps of internally displaced Roma, Ashkali and Kosovan-Egyptian families in North Mitrovica, Kosovo"
Society for Threatened Peoples, July, 2009
http://www.toxicwastekills.com/downloads/Dossier%20of%20Evidence.pdf
Memorandum of the Society for Threatened People: Lead Poisoning of Roma in IDP Camps in Kosovo
http://www.gfbv.de/show_file.php?type=download&property=download&id=14
"Until the Very Last Gipsy Has Fled the Country: The Mass Expulsion of Roma and Ashkali from Kosovo"
Society for Threatened Peoples International
Human Rights Report No. 21 September 1999
http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/STP-Roma.PDF
BOOK
Romani Routes: Cultural Politics and Balkan Music in Diaspora
Oxford University Press, 2012
by Carol Silverman, Professor of Cultural Anthropology and Folklore at the University of Oregon.
"Romani Routes provides a timely and insightful view into Romani communities both in their home countries and in the diaspora."
--Companion site for book: http://www.oup.com/us/companion.websites/9780195300949/
--Article: "University professor shows folklore is more than just fairy tales"
http://dailyemerald.com/2012/06/07/folklore-more-than-just-fairy-tales/
UPDATE ON SREBRENICA AND THE MARCH 1st COALITION
In recent months I have covered the campaign of the "Glasaću za Srebrenicu" organization and its political heir, the March 1st Coalition, introduced in my last report on Bosnia. (Seehttp://balkanwitness.glypx.com/journal2012-10.htm.) In the last few weeks, the Dodik regime in the Republika Srpska has responded aggressively to its delayed defeat in the Srebrenica municipal elections and to the perceived threat of the March 1st Coalition. In Srebrenica, the District Prosecutor (based in Bijeljina) has been hauling activists to the police station for interrogation, and conducting some night-time raids in search of other activists.
The Prosecutor and other RS officials, all the way up to President Dodik, have alleged that the activists had pressured those who voted for Mayor Ćamil Duraković to register their residence in Srebrenica and to vote there; there have been insinuations that the campaign paid people to do so. In the course of all this repression, there has been no mention of the real electoral engineering and malversation, which I witnessed, of people being brought in from Serbia to vote against Duraković, using very flimsy identification papers or none at all.
As part of this campaign of repression, RS inspectors have informed a Srebrenica student association that it will be subject to a tax inspection.Meanwhile, in recent days Dodik and other high RS officials have repeatedly announced that the March 1st Coalition shall not be allowed to do on the scale of the RS what it did in Srebrenica municipality - that is, to assist the displaced former inhabitants of that territory in returning and voting where they please. The right to do these things is guaranteed in Annex 7 of the Dayton Constitution, but Dodik et al, who swear by Dayton, also effectively swear against its full implementation. On top of everything else, Dodik recently accused unspecified "foreign sources" of financing a rebellion meant to destroy the RS.
As I wrote before, the March 1st Coalition is a campaign to watch and to support. For those who read Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian, the Coalition recently opened up its web site:http://www.prvimart.ba/
And while I'm mentioning web sites, see also the web site of Hikmet Karčić's organization, Ćuprija (mentioned in an earlier posting - see http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/journal2012-4.htm). The web site is here: http://www.cuprija.org.ba/ and Ćuprija's Facebook page is here: http://www.facebook.com/udruzenje.cuprija.1?ref=ts&fref=ts
Friday, January 04, 2013
Peter Lippman Bosnia Travel Journal: Entry # 11
Hello friends,
Leaving Bosnia in November, I flew to Skopje, Macedonia. I spent some days there visiting friends and catching up, and then went to Kosovo for another few days. This report is about those visits, and about things I heard and saw in those places. I had not been to Macedonia or Kosovo for six years.
Some of the names in this report have been changed to protect people’s privacy.
MACEDONIA
I arrived at Alexander the Great International Airport on a Tuesday evening. As I was getting off the plane I immediately received a voice-mail message in my cell phone that said, “Welcome to Macedonia, the cradle of civilization.”
The population of Macedonia is around a couple million, with approximately one fourth of that number being Albanian, and most of the rest Christian Slavs. There have long been tensions between the two ethnic populations, with some flare-ups in the past dozen-odd years. Driving home from the airport with my old friend Gzim, I immediately asked if things were peaceful in Macedonia. He said, “Yes, they are, for now.”
That “for now” is significant, because during the year 2012 there were sporadic incidents of violence between Albanians and Macedonians. Churches were torched; five Macedonians were killed in one mysterious incident; Macedonian police shot two Albanians in another. Nothing like a war is threatened, but neither are relations friendly. (For more detail on this situation see “Macedonia: Ghost of Ethnic Conflict Returns,” December 28, 2012:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-ghost-of-ethnic-conflict-returns.)
Arriving home, I chatted with Gzim and his wife Drita. They explained to me that the Macedonian government was currently in the midst of a grandiose reconstruction project in the capital, where they were spending hundreds of millions of euros. The term “facelift” would be an understatement of the extent of this project, called “Skopje 2014.” In a huge way, they said, the project was a form of propaganda for the VMRO, the leading Macedonian nationalist party.
As “transitional” countries go, Macedonia is in a tricky situation. It is a small and poor country that aspires to join NATO and the EU. Right next door is Greece, already a member of those two structures. For reasons that adhere more to populist politics than to rationality, Greece opposes Macedonia’s membership. The reason given is that Macedonia chooses to call itself Macedonia. And because this name is associated with Greek history going all the way back to the fourth century B.C.E., the use of the name by “Slavic usurpers from the north” betrays Macedonia’s “aggressive territorial ambitions upon part of Greece.”
The historical region of Macedonia covered territory that, after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, fell to Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Yugoslav or Vardar Macedonia became part of post-World War I Yugoslavia, and during the Tito era became one of the six republics of Yugoslavia. After the Yugoslav federation broke up in the early 1990s, the new state named itself the Republic of Macedonia. In 1993 it was accepted into the UN as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or FYROM. Greece, when it is not calling Macedonia “Skopje,” insists upon this name being used as the country’s official name. I don’t know of any other country that is primarily referred to by initials containing a reference to another country that no longer exists.
Over the past few years, Macedonia’s nationalist government has promoted an increasingly populist and chauvinist, Slavic Macedonian atmosphere. To some extent this is a standard vote-getting strategy for domestic consumption, but it is also partially a response to Greece’s resistance to the acceptance of Macedonia into the European political and military infrastructure.
In the next few days, walking through various parts of Skopje, I would witness, with some astonishment, what Gzim and Drita were talking about.
*
The next morning, with eagerness, I walked into the old section of Skopje, to the northeast of the Vardar River. The Bit Pazar and the old Čaršija are located there. Coming into the neighborhood from the east, first I entered the Bit Pazar – literally, the “flea market.” There’s a covered section where mainly produce is sold, and then there are stalls purveying all kinds of other items. In the covered section, just to give a sample, I saw a vast area selling only red bell peppers. Seeing so many red bell peppers all together made me happy because it represented a culinary priority in that culture – so superior, in that way, to our cuisine.
Likewise, there were huge piles of leeks, cabbages, tomatoes, and onions. There were large bins displaying various kinds of rice, and in the next stall, beautiful big red bags of paprika and cayenne that would take most of us in the US years to consume. Nearby were great chunks of white cheese, and another stall with large bins of several different kinds and colors of olives. One man in a corner stall was selling plastic bags. The aroma, not really describable here, seemed to beckon anyone who was interested in preparing to make a typical southern Balkan meal.
