"The Destruction of Yugoslavia" by Branka Magas--Part Two

Part Two: Interregnum (1980-88)

Part Two essentially covers the same time frame as Part One, but instead of focusing on events in Kosovo, the focus here is on the reaction of the post-Tito state to growing economic and social unrest, and on the growing rift between the Party and the working class.

We being with the death of Tito and the resulting fears of threats both external (which seem to have rightly not been considered as dire) and internal--specifically the danger of nationalism, and the dire economic situation the country found itself in. These twin dangers were not unrelated, as republican bureaucratic elites found that nationalism was an effective device to shore up their own power in reaction to economic fear and uncertainty. In the meantime, the working class was increasingly disconnected from the Party and shut out from any considerations of how to deal with the deteriorating economic conditions. With the Federal center weakened and more and more political power devolved to the republics (and more and more economic power devolved to local bosses like Fikret Abdic), the Party proved to be bankrupt of new ideas and of any ability to rally the working class to the cause of Yugoslav unity. Instead, repression and reaction, in hopes to squelching dissent and social disorder until the country somehow, some way managed to recover economically.

Magas notes, more than any other Western source I've read, how much the Polish coup and the resistance of Solidarity in Poland influenced and inspired events in Yugoslavia in the early 1980s. There were demonstrations and petitions in support of the Polish workers, and sometimes the Yugoslav state reacted repressively in reaction, including the mysterious death of Radomir Radovic, an activist worker who had a long history of fighting for workers' rights.

This occurred within the context of a broad campaign of increasing repression throughout Yugoslavia, as even meetings of intellectuals and academics were raided and banned, and participants often arrested, and sometimes incarcerated.

At this point, Magas considers the severe, almost punitive, measures the IMF imposed on Yugoslavia as a result of its enormous foreign debt and continuing economic decline. This is important, because many Left-revisionists have argued that these pressures by the IMF represented the sharp end of the wedge designed by Western interests to dismember Yugoslavia and it socialist economy. While their analysis is ridiculous on the face of it--they have little other actual evidence to support such a claim, even if one can believe that western financial interests desired to the violent disintegration of a nation which owed them so much money, and which possessed resources and an infrastructure which were of much more value intact that war-ravaged--it also ignores the fact that these economic problems were very real, and were not merely the product of Western conniving. Yugoslavia's economy was failing, and the political class lacked the will or the ability to rise above individual Republican interests in order to formulate a coherent, effective response. The alienation of the working class from the Party only furthered the problem--the response of the state was repression, denial, and wishful thinking.

One of the fatal weaknesses of Tito's rule was that he simply sucked all the oxygen out of the room, so to speak--there was no room in the political sphere of the country to consider the difficult realities that the deteriorating economic situation presented; the cumbersome collective presidency that Tito bequeathed to his beloved Federation after his death made it virtually impossible for a coherent, national response to these difficulties to be formulated, much less implemented. The Yugoslav press continued to report on the unpleasant realities the ruling elite and the Party continued to ignore, but the repression of strikes by worker in Bosnia and Macedonia by their respective republican governments--with no intervention on the side of workers by the Party, and no involvement by the Federal government--only underscored the continuing deterioration of the federal center and the growth of increasingly nationalist-leaning Republic governments. The Serbian crushing of unrest in Kosovo--without protest from the Federal government--further demonstrated how power was there for the taking, if unscrupulous demagogues were willing to fan the flames of nationalism, calling for "unity" in the face of unaddressed economic decline.

Decentralization was now a problem, turning republic governments into institutional conduits for nationalism and sectarianism, even as economic decentralization led to the creation of local bosses like Fikret Abdic even as it did nothing to strengthen the position of workers within "socialist self-management."

The campaign against Slovenia in the Serb press only underscored what was at stake--nationalism could be a tool for greater democratic freedom, as Slovene elites fought to maintain their republics political power within a Federation in which an otherwise desirable centralization was in actuality a front for Greater Serb hegemony. The increasing hostility towards the Slovene leadership from an increasingly Serb nationalist-controlled central government, as well as the growing belligerence of the Serb Republican government, in this period is another context which revisionists and Serb nationalist apologists routinely ignore when blaming Slovene separatism for the breakup of the country. Magas makes it quite clear that Yugoslav "unity" was, by the late 1980s, nothing but a sham.

