I repeat my recommendation of this excellent, well-researched, and readable account on the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This book is of interest to anyone curious to understand more about the Bosnian war; it should be noted that while the topic requires Hoare to cover certain military incidents and trends, it is not a military history of the war, but rather a study of the development of the ARBiH. Unfortunately, while the military story ends somewhat positively (against the odds, the ARBiH managed to prevent the absolute destruction of the country), the institutional story is much less ambiguous, and much more discouraging.
The ARBiH became a more effective fighting force in the final two years of the war, but it also abandoned its (admittedly always somewhat nominal) commitment to a multicultural, secular Bosnia. The army became an explicitly Muslim nationalist armed force. While that might not be a surprise to any reader familiar with the inevitable breakdown of interethnic cooperation in a vicious ethnic war; the point that Attila Hoare brings to light is how much of this process was a deliberate policy on the part of the leadership. He details how the control over the army by the civilian government was usurped by the SDA leadership; the army became a party army directly controlled by Izetbegovic and his party. The government was out of the loop, and the army's leadership instituted policies in line with SDA ideology.
Attila Hoare traces this depressing development adeptly. The breakdown in relations between ARBiH leaders and various non-Bosniak factions within the army and the government are painful to read; nor does the author shy away from detailing episodes of gross human rights violations by ARBiH units. The stubborn refusal to accept cooperation from friendly HVO factions after the outbreak of war between Herzegovina separatists and government forces defies understanding. And most depressing of all is Attila Hoare's contention that Izetbegovic and the SDA were, in the final two years at least, fighting for a Muslim ministate (or "parastate" in his apt phrasing, which he applies throughout the book to Herceg-Bosna and Republika Srpska as well) of their own, even while publicly maintaining a commitment to a unified, secular Bosnia. Ultimately, Bosnia was betrayed by their political leaders just as it was betrayed by an indifferent international community.
This does not suggest to me that intervention would have been less justified; if anything this breakdown in commitment to a unified Bosnia by the ruling party (as opposed to it citizens) only illustrates how in such situations the international community needs to intervene early rather than to wait for the situation to deteriorate.
Attila Hoare's brief Appendix on Osama bin Ladin and Al Qaeda is worthy reading, acknowledging the controversy over the mujahedin in Bosnia and then dismissing most of said controversy as overblown. This most likely will not have much effect on Bosnian revisionists keen to believe that the Bosnian government was an Islamist front bringing jihad to the Balkans. I'm quite certain he knows that mere facts are not enough to dissuade the likes of Diana Johnstone and Jared Israel; most likely he believes they are simply not worth the bother.
Again: I highly recommend this book.
In Bosnia, a war was fought between civic nationalism and individual liberty versus ethnic nationalism and collectivism. Bosnia's struggle was, and is, America's struggle. Dedicated to the struggle of all of Bosnia's peoples--Bosniak, Croat, Serb, and others--to find a common heritage and a common identity.
Showing posts with label HVO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label HVO. Show all posts
Thursday, January 24, 2008
Sunday, January 20, 2008
"How Bosnia Armed" by Marko Attila Hoare [1]
Marko Attila Hoare has written extensively on Bosnia and the Balkan wars; you can access many of his recent articles through his own blog: Great Surbiton. Of special note, given the emphasis of this blog, is this article (linked from Balkan Witness):
The Left Revisionists
which I have read and re-read many times over the past couple of years while struggling to articulate my own critique of left-wing Balkan revisionism.
I am now reading How Bosnia Armed, his study of the development, history and, and institutional structure of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). Hoare's knowledge and the depth of his research is impressive, and he certainly benefits from being fluent in Serbo-Croat. The book is briskly written and concise--Hoare keeps to the subject at hand, and as a result this book is both focused and brief.
In the Forward, Brendan Simms--author of Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia--notes that the book sheds light on the months and years leading up to the outbreak of war, when the Serb nationalist leadership was deliberately and systematically preparing for ethnic war while the Muslim and pro-Bosnian population had no inkling of what was in store. This is a strong refutation of Diana Johnstone's gross exaggerations about the SDA's preparations for war, if nothing else.
Simms also notes that the book examines the effect of Western policy on the development of the ARBiH; specifically, on the ultimate failure of the army to live up to its early--if somewhat (but not entirely) symbolic--secular, multicultural ideal. The depressing reality is that as the ARBiH became a more organized and formidable fighting force, it became less and less a truly Bosnian army, morphing into more explicitly nationalist-Muslim institution. However, it never became as "Islamist" army; an important distinction, and if Hoare does nothing other than decisively refute this revisionist claim, his book will have preformed an important service.
In his Introduction, Hoare touches on some of the same points Simms made, while more precisely defining the parameters of his study; while he will touch on the development of the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS) and the Croat Defense Council (HVO), this is not a study of the military history of the war or a detailed study of all the actors in that struggle. He is interested in the dual institutional history of the ARBiH, which was developed both from the Tito-era Territorial Defense militias and the Patriotic League cells developed after the ascent of the SDA. He is also interested in how the SDA leadership dealt with the conflicting aims of being a Muslim nationalist party in charge of a secular, multifaith/multiethnic republic, and how that tension affected the development and institutional structure of the ARBiH.
He also discusses "the role of foreign mujahedin [his spelling] and the truth about bin Laden's alleged involvement." Given some other recent developments in the region, having a well-researched, definitive study of Al Qaeda in Bosnia is of vital importance.
The Left Revisionists
which I have read and re-read many times over the past couple of years while struggling to articulate my own critique of left-wing Balkan revisionism.
I am now reading How Bosnia Armed, his study of the development, history and, and institutional structure of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). Hoare's knowledge and the depth of his research is impressive, and he certainly benefits from being fluent in Serbo-Croat. The book is briskly written and concise--Hoare keeps to the subject at hand, and as a result this book is both focused and brief.
In the Forward, Brendan Simms--author of Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia--notes that the book sheds light on the months and years leading up to the outbreak of war, when the Serb nationalist leadership was deliberately and systematically preparing for ethnic war while the Muslim and pro-Bosnian population had no inkling of what was in store. This is a strong refutation of Diana Johnstone's gross exaggerations about the SDA's preparations for war, if nothing else.
Simms also notes that the book examines the effect of Western policy on the development of the ARBiH; specifically, on the ultimate failure of the army to live up to its early--if somewhat (but not entirely) symbolic--secular, multicultural ideal. The depressing reality is that as the ARBiH became a more organized and formidable fighting force, it became less and less a truly Bosnian army, morphing into more explicitly nationalist-Muslim institution. However, it never became as "Islamist" army; an important distinction, and if Hoare does nothing other than decisively refute this revisionist claim, his book will have preformed an important service.
In his Introduction, Hoare touches on some of the same points Simms made, while more precisely defining the parameters of his study; while he will touch on the development of the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS) and the Croat Defense Council (HVO), this is not a study of the military history of the war or a detailed study of all the actors in that struggle. He is interested in the dual institutional history of the ARBiH, which was developed both from the Tito-era Territorial Defense militias and the Patriotic League cells developed after the ascent of the SDA. He is also interested in how the SDA leadership dealt with the conflicting aims of being a Muslim nationalist party in charge of a secular, multifaith/multiethnic republic, and how that tension affected the development and institutional structure of the ARBiH.
He also discusses "the role of foreign mujahedin [his spelling] and the truth about bin Laden's alleged involvement." Given some other recent developments in the region, having a well-researched, definitive study of Al Qaeda in Bosnia is of vital importance.
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