The outside part of the Bit Pazar contained the products that we know from a department store, but each in its own stall. So you could buy shoes, razors, radios, bars of soap, packs of cigarettes, music CDs, t-shirts, hair curlers, fireworks, and so on and on, each from a different stall in the same area. One stall, a riot of red and black, sold patriotic Albanian t-shirts and flags. The Bit Pazar and Čaršija are dominated by Albanians, and the hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Albanian state was approaching.
Whenever I have been in the Bit Pazar I have noticed the music – Macedonian, Albanian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Turkish, playing in the stalls. I have felt that I am somehow in the geographic, or at least ethnographic center of the Balkans. I could see living there for a spell.
From the Bit Pazar I wandered into to the old Čaršija, or market area, and this feeling was only reinforced. I spoke Serbo-Croatian with the Albanians and Macedonians. I apologized to one shopkeeper for not knowing Albanian, only to learn that he was a local Turk. Many shopkeepers in the neighborhood, young and old, are prepared to sell things in five or six different languages, and to switch from one to another on the slightest hint that might be called for.
The streets were lively, although there were no tourists. At the very entrance to the Čaršija there was a man sitting on a stool, getting ready to play the ҫifteli, a traditional Albanian long-necked, two-stringed instrument. He was a middle-aged man, serious, wearing a traditional plis, a white felt cap shaped like half of an egg. There was a container for coins in front of him and, nearby, a glass of tea. I made a donation and he allowed me to photograph him. We talked, he told me that his name was Nevaip.
The Čaršija is arranged of several straight pedestrian streets paved with smooth-worn stones; as you walk down those streets you pass an ancient stone mosque here and there, or some other stone building constructed in the Ottoman period. There is an entire block of stores selling fancy wedding dresses, and another street of jewelry stores. One shop catered to women who covered their hair in a fashionable way. A back street is home to blacksmiths and metal workers. There, you could buy shovel heads, axes, pails, and home-made tin woodstoves. A man worked at a grinder, sharpening a scythe blade, outside his shop.
Every block was also home to a couple of casual restaurants where you could eat stew or grilled meat; there were also tea and coffee shops where men hung out. If the weather was dry you could see a couple of older men in black berets sitting at a table outside.
An oddity in the Balkans: I saw a storefront with the brightly-colored logo, “LGBT,” and the simple title, “Support Centre.” You would not see that in Bosnia or Serbia. Other than this detail, it seems that in the Bit Pazar and the Čaršija things have not changed, perhaps, since the 1950s.
There is little development of infrastructure in Skopje’s Albanian section. Skopje’s ethnic populations used to be much more mixed, with Albanians and Macedonians living in the same neighborhoods. But in the last fifteen-odd years, the two communities have been separating. Macedonians have been moving south of the Vardar. Albanians have been buying property in the neighborhoods of Ҫair and Butel, where Macedonians have moved out, leaving their old houses. The Albanians tear down those houses and put up new ones.
There is another Albanian neighborhood nearer to the river and the center of town, in a more convenient location. It has more of a run-down aspect, because the municipal government has not allowed people there to receive permits to build or improve their property. So everything is worn and decrepit there. “They want us to leave,” says Gzim.
Now the Albanian and Macedonian students go to separate schools. They used to go to the same schools, but took separate classes because of the language.
Gzim tells me that some Albanians in Macedonia are attaching to a conservative brand of Islam. He says that this is more of a trend in Macedonia, but not in Albania. He calls adherents to this conservative religion the “Taliban” of Macedonia, and says that their numbers are growing. They are sending their girls to elementary school wearing scarves.
*
I walked to the western end of the Čaršija and approached the ancient Kameni Most, the stone bridge over the Vardar. As I arrived, I saw that huge changes had taken place. First, a statue to Philip II of Macedonia was under construction, the finishing touches being implemented behind a rusty corrugated steel barrier. Then, just before the bridge, on one side of the entrance there was a statue of Saints Cyril and Methodius, and on the other side, a statue of Saints Naum and Kliment. These saints are ninth-century Christian missionaries. The former were Greeks from Thessaloniki, and the latter two were local Slavs. Philip II, father of Alexander the Great, lived nearly a millennium before the Slavs arrived in Macedonia.
To the left of the bridge, still on the same side of the river as the Čaršija, was an imposing, baroque-style Museum of Archeology. To the right of the bridge on the same side of the river were a couple more new, grand buildings. One housed the Ministry of the Interior. In front of one of these buildings there was a monument to Karposh, who mounted a rebellion against the Ottomans in the 17th century. Defeated, he was executed on the Kameni Most.
I felt slightly dizzy as I saw the lovely bridge surrounded by extravagant architecture that rendered the whole scene nearly unrecognizable.
I walked across the familiar old bridge, passing a couple of people selling CDs and cigarettes. I arrived at the grand plaza on the bigger, newer side of Skopje. I found it dotted with one statue after another. The Emperor Justinian was there, establishing (pre-Slavic) Macedonia’s early Byzantine credentials. Czar Samuel, 11th century conqueror of most of the Balkans, was there. Statues of the rebels Damjan Gruev and Goce Delčev cemented Macedonia’s hajduk, anti-Ottoman history.
Alexander himself reigned over the plaza on a horse rampant, and I have not mentioned another dozen-odd statues. I wouldn’t be surprised if Washington DC had fewer statues than this 2500 square meter plaza and an adjacent park. A replica of the Arc d’Triomphe stood off to the side, looking like an afterthought. Altogether, the ensemble of statues reminded me of an antique store filled with kitsch.
Compounding the tackiness of the scene, a large, permanent digital advertisement screen, which must have been some thirty feet long and twenty feet high, was mounted to one of the buildings. It prominently advertised local travel agencies and high-tech outlets.
Albanians, at least one quarter of Macedonia’s population, don’t exist in this idealized portrayal of Macedonian history and society. The only Albanian represented there was Mother Teresa, but her ethnicity was not mentioned.
In the glorious pantheon of Macedonian history, stretching twice the length of the Slavic presence on this territory, the timeline apparently ends right around 1940. The only mention of the Partisan era was to insinuate that Tito’s regime was an oppressor of the identity of the Macedonians. Other than that, the Tito era never happened. And the VMRO, Macedonia’s reconstituted, ruling nationalist party, is glorified as practically the founder of the nation.
A block away from this main commercial square stood a large park with more statues: the anti-Ottoman rebel Pitu Guli, the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, and an expansive monument to the VMRO, the resurrected Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. This party, dominating Macedonian politics today, named itself after the anti-Ottoman rebel movement that was founded in the late 19th century.
This leading political clique of Slavic Macedonia thus completes its credentials, ranging from ancient times to pre-World War II, constructing a national mythology that excludes Albanians and Partisans, and ignores Macedonia’s intertwined history with Bulgaria as well. In tying part of its identity to Alexander the Great, Macedonia’s profligate government spites Greece while simultaneously shooting itself in the foot by spending half a billion Euros on ridiculous construction, money that could be going to schools and factories.
Gzim tells me that there was less corruption in Macedonia during the socialist period than there is now – that now the government will, for example, announce that a statue or some construction project is going to cost ten million Euros, when the real cost would be five million. Then that extra five would go partially for kickbacks, and the rest directly into the pockets of the politicians. As in Bosnia and Serbia, the link between nationalism and corruption is a firm one.
For an extensive and very informative article on government support of culture in Macedonia, see “Macedonian Culture Strategy: Milestone or Wish List?” from November 15th, 2012, at:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonian-culture-strategy-milestone-or-wish-list.