"Balkan Idols" by Vjekoslav Perica [12]

CHAPTER SIX: UNITED WE STAND, DIVIDED WE FALL

[continued]

Civil Relgion in a Communist Country

Every successful nation-state needs a "civil religion" of some kind; some shared belief to which the people can give loyalty. Holding a nation together by force alone is ultimately futile.

These civil religions involve founding myths, cults around "founding fathers" and other national heroes, a sense of national mission ("exceptionalism", as Perica puts it), and various patriotic ceremonies, rituals, commemorations, memorials, and--in Yugoslavia especially--sports.

In Communist Yugoslavia, the civil religion was built on the creed of "Brotherhood and Unity," which was founded on various national myths including the Partisan resistance of WWII, the break with Stalin in 1948, the unity and harmony between all the national groups making up Yugoslavia, the cult of Tito, the leadership of the non-aligned nations movement and the form of "self-management" socialism that Yugoslavia pursued, and finally the important role assigned to sport in Yugoslav ideology.

The Myth of the Nation's Origin: Yugoslav Victories over Hitler and Stalin

The Partisan anti-fascist struggle was by far the most successful and broad-based liberation movement in all of Europe during WWII. Although Allied aid cannot be discounted, the Yugoslavs could justifiably take pride that they had, by and large, freed themselves from the Nazis and their domestic allies (most notably the NDH and, later, the Chetniks). The liberation struggle was both costly and popular--casualty rates were high, especially for Party member who were expected to take leadership roles and risk in combat; at the same time the Partisan forces grew in size until what began as a guerrilla movement ended up fielding large armies and even a proper air force and navy. The heroism of the war went beyond the ideologically committed cadres--this was truly a People's War, with members of Yugoslavia's many minorities well-represented.

This war became the founding myth, commemorated with countless "people's heroes" and battlefield commemorations, etc. Ultimately, Tito's break with Stalin--and his ability to hold power against the attempted Stalinist purge from within--can be explained at least partially because Tito's appeal was to nationalism rather than class identity. Stalin himself understood this, but failed to rein Tito in.

Self-Management and Nonalignment

The shift from Stalinist-style communism and the creation of "self-managed" socialism--which borrowed as much, if not more, from 19th Century socialism than from orthodox Marxism--was a source of genuine pride and self-identity for Yugoslavs. As was Tito's leadership role in what became known as the organization of non-aligned countries.

The Myth of Brotherhood and Unity

The ideal of "Brotherhood and Unity" was premised on the idea that ethnic strife (most notably Greater Serbia ideology) was a threat to the peace and stability of Yugoslavia, and it was up to the party to dampen and eventually exterminate such passions. The official ideology did not seek to create a new, "Yugoslav" nationality, but rather to encourage and promote tolerance and mutual acceptance among the countries various national groups.

This civil religion was no mere figment of Tito's imagination; at least some observers have argued that the country was not held together primarily by force. And when the option of selecting "Yugoslav" as an ethnic label was offered, it became increasingly popular over the years (particularly in Bosnia). Studies showed that self-described Yugoslavs were less religious than other citizens, and more hostile to the various national churches. At the same time, they were more likely to participate in civic and official patriotic events. They're "Yugoslavism" was genuine and deep-seated.

The Tito Cult

Tito was a larger-than-life figure to Yugoslavs, and much revolutionary sentiment was directly tied to him. The Tito cult died hard; in the late 1980s, as the League of Communists lost powerful to the republics, loyalty to Tito's and his legacy remained strong.

A Patriotic Ritual: Tito's Relay

Although Tito later decreed that this annual celebration of his birthday be renamed the "Youth Relay" as a way of underscoring the nation's youth and vitality, it never lost the strong connection to personally commemorating the leader. The relay passed through all the republics, and the baton--containing a birthday message to Tito--was carried by young representatives of different Yugoslav nationalities.

The Myth of the Yugoslav Synergy: Was There a Secret Link?

In this final section, Perica briefly discusses some of the arguments against the legitimacy of Yugoslavia' civil religion. The anti-communists and nationalists, he argues, faced the burden imposed by the fact that "Brotherhood and Unity," in many ways, was a success. Nationalists had to turn to a sense of martyrdom, the notion that their respective national group had been subverted, oppressed, and betrayed in the trap of nations that made up Yugoslavia.