This article mentions that seventy percent of Macedonia’s cultural monuments are in “critical condition,” with some “practically decomposing.” The medieval frescoes in Macedonia’s churches are a world treasure. There, just for one example, is a place where Macedonia could better spend its scarce funds.
Additionally, an excellent article that just came out explains the politics behind the above-described project in very clear terms. It describes the political system as being “held hostage to the egos of a few leaders who consider the country their property,” those leaders being “clusters of influential people, often well planted on both sides of the thin line that separates legality from crime.” The “clientelist” networks dominated by profiteer-politicians are distinguished not by any particular ideology or state-building agenda, but by their lust for riches and power. This applies to the political infrastructures dominating both the Macedonian and the Albanian sides.
The article describes the crafting of a national narrative that I have introduced above, commenting that the massive construction project on the Macedonian side is too expensive to undertake in a recession period. This can lead to further unrest. But, the article concludes, “When the political fight is left to warlords, it is not surprising that there is no respect for laws or civil liberties. Rules are made for those who are under them, not for the rulers.”
See “Patronage Politics Push Macedonia to a Precipice,” December 28th, 2012: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/patronage-politics-push-macedonia-to-a-precipice.
KOSOVO
I took an early bus from Skopje across the border to Kosovo, less than an hour away. Going into Kosovo, the scenery for the first half hour or so was unremarkable, not changed much since my previous visits. There were some dilapidated shacks and offices near the border in Blace, projecting the air of a neglected outpost. Soon afterwards the road, bordering on a canyon, entered a pleasant, undeveloped mountainous area.
About a half hour before the capital, Prishtina, there were signs of a kind of parasitical development that promises nothing productive. Boxy, glassy buildings with cheap metal siding lined the road, offering construction materials, new cars, and furniture. Here and there stood a gleaming hotel.
The scene read “foreign assistance” mixed with “remittance from the diaspora.” Later I was told that many Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora were building houses in Kosovo, leaving them empty, and coming back once a year to visit.
I remember that last time I was in Kosovo, in 2006, the country was discussing a declaration of independence. This declaration finally took place two years later, in February of 2008, and to date nearly one hundred states have recognized Kosovo (the most recent recognition coming from Pakistan, just last week). Of the EU members, 22 out of 27 states recognize Kosovo. Significantly, Serbia and Russia have not recognized Kosovo, and probably never will, or not for a long time.
There was euphoria on the streets in Kosovo when independence and statehood were proclaimed. But during my last visit I spoke with one man who said to me, “I don’t care about independence; I just want a job. Now, our economy is so poor that the only thing we are really exporting is money [for imported goods].” I would add that another significant export from Kosovo is people.
In Prishtina, I spoke with my friend Loran, the nephew of Gzim. He brought me up to date on political developments in Kosovo. Loran and all his relatives, many cousins, some uncles and aunts too, were all subject to the occupation and attacks by Serb forces in the late 1990s. Most of them were temporarily displaced; it’s fortunate and rather remarkable that they all survived that period, though not all of their properties were found intact after the war.
I spent some time in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 during that turbulent period, and wrote about it: see http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/kosovo98.htm from 1998; http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/kos99-1.htm from 1999, and various other reports whose links you can find if you scroll down towards the bottom of this page: http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/journal.htm.
When NATO was intervening and bombing many parts of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999, around 800,000 Albanians fled Kosovo for Montenegro and Macedonia, in response to heightened persecution from Serb forces. Those forces destroyed several hundred villages and killed thousands of Albanians.
Loran told me something I had not heard before about that period. The NATO intervention started in late March of 1999, and mistreatment of Albanians, which had been going on all along, immediately increased in a premeditated bid to rid Kosovo of its majority Albanian population. But, Loran told me, the expulsions stopped in May of that year, before the end of the intervention and the defeat of the Serbian forces. At that time, Loran said, “the Serbs stopped killing and expelling Albanians from Kosovo. They started registering us, instead.” Apparently it was deemed acceptable by the Serb authorities to retain a certain disempowered minority of non-Serbs within the province.
Loran also told me that, among the Albanians when he was growing up, “no one really believed that Yugoslavia was going to last for a very long time.” I remember speaking to young people in Kosovo, as long ago as the early 1980s, and hearing resentment of the discrimination and mistreatment they experienced at the hands of the Serbian rulers of their autonomous province. Some of them advocated the creation of Kosovo as a seventh republic within Yugoslavia – but I never heard promotion of Kosovo as an independent country at that time. However, Loran said, “The elders told us that Yugoslavia was not going to last forever.”
Present-day, semi-independent Kosovo has been engaged in state-building, but it faces a raft of problems. The poor, unproductive economy, with little to export, is one of them. Corruption among the leaders is another. Bad relations with neighboring Serbia is a third problem. The relationship between Kosovo’s government and Albanian majority, on one hand, and its minorities – especially its Serb inhabitants, on the other, are a particularly difficult problem. In the south, Serb enclaves are for the most part living in cooperation with the government. But in the north, the Ibar River acts as an unofficial border between the main part of Kosovo and a primarily Serb-inhabited region.
This area has repeatedly been the scene of violence between Serb separatists who refuse to recognize the sovereignty of Kosovo, and Kosovo’s authorities. And the status of northern Kosovo has served as a political issue to be manipulated by the Serbian government in Belgrade.
Because of ongoing instability, NATO has retained a military force, KFOR (Kosovo Force) in Kosovo. Over the years this force has been reduced to the point where it now numbers around 5,500 troops. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has created and enforced civil administration procedures. After Kosovo’s declaration of independence, UNMIK reduced its role in favor of EULEX, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. EULEX deploys several thousand European police and judges in Kosovo, and concerns itself with security and defense policy.
These international institutions have in some degree constituted a protectorate, their intervention in domestic matters compromising Kosovo’s sovereignty. That is why I call Kosovo semi-independent, in addition to the fact that, without Russia’s consent, its prospects for admission into the UN are nil. However, in the past year international supervision was declared to be over. And under international pressure, relations with Serbia are making very tentative steps forward as negotiations have been resumed and an agreement has been reached on bilateral supervision of the tense northern border of Kosovo.
For an overview of Kosovo’s international position, see the recent article, “Kosovo: Year of the Historic Handshake,” December 28, 2012, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-year-of-the-historic-handshake.
Over the years, the movement for self-determination Vetëvendosje (full name in Albanian: Lëvizja Vetëvendosje!) has played an interesting role as gadfly, a fighter against corruption and against the compromise of Kosovo’s sovereignty both by Serbia and the international officials who they see as giving that sovereignty away. Led by former student activist (and for two years political prisoner in Serbia) Albin Kurti, Vetëvendosje started as a grassroots movement, and a few years ago it transformed into a political party. During its movement years it was often in the headlines for fomenting unruly demonstrations in which projectiles were thrown and people were arrested. Kurti himself seemed to be in jail or under house arrest by the Albanian authorities just about as often as he was free. The organization has also been very creative in its use of graffiti and political theater.
I have mentioned Vetëvendosje because people in Kosovo have strong opinions about it. They either love Vetëvendosje or despise it. In any case, I think that the organization brings up very important issues and it is correct to mistrust Kosovo’s leaders, Serbian leaders, and international officials who they see as too willing to compromise on important issues. For these reasons, I tried to learn what people I met with thought about Vetëvendosje.
Some people call Vetëvendosje “nationalists” or “extremists.” Loran told me, “Vetëvendosje says that they are in favor of uniting with Albania, but they are not serious about it. This is just rhetoric.” Commenting on Vetëvendosje’s indoor-outdoor practices, he said, “It is not ok that they are in Parliament, but still organizing rowdy demonstrations...Vetëvendosje opposes negotiations with Serbia. But negotiations are needed. It shows that we are serious. And the European Commission has taken steps to bring Kosovo closer to the EU, even though our sovereignty is not complete. Maybe this took place because we have been willing to negotiate.”
For more information on Vetëvendosje, see its English language home page at http://www.vetevendosje.org/?cid=2,1.
Loran criticized the leaders of Kosovo for corruption, saying that money that comes into the country “is all going into the pockets of the politicians.” He added, “Most of the development money in Kosovo comes from the diaspora. Some of it comes from money laundering.”
On local administration in Prishtina, Loran said, “The mayor of Prishtina was chosen because he was popular, not because he was capable. He rejected a 30 million euro offer from the European Commission to build a sports complex behind the shopping center, simply because his party would not have control over the property.”
I bought a SIM card for my cell phone so that I could arrange meetings. Unlike in several other countries where I have done so, I was required to register my identity as owner of that phone number. In Bosnia, Croatia, Germany, and England you can walk into any cell phone store or a corner market, or even a kiosk, and purchase a phone number for the equivalent of a few dollars. In Kosovo I had to show my passport and fill out a form that even asked my father’s first name. Loran explained that the government has decided on this measure in order to cut down on crime. I told him, “I guess they don’t like the competition.”
Loran spoke of a lack of hope in Kosovo, saying that more Kosovars are now seeking asylum in Europe. He himself is thinking of leaving Kosovo. It would be hard for him and his wife, he said, but in the long run, it would afford a better life for his children.
*
For a recent article on militant Islam in Kosovo and in Macedonia, see “Fissures in the Faith: Rise of Conservative Islamists Alarms Kosovans,” December 24th, 2012: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fissures-in-the-faith-rise-of-conservative-islamists-alarms-kosovans
*
I spoke with my old friend Erëblir Kadriu. I met him when I came to Kosovo immediately after the NATO intervention. Then, he was a skinny high school kid, but a very intelligent and helpful one, and already an activist – among other things, a member of the regional PostPessimist Network (see http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=165433). He helped me set up interviews with various activists.
Over twelve years later, Erëblir is the same guy – just not skinny anymore. He spent five years in the United States, finishing his high school and undergraduate studies. Then, he returned to his native Kosovo – a patriotic and optimistic act – and became a teacher. Later he received a master’s degree in psychology and education at Cambridge. He is considering pursuing PhD studies.
You can see that this puts Erëblir in an area of interest very similar to Belma and the staff of Krila Nade in Sarajevo, whom I wrote about in my last report.
Today, Erëblir wears many hats; his list of undertakings is impressive. He works as a guidance counselor at American School of Kosovo; runs the American Advising Center-EducationUSA Center in Kosovo; teaches social psychology and research methods at the University of Prishtina; and does research in educational activities for students. Erëblir also works with an NGO called IPE, International Progressive Education (see www.ipeks.org).
IPE provides information about state building and civil society, and supports research on educational issues. The NGO is involved in research on training teachers in this work. One study that it has implemented asked students about their perception of a good teacher. Another study dealt with teachers' experience in curriculum reforms in Kosovo. IPE also plans to conduct a study on school violence.
Together with colleagues from the American School and IPE, Erëblir organizes an event called the “Kosovar and Regional Student Conference on Social Issues.” Participants are a mixed group of young people including local Albanians, Serbs, and Americans. The most recent conference took place this year in Kosovo, on December 7th and 8th. Young Serbs from North Mitrovica and Serbia attended. Students presented reports on social issues such as economics, education, privatization, gender issues, and religion.
Erëblir told me, “People who attended from different parts of the region became good friends with each other after a few days. On Friday and Saturday the activities were at the school dormitory. People went bowling together.”
Regarding the research that IPE shares with teachers, Erëblir says, “The teachers learn and say, ‘These are great techniques, but we can’t practice them in classes of up to 45 students.’ …There is a disconnect between the theory and the practical. People attend the trainings but then they are blocked because of the large classes, also because of problems with resources. For example, it is difficult even to photocopy something for the students. A class lesson has to go to the school principal for approval. And some school maintenance projects even have to be approved by the municipality. It takes forever, for example, just to fix a broken window.”
Some aspects of Kosovo’s educational system are carryovers from the Yugoslav system of the Tito era. In my report on Krila Nade I mentioned the pedagogues that were present in Sarajevo’s schools. They are present in Kosovo as well, but are becoming less important there. There is a new educational strategy now that involves having a psychologist, a nurse, a doctor, and a social worker in each high school. Erëblir tells me that there is a new framework for the curriculum as well. New courses include health education. But there is a lack of resources for implementing the changes.
Erëblir says, “The official count of students per classroom is around 36. But it is not true. There are as many as 50 students in some classes.”
We talked about broader issues of economics and corruption in Kosovo as well. Erëblir told me that “Kosovo has a high percentage of the population that is under 30 years old, but they are leaving. People are losing hope. Youth unemployment is around 70%, while overall, it’s around 50%.”
“It is a ghetto feeling here. People want to leave. The only places they can go without a visa are Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Turkey. They can’t go to Bosnia without a visa. There is a special document that they can get to go to Bosnia and Greece.”
Regarding the economic situation, Erëblir told me, “Kosovo’s economy has to be focused on agriculture. We produce potatoes, tomatoes, and apples.” Kosovo’s biggest trading partners, both for export and import, are Macedonia, Serbia, Germany, and Turkey. “But the local Kosovar producers are giving up. Our farmers could grow and produce our own vegetables. We are importing tomatoes from Macedonia, and we don’t need to. The farmers can’t compete with these imports, and financial stimulation for domestic agriculture is small to non-existent.”
Along with the poor economy comes corruption – partly a cause, and partly a result. Erëblir mentioned the Hotel Grand as an example, saying that the deputy prime minister of Kosovo was involved in the corrupt privatization of that hotel.
“There was a scandal with the Minister of Internal Affairs,” Erëblir continued. “That Ministry entered a tender for printing Kosovo’s passports. They paid 14 million euros to an Austrian company. There was a woman who transferred ten percent of that tender back to some people from the Ministry. Upon inquiry into this kickback, she said, ‘I will tell the names of the people who engaged in the corruption, but you have to provide me with witness protection.’ EULEX refused to do this. …was it because it would ‘destabilize the government.’” (For more on this scandal, see http://www.vetevendosje.org/index.php?cid=2,2,5369&author=0.)
“Kosovo is a ghetto. There is uncontrolled construction going on here, without any plan. If there were an earthquake, everything would fall down like dominoes. There is corruption, and no enforcement of the laws.
“Then there was a new highway construction project, and the government wouldn’t tell the public how much it cost. Vetëvendosje published the figures, how much the international corporations Bechtel and Enka were being paid.”
I asked Erëblir his opinion on Vetëvendosje. He said, “Now I am closer to Vetëvendosje than I was before. I see that nothing is changing, and we need radical changes. I have given everything a chance, but in some aspects, things got even worse. Some people automatically associate Vetëvendosje with nationalism, but don’t want to take a look at what they are offering. Vetëvendosje wants the right to a referendum on unification with Albania. This is prohibited in our constitution. It is having the right to a referendum that is key. If people are not in favor of it, then they can vote that way. In any case, we are not going to wage a war to reunite with Albania. There has already been enough war.”