Perica concludes the chapter with the heartfelt claim that Yugoslavia, and the creed of brotherhood and unity, could have outlived not only Tito's death but even the end of communism. There was nothing in the creed incompatible with democracy, and the Tito cult could have lived on as a unifying national myth of tolerance. But he concludes this hopeful tone with a more somber note--this myth alone was not enough. Yugoslavia needed to have begun democratization much earlier.

"Balkan Idols" by Vjekoslav Perica [7]

CHAPTER THREE: THE OTHER SERBIA

The Serbian Orthodox Church in the Communist Federation

"The Communist Party of Yugoslavia considered Great Serbian nationalism the principal enemy of the revolution."

Despite getting a lion's share of state support, in many other ways the Serbian Orthodox Church suffered under Tito, and lost ground to the Croatian Catholic Church and the Islamic Community.

Kosovo Embattled

The sack of Serbian Communist Aleksandar Rankovic ended his efforts to increase the size of the Serb majority in Kosovo. Ethnic Albanians rebelled frequently from 1968 to 1973, winning a greater degree of autonomy from Belgrade but also posing a threat to ethnic Serbs, who had lost their privileged status.

The Serbian Orthodox Church reacted strongly to this backlash, holding an unauthorized liturgy in honor of Dusan the Mighty, the medieval Serbian tsar. The public ceremony explicitly linked the fate of contemporary Serbs with the status of Kosovo and the legendary legacy associated with it.

The Church also increased the volume and intensity of its claims that there was widespread persecution of ethnic Serbs, and their cultural and religious sites, in Kosovo. Claims of widespread rape of Serb women by Albanians were vigorously disseminated by the Church, although official records did not substantiate these claims.

Schism and Disunity

Despite the efforts of Patriarch Germanus to keep the Macedonian Orthodox in the fold (the Serbian Church even acknowledged the newly defined Macedonian nationality), in 1967 the Macedonian Orthodox churches formally broke away to form their own national church. The schism was not encouraged by federal authorities, but did little to discourage it, either.

Macedonian nationalists naturally tried to claim that there had always been an indigenous Macedonian Orthodox Church. The Serbian Orthodox Church did what it could to make life difficult for this new national church, and the heavy-handed efforts of the state to lean on the Serb church in order to force it to accept the new reality only produced a reactionary and stubborn backlash. The fact that the Vatican was supportive of the new church deepened anti-Catholic sentiment among Serb Orthodox clergy. Turf wars over control of a historic monastery had the effect of making the new church and the Macedonian republic government into allies.

At the same time, there was another schism, as the hardline anti-Communist Serbian Church in the USA--which had officially continued to support the Chetniks and the royalist cause even after the American government threw its support to the Partisans--officially broke with the mother church. The American hierarchy accused Germanus and the Serbian leadership with cooperation and appeasement of the communist regime.

The pro-regime clerical association worried the churches leadership; this organization provided persions to members of the clergy who had supported the Partisan cause. Despite the churches official position during the war, many lower-level clerics had supported the Partisan movement, if only because they were victims of, or threatened by, Usasha violence. These were paid as part of a larger clerical association, which encouraged and rewarded support for "Brotherhood and Unity." Two-thirds of the Serb clergy belonged.

The regime also sought to create a stronger and more distinct Montenegrin identity, separate from Serbia. These efforts included the destruction of the old chapel housing the remains of Prince-Bishiop Njegos, which were then moved to a new, secular mausoleum.

Commemorations and Renewal

The religiosity of ordinary Orthodox continued to decline, to rates of belief much lower than for Catholics or Muslims. The church leadership took to raising consciousness by frequent public displays and commemorations, cementing the church as a repository of ethnic and national identity in lieu of widespread individual devotion.

Germanus also turned his attention to foreign relations, especially with Orthodox churches overseas--particularly with the Russian church. The two churches stressed the cultural and religious ties between their two peoples, and their shared sense of being both special and threatened peoples, surrounded by jealous and hostile others.

The state was quite suspicious of the Serbian Church; Perica quotes documents which surmise that the church understood it did not have theological or spiritual sway over the masses, so it turned to ethnic and nationalist sentiment. The church played to fears--and stoked them--in order to strengthen it's position. The Serbian Orthodox Church increasingly presented itself as the defenders of Serbian national interests. And by purging any party members sympathetic to Serbian sentiments and fears, real or imagined, he unwittingly ceded the cause of Serbian nationalism to non-secular forces. The Church was well-positioned to pick up the mantle which Tito had allowed to fall unclaimed.