Q: Does Vetëvendosje want EULEX to leave?
A: “No, Vetëvendosje says they should stay, but as partners. And we need the foreign judges who are present in our court system to stay as well, but as equals.”
For my final question, I asked Erëblir, “Do you have hope?”
“I’m always hopeful,” he responded. “Remember, I was in the PostPessimists - we were beyond pessimism, but not yet optimistic.”
UPDATES
The Missing:
In my previous report I wrote about search for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s missing persons and Jasmin Odobašić’s work in this field. I mentioned that he had been removed from his position as head of the Sector for Operational, Legal, and Financial Affairs in the Missing Persons Institute in 2010 after having publicly criticized his colleagues. Odobašić appealed his removal. In a recent decision, the Appeals Council of the Bosnian Court found that he should be returned to his position in the Institute, and should be awarded thirty months’ back pay.
Formation of Srebrenica’s Municipal Assembly
In my eighth report, I mentioned with alarm some news about the formation of Srebrenica’s municipal assembly. It had been announced that the SDP and SBB (respectively, the social-democrat party of Zlatko Lagumdžija and the party of Fahrudin Radončić) were planning to form a coalition with the Serb-controlled parties in Srebrenica, thus nullifying the entire effort to elect Ćamil Duraković as a candidate from a coalition of parties that do not deny the fact that genocide took place in Srebrenica. Well, the municipal assembly was finally formed, on the last day of 2012, and no coalition was formed. The several parties involved – both Serb- and Bosniak-dominated – agreed to form a government with no opposition.
This unusual arrangement could mean that “instant coalitions” will form whenever it is convenient; it could also mean that the parties will all cooperate in the best interests of the people of Srebrenica. Time will tell.
Leaving Bosnia in November, I flew to Skopje, Macedonia. I spent some days there visiting friends and catching up, and then went to Kosovo for another few days. This report is about those visits, and about things I heard and saw in those places. I had not been to Macedonia or Kosovo for six years.
Some of the names in this report have been changed to protect people’s privacy.
MACEDONIA
I arrived at Alexander the Great International Airport on a Tuesday evening. As I was getting off the plane I immediately received a voice-mail message in my cell phone that said, “Welcome to Macedonia, the cradle of civilization.”
The population of Macedonia is around a couple million, with approximately one fourth of that number being Albanian, and most of the rest Christian Slavs. There have long been tensions between the two ethnic populations, with some flare-ups in the past dozen-odd years. Driving home from the airport with my old friend Gzim, I immediately asked if things were peaceful in Macedonia. He said, “Yes, they are, for now.”
That “for now” is significant, because during the year 2012 there were sporadic incidents of violence between Albanians and Macedonians. Churches were torched; five Macedonians were killed in one mysterious incident; Macedonian police shot two Albanians in another. Nothing like a war is threatened, but neither are relations friendly. (For more detail on this situation see “Macedonia: Ghost of Ethnic Conflict Returns,” December 28, 2012:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-ghost-of-ethnic-conflict-returns.)
Arriving home, I chatted with Gzim and his wife Drita. They explained to me that the Macedonian government was currently in the midst of a grandiose reconstruction project in the capital, where they were spending hundreds of millions of euros. The term “facelift” would be an understatement of the extent of this project, called “Skopje 2014.” In a huge way, they said, the project was a form of propaganda for the VMRO, the leading Macedonian nationalist party.
As “transitional” countries go, Macedonia is in a tricky situation. It is a small and poor country that aspires to join NATO and the EU. Right next door is Greece, already a member of those two structures. For reasons that adhere more to populist politics than to rationality, Greece opposes Macedonia’s membership. The reason given is that Macedonia chooses to call itself Macedonia. And because this name is associated with Greek history going all the way back to the fourth century B.C.E., the use of the name by “Slavic usurpers from the north” betrays Macedonia’s “aggressive territorial ambitions upon part of Greece.”
The historical region of Macedonia covered territory that, after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, fell to Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Yugoslav or Vardar Macedonia became part of post-World War I Yugoslavia, and during the Tito era became one of the six republics of Yugoslavia. After the Yugoslav federation broke up in the early 1990s, the new state named itself the Republic of Macedonia. In 1993 it was accepted into the UN as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or FYROM. Greece, when it is not calling Macedonia “Skopje,” insists upon this name being used as the country’s official name. I don’t know of any other country that is primarily referred to by initials containing a reference to another country that no longer exists.
Over the past few years, Macedonia’s nationalist government has promoted an increasingly populist and chauvinist, Slavic Macedonian atmosphere. To some extent this is a standard vote-getting strategy for domestic consumption, but it is also partially a response to Greece’s resistance to the acceptance of Macedonia into the European political and military infrastructure.
In the next few days, walking through various parts of Skopje, I would witness, with some astonishment, what Gzim and Drita were talking about.
*
The next morning, with eagerness, I walked into the old section of Skopje, to the northeast of the Vardar River. The Bit Pazar and the old Čaršija are located there. Coming into the neighborhood from the east, first I entered the Bit Pazar – literally, the “flea market.” There’s a covered section where mainly produce is sold, and then there are stalls purveying all kinds of other items. In the covered section, just to give a sample, I saw a vast area selling only red bell peppers. Seeing so many red bell peppers all together made me happy because it represented a culinary priority in that culture – so superior, in that way, to our cuisine.
Likewise, there were huge piles of leeks, cabbages, tomatoes, and onions. There were large bins displaying various kinds of rice, and in the next stall, beautiful big red bags of paprika and cayenne that would take most of us in the US years to consume. Nearby were great chunks of white cheese, and another stall with large bins of several different kinds and colors of olives. One man in a corner stall was selling plastic bags. The aroma, not really describable here, seemed to beckon anyone who was interested in preparing to make a typical southern Balkan meal.
The outside part of the Bit Pazar contained the products that we know from a department store, but each in its own stall. So you could buy shoes, razors, radios, bars of soap, packs of cigarettes, music CDs, t-shirts, hair curlers, fireworks, and so on and on, each from a different stall in the same area. One stall, a riot of red and black, sold patriotic Albanian t-shirts and flags. The Bit Pazar and Čaršija are dominated by Albanians, and the hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Albanian state was approaching.
Whenever I have been in the Bit Pazar I have noticed the music – Macedonian, Albanian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Turkish, playing in the stalls. I have felt that I am somehow in the geographic, or at least ethnographic center of the Balkans. I could see living there for a spell.
From the Bit Pazar I wandered into to the old Čaršija, or market area, and this feeling was only reinforced. I spoke Serbo-Croatian with the Albanians and Macedonians. I apologized to one shopkeeper for not knowing Albanian, only to learn that he was a local Turk. Many shopkeepers in the neighborhood, young and old, are prepared to sell things in five or six different languages, and to switch from one to another on the slightest hint that might be called for.
The streets were lively, although there were no tourists. At the very entrance to the Čaršija there was a man sitting on a stool, getting ready to play the ҫifteli, a traditional Albanian long-necked, two-stringed instrument. He was a middle-aged man, serious, wearing a traditional plis, a white felt cap shaped like half of an egg. There was a container for coins in front of him and, nearby, a glass of tea. I made a donation and he allowed me to photograph him. We talked, he told me that his name was Nevaip.
The Čaršija is arranged of several straight pedestrian streets paved with smooth-worn stones; as you walk down those streets you pass an ancient stone mosque here and there, or some other stone building constructed in the Ottoman period. There is an entire block of stores selling fancy wedding dresses, and another street of jewelry stores. One shop catered to women who covered their hair in a fashionable way. A back street is home to blacksmiths and metal workers. There, you could buy shovel heads, axes, pails, and home-made tin woodstoves. A man worked at a grinder, sharpening a scythe blade, outside his shop.
Every block was also home to a couple of casual restaurants where you could eat stew or grilled meat; there were also tea and coffee shops where men hung out. If the weather was dry you could see a couple of older men in black berets sitting at a table outside.
An oddity in the Balkans: I saw a storefront with the brightly-colored logo, “LGBT,” and the simple title, “Support Centre.” You would not see that in Bosnia or Serbia. Other than this detail, it seems that in the Bit Pazar and the Čaršija things have not changed, perhaps, since the 1950s.
There is little development of infrastructure in Skopje’s Albanian section. Skopje’s ethnic populations used to be much more mixed, with Albanians and Macedonians living in the same neighborhoods. But in the last fifteen-odd years, the two communities have been separating. Macedonians have been moving south of the Vardar. Albanians have been buying property in the neighborhoods of Ҫair and Butel, where Macedonians have moved out, leaving their old houses. The Albanians tear down those houses and put up new ones.
There is another Albanian neighborhood nearer to the river and the center of town, in a more convenient location. It has more of a run-down aspect, because the municipal government has not allowed people there to receive permits to build or improve their property. So everything is worn and decrepit there. “They want us to leave,” says Gzim.
Now the Albanian and Macedonian students go to separate schools. They used to go to the same schools, but took separate classes because of the language.
Gzim tells me that some Albanians in Macedonia are attaching to a conservative brand of Islam. He says that this is more of a trend in Macedonia, but not in Albania. He calls adherents to this conservative religion the “Taliban” of Macedonia, and says that their numbers are growing. They are sending their girls to elementary school wearing scarves.
*
I walked to the western end of the Čaršija and approached the ancient Kameni Most, the stone bridge over the Vardar. As I arrived, I saw that huge changes had taken place. First, a statue to Philip II of Macedonia was under construction, the finishing touches being implemented behind a rusty corrugated steel barrier. Then, just before the bridge, on one side of the entrance there was a statue of Saints Cyril and Methodius, and on the other side, a statue of Saints Naum and Kliment. These saints are ninth-century Christian missionaries. The former were Greeks from Thessaloniki, and the latter two were local Slavs. Philip II, father of Alexander the Great, lived nearly a millennium before the Slavs arrived in Macedonia.
To the left of the bridge, still on the same side of the river as the Čaršija, was an imposing, baroque-style Museum of Archeology. To the right of the bridge on the same side of the river were a couple more new, grand buildings. One housed the Ministry of the Interior. In front of one of these buildings there was a monument to Karposh, who mounted a rebellion against the Ottomans in the 17th century. Defeated, he was executed on the Kameni Most.
I felt slightly dizzy as I saw the lovely bridge surrounded by extravagant architecture that rendered the whole scene nearly unrecognizable.
I walked across the familiar old bridge, passing a couple of people selling CDs and cigarettes. I arrived at the grand plaza on the bigger, newer side of Skopje. I found it dotted with one statue after another. The Emperor Justinian was there, establishing (pre-Slavic) Macedonia’s early Byzantine credentials. Czar Samuel, 11th century conqueror of most of the Balkans, was there. Statues of the rebels Damjan Gruev and Goce Delčev cemented Macedonia’s hajduk, anti-Ottoman history.
Alexander himself reigned over the plaza on a horse rampant, and I have not mentioned another dozen-odd statues. I wouldn’t be surprised if Washington DC had fewer statues than this 2500 square meter plaza and an adjacent park. A replica of the Arc d’Triomphe stood off to the side, looking like an afterthought. Altogether, the ensemble of statues reminded me of an antique store filled with kitsch.
Compounding the tackiness of the scene, a large, permanent digital advertisement screen, which must have been some thirty feet long and twenty feet high, was mounted to one of the buildings. It prominently advertised local travel agencies and high-tech outlets.
Albanians, at least one quarter of Macedonia’s population, don’t exist in this idealized portrayal of Macedonian history and society. The only Albanian represented there was Mother Teresa, but her ethnicity was not mentioned.
In the glorious pantheon of Macedonian history, stretching twice the length of the Slavic presence on this territory, the timeline apparently ends right around 1940. The only mention of the Partisan era was to insinuate that Tito’s regime was an oppressor of the identity of the Macedonians. Other than that, the Tito era never happened. And the VMRO, Macedonia’s reconstituted, ruling nationalist party, is glorified as practically the founder of the nation.
A block away from this main commercial square stood a large park with more statues: the anti-Ottoman rebel Pitu Guli, the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, and an expansive monument to the VMRO, the resurrected Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. This party, dominating Macedonian politics today, named itself after the anti-Ottoman rebel movement that was founded in the late 19th century.
This leading political clique of Slavic Macedonia thus completes its credentials, ranging from ancient times to pre-World War II, constructing a national mythology that excludes Albanians and Partisans, and ignores Macedonia’s intertwined history with Bulgaria as well. In tying part of its identity to Alexander the Great, Macedonia’s profligate government spites Greece while simultaneously shooting itself in the foot by spending half a billion Euros on ridiculous construction, money that could be going to schools and factories.
Gzim tells me that there was less corruption in Macedonia during the socialist period than there is now – that now the government will, for example, announce that a statue or some construction project is going to cost ten million Euros, when the real cost would be five million. Then that extra five would go partially for kickbacks, and the rest directly into the pockets of the politicians. As in Bosnia and Serbia, the link between nationalism and corruption is a firm one.
For an extensive and very informative article on government support of culture in Macedonia, see “Macedonian Culture Strategy: Milestone or Wish List?” from November 15th, 2012, at:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonian-culture-strategy-milestone-or-wish-list.
This article mentions that seventy percent of Macedonia’s cultural monuments are in “critical condition,” with some “practically decomposing.” The medieval frescoes in Macedonia’s churches are a world treasure. There, just for one example, is a place where Macedonia could better spend its scarce funds.
Additionally, an excellent article that just came out explains the politics behind the above-described project in very clear terms. It describes the political system as being “held hostage to the egos of a few leaders who consider the country their property,” those leaders being “clusters of influential people, often well planted on both sides of the thin line that separates legality from crime.” The “clientelist” networks dominated by profiteer-politicians are distinguished not by any particular ideology or state-building agenda, but by their lust for riches and power. This applies to the political infrastructures dominating both the Macedonian and the Albanian sides.
The article describes the crafting of a national narrative that I have introduced above, commenting that the massive construction project on the Macedonian side is too expensive to undertake in a recession period. This can lead to further unrest. But, the article concludes, “When the political fight is left to warlords, it is not surprising that there is no respect for laws or civil liberties. Rules are made for those who are under them, not for the rulers.”
See “Patronage Politics Push Macedonia to a Precipice,” December 28th, 2012: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/patronage-politics-push-macedonia-to-a-precipice.
KOSOVO
I took an early bus from Skopje across the border to Kosovo, less than an hour away. Going into Kosovo, the scenery for the first half hour or so was unremarkable, not changed much since my previous visits. There were some dilapidated shacks and offices near the border in Blace, projecting the air of a neglected outpost. Soon afterwards the road, bordering on a canyon, entered a pleasant, undeveloped mountainous area.
About a half hour before the capital, Prishtina, there were signs of a kind of parasitical development that promises nothing productive. Boxy, glassy buildings with cheap metal siding lined the road, offering construction materials, new cars, and furniture. Here and there stood a gleaming hotel.
The scene read “foreign assistance” mixed with “remittance from the diaspora.” Later I was told that many Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora were building houses in Kosovo, leaving them empty, and coming back once a year to visit.
I remember that last time I was in Kosovo, in 2006, the country was discussing a declaration of independence. This declaration finally took place two years later, in February of 2008, and to date nearly one hundred states have recognized Kosovo (the most recent recognition coming from Pakistan, just last week). Of the EU members, 22 out of 27 states recognize Kosovo. Significantly, Serbia and Russia have not recognized Kosovo, and probably never will, or not for a long time.
There was euphoria on the streets in Kosovo when independence and statehood were proclaimed. But during my last visit I spoke with one man who said to me, “I don’t care about independence; I just want a job. Now, our economy is so poor that the only thing we are really exporting is money [for imported goods].” I would add that another significant export from Kosovo is people.
In Prishtina, I spoke with my friend Loran, the nephew of Gzim. He brought me up to date on political developments in Kosovo. Loran and all his relatives, many cousins, some uncles and aunts too, were all subject to the occupation and attacks by Serb forces in the late 1990s. Most of them were temporarily displaced; it’s fortunate and rather remarkable that they all survived that period, though not all of their properties were found intact after the war.
I spent some time in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 during that turbulent period, and wrote about it: see http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/kosovo98.htm from 1998; http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/kos99-1.htm from 1999, and various other reports whose links you can find if you scroll down towards the bottom of this page: http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/journal.htm.
When NATO was intervening and bombing many parts of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999, around 800,000 Albanians fled Kosovo for Montenegro and Macedonia, in response to heightened persecution from Serb forces. Those forces destroyed several hundred villages and killed thousands of Albanians.
Loran told me something I had not heard before about that period. The NATO intervention started in late March of 1999, and mistreatment of Albanians, which had been going on all along, immediately increased in a premeditated bid to rid Kosovo of its majority Albanian population. But, Loran told me, the expulsions stopped in May of that year, before the end of the intervention and the defeat of the Serbian forces. At that time, Loran said, “the Serbs stopped killing and expelling Albanians from Kosovo. They started registering us, instead.” Apparently it was deemed acceptable by the Serb authorities to retain a certain disempowered minority of non-Serbs within the province.
Loran also told me that, among the Albanians when he was growing up, “no one really believed that Yugoslavia was going to last for a very long time.” I remember speaking to young people in Kosovo, as long ago as the early 1980s, and hearing resentment of the discrimination and mistreatment they experienced at the hands of the Serbian rulers of their autonomous province. Some of them advocated the creation of Kosovo as a seventh republic within Yugoslavia – but I never heard promotion of Kosovo as an independent country at that time. However, Loran said, “The elders told us that Yugoslavia was not going to last forever.”
Present-day, semi-independent Kosovo has been engaged in state-building, but it faces a raft of problems. The poor, unproductive economy, with little to export, is one of them. Corruption among the leaders is another. Bad relations with neighboring Serbia is a third problem. The relationship between Kosovo’s government and Albanian majority, on one hand, and its minorities – especially its Serb inhabitants, on the other, are a particularly difficult problem. In the south, Serb enclaves are for the most part living in cooperation with the government. But in the north, the Ibar River acts as an unofficial border between the main part of Kosovo and a primarily Serb-inhabited region.
This area has repeatedly been the scene of violence between Serb separatists who refuse to recognize the sovereignty of Kosovo, and Kosovo’s authorities. And the status of northern Kosovo has served as a political issue to be manipulated by the Serbian government in Belgrade.
Because of ongoing instability, NATO has retained a military force, KFOR (Kosovo Force) in Kosovo. Over the years this force has been reduced to the point where it now numbers around 5,500 troops. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has created and enforced civil administration procedures. After Kosovo’s declaration of independence, UNMIK reduced its role in favor of EULEX, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. EULEX deploys several thousand European police and judges in Kosovo, and concerns itself with security and defense policy.
These international institutions have in some degree constituted a protectorate, their intervention in domestic matters compromising Kosovo’s sovereignty. That is why I call Kosovo semi-independent, in addition to the fact that, without Russia’s consent, its prospects for admission into the UN are nil. However, in the past year international supervision was declared to be over. And under international pressure, relations with Serbia are making very tentative steps forward as negotiations have been resumed and an agreement has been reached on bilateral supervision of the tense northern border of Kosovo.
For an overview of Kosovo’s international position, see the recent article, “Kosovo: Year of the Historic Handshake,” December 28, 2012, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-year-of-the-historic-handshake.
Over the years, the movement for self-determination Vetëvendosje (full name in Albanian: Lëvizja Vetëvendosje!) has played an interesting role as gadfly, a fighter against corruption and against the compromise of Kosovo’s sovereignty both by Serbia and the international officials who they see as giving that sovereignty away. Led by former student activist (and for two years political prisoner in Serbia) Albin Kurti, Vetëvendosje started as a grassroots movement, and a few years ago it transformed into a political party. During its movement years it was often in the headlines for fomenting unruly demonstrations in which projectiles were thrown and people were arrested. Kurti himself seemed to be in jail or under house arrest by the Albanian authorities just about as often as he was free. The organization has also been very creative in its use of graffiti and political theater.
I have mentioned Vetëvendosje because people in Kosovo have strong opinions about it. They either love Vetëvendosje or despise it. In any case, I think that the organization brings up very important issues and it is correct to mistrust Kosovo’s leaders, Serbian leaders, and international officials who they see as too willing to compromise on important issues. For these reasons, I tried to learn what people I met with thought about Vetëvendosje.
Some people call Vetëvendosje “nationalists” or “extremists.” Loran told me, “Vetëvendosje says that they are in favor of uniting with Albania, but they are not serious about it. This is just rhetoric.” Commenting on Vetëvendosje’s indoor-outdoor practices, he said, “It is not ok that they are in Parliament, but still organizing rowdy demonstrations...Vetëvendosje opposes negotiations with Serbia. But negotiations are needed. It shows that we are serious. And the European Commission has taken steps to bring Kosovo closer to the EU, even though our sovereignty is not complete. Maybe this took place because we have been willing to negotiate.”
For more information on Vetëvendosje, see its English language home page at http://www.vetevendosje.org/?cid=2,1.
Loran criticized the leaders of Kosovo for corruption, saying that money that comes into the country “is all going into the pockets of the politicians.” He added, “Most of the development money in Kosovo comes from the diaspora. Some of it comes from money laundering.”
On local administration in Prishtina, Loran said, “The mayor of Prishtina was chosen because he was popular, not because he was capable. He rejected a 30 million euro offer from the European Commission to build a sports complex behind the shopping center, simply because his party would not have control over the property.”
I bought a SIM card for my cell phone so that I could arrange meetings. Unlike in several other countries where I have done so, I was required to register my identity as owner of that phone number. In Bosnia, Croatia, Germany, and England you can walk into any cell phone store or a corner market, or even a kiosk, and purchase a phone number for the equivalent of a few dollars. In Kosovo I had to show my passport and fill out a form that even asked my father’s first name. Loran explained that the government has decided on this measure in order to cut down on crime. I told him, “I guess they don’t like the competition.”
Loran spoke of a lack of hope in Kosovo, saying that more Kosovars are now seeking asylum in Europe. He himself is thinking of leaving Kosovo. It would be hard for him and his wife, he said, but in the long run, it would afford a better life for his children.
*
For a recent article on militant Islam in Kosovo and in Macedonia, see “Fissures in the Faith: Rise of Conservative Islamists Alarms Kosovans,” December 24th, 2012: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fissures-in-the-faith-rise-of-conservative-islamists-alarms-kosovans
*
I spoke with my old friend Erëblir Kadriu. I met him when I came to Kosovo immediately after the NATO intervention. Then, he was a skinny high school kid, but a very intelligent and helpful one, and already an activist – among other things, a member of the regional PostPessimist Network (see http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=165433). He helped me set up interviews with various activists.
Over twelve years later, Erëblir is the same guy – just not skinny anymore. He spent five years in the United States, finishing his high school and undergraduate studies. Then, he returned to his native Kosovo – a patriotic and optimistic act – and became a teacher. Later he received a master’s degree in psychology and education at Cambridge. He is considering pursuing PhD studies.
You can see that this puts Erëblir in an area of interest very similar to Belma and the staff of Krila Nade in Sarajevo, whom I wrote about in my last report.
Today, Erëblir wears many hats; his list of undertakings is impressive. He works as a guidance counselor at American School of Kosovo; runs the American Advising Center-EducationUSA Center in Kosovo; teaches social psychology and research methods at the University of Prishtina; and does research in educational activities for students. Erëblir also works with an NGO called IPE, International Progressive Education (see www.ipeks.org).
IPE provides information about state building and civil society, and supports research on educational issues. The NGO is involved in research on training teachers in this work. One study that it has implemented asked students about their perception of a good teacher. Another study dealt with teachers' experience in curriculum reforms in Kosovo. IPE also plans to conduct a study on school violence.
Together with colleagues from the American School and IPE, Erëblir organizes an event called the “Kosovar and Regional Student Conference on Social Issues.” Participants are a mixed group of young people including local Albanians, Serbs, and Americans. The most recent conference took place this year in Kosovo, on December 7th and 8th. Young Serbs from North Mitrovica and Serbia attended. Students presented reports on social issues such as economics, education, privatization, gender issues, and religion.
Erëblir told me, “People who attended from different parts of the region became good friends with each other after a few days. On Friday and Saturday the activities were at the school dormitory. People went bowling together.”
Regarding the research that IPE shares with teachers, Erëblir says, “The teachers learn and say, ‘These are great techniques, but we can’t practice them in classes of up to 45 students.’ …There is a disconnect between the theory and the practical. People attend the trainings but then they are blocked because of the large classes, also because of problems with resources. For example, it is difficult even to photocopy something for the students. A class lesson has to go to the school principal for approval. And some school maintenance projects even have to be approved by the municipality. It takes forever, for example, just to fix a broken window.”
Some aspects of Kosovo’s educational system are carryovers from the Yugoslav system of the Tito era. In my report on Krila Nade I mentioned the pedagogues that were present in Sarajevo’s schools. They are present in Kosovo as well, but are becoming less important there. There is a new educational strategy now that involves having a psychologist, a nurse, a doctor, and a social worker in each high school. Erëblir tells me that there is a new framework for the curriculum as well. New courses include health education. But there is a lack of resources for implementing the changes.
Erëblir says, “The official count of students per classroom is around 36. But it is not true. There are as many as 50 students in some classes.”
We talked about broader issues of economics and corruption in Kosovo as well. Erëblir told me that “Kosovo has a high percentage of the population that is under 30 years old, but they are leaving. People are losing hope. Youth unemployment is around 70%, while overall, it’s around 50%.”
“It is a ghetto feeling here. People want to leave. The only places they can go without a visa are Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Turkey. They can’t go to Bosnia without a visa. There is a special document that they can get to go to Bosnia and Greece.”
Regarding the economic situation, Erëblir told me, “Kosovo’s economy has to be focused on agriculture. We produce potatoes, tomatoes, and apples.” Kosovo’s biggest trading partners, both for export and import, are Macedonia, Serbia, Germany, and Turkey. “But the local Kosovar producers are giving up. Our farmers could grow and produce our own vegetables. We are importing tomatoes from Macedonia, and we don’t need to. The farmers can’t compete with these imports, and financial stimulation for domestic agriculture is small to non-existent.”
Along with the poor economy comes corruption – partly a cause, and partly a result. Erëblir mentioned the Hotel Grand as an example, saying that the deputy prime minister of Kosovo was involved in the corrupt privatization of that hotel.
“There was a scandal with the Minister of Internal Affairs,” Erëblir continued. “That Ministry entered a tender for printing Kosovo’s passports. They paid 14 million euros to an Austrian company. There was a woman who transferred ten percent of that tender back to some people from the Ministry. Upon inquiry into this kickback, she said, ‘I will tell the names of the people who engaged in the corruption, but you have to provide me with witness protection.’ EULEX refused to do this. …was it because it would ‘destabilize the government.’” (For more on this scandal, see http://www.vetevendosje.org/index.php?cid=2,2,5369&author=0.)
“Kosovo is a ghetto. There is uncontrolled construction going on here, without any plan. If there were an earthquake, everything would fall down like dominoes. There is corruption, and no enforcement of the laws.
“Then there was a new highway construction project, and the government wouldn’t tell the public how much it cost. Vetëvendosje published the figures, how much the international corporations Bechtel and Enka were being paid.”
I asked Erëblir his opinion on Vetëvendosje. He said, “Now I am closer to Vetëvendosje than I was before. I see that nothing is changing, and we need radical changes. I have given everything a chance, but in some aspects, things got even worse. Some people automatically associate Vetëvendosje with nationalism, but don’t want to take a look at what they are offering. Vetëvendosje wants the right to a referendum on unification with Albania. This is prohibited in our constitution. It is having the right to a referendum that is key. If people are not in favor of it, then they can vote that way. In any case, we are not going to wage a war to reunite with Albania. There has already been enough war.”
Q: Does Vetëvendosje want EULEX to leave?
A: “No, Vetëvendosje says they should stay, but as partners. And we need the foreign judges who are present in our court system to stay as well, but as equals.”
For my final question, I asked Erëblir, “Do you have hope?”
“I’m always hopeful,” he responded. “Remember, I was in the PostPessimists - we were beyond pessimism, but not yet optimistic.”
UPDATES
The Missing:
In my previous report I wrote about search for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s missing persons and Jasmin Odobašić’s work in this field. I mentioned that he had been removed from his position as head of the Sector for Operational, Legal, and Financial Affairs in the Missing Persons Institute in 2010 after having publicly criticized his colleagues. Odobašić appealed his removal. In a recent decision, the Appeals Council of the Bosnian Court found that he should be returned to his position in the Institute, and should be awarded thirty months’ back pay.
Formation of Srebrenica’s Municipal Assembly
In my eighth report, I mentioned with alarm some news about the formation of Srebrenica’s municipal assembly. It had been announced that the SDP and SBB (respectively, the social-democrat party of Zlatko Lagumdžija and the party of Fahrudin Radončić) were planning to form a coalition with the Serb-controlled parties in Srebrenica, thus nullifying the entire effort to elect Ćamil Duraković as a candidate from a coalition of parties that do not deny the fact that genocide took place in Srebrenica. Well, the municipal assembly was finally formed, on the last day of 2012, and no coalition was formed. The several parties involved – both Serb- and Bosniak-dominated – agreed to form a government with no opposition.
This unusual arrangement could mean that “instant coalitions” will form whenever it is convenient; it could also mean that the parties will all cooperate in the best interests of the people of Srebrenica. Time will tell.
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