2. INVISIBLE ECONOMIC CAUSES
This next section purports to document the weakening of Yugoslavia's socialist economy by the IMF and other Western actors. The section starts off with this odd statement:
"During the 1990s, Yugoslavia was disparaged as a sort of mini-USSR which was taking too long to abandon communism."
Actually, during the 1990s Yugoslavia was being torn apart by war and genocide.
Despite this strange--and understandably non-footnoted (where on Earth would you get a 'source' for this assertion?)--opening, THIS section actually contains some actual facts NOT being used facetiously.
Although Johnstone is a little too laudatory towards Yugoslavia's particular brand of decentralized socialism (it was still inefficient; it did not translate into civil liberties and freedom, as communist Yugoslavia was an 'open' country only in comparison to the Warsaw Pact nations; the decentralization was largely theoretical as long as Tito held all the reins, regardless), it is true, as she claims, that the standard of living in Yugoslavia wasn't bad, especially considering how poor, rural, and underdevoped it had been.
She also notes, though with less emphasis than is probably called for, how Yugoslavia's unique non-aligned status benefitted the country and its economy during the Cold War. Its economy did indeed go through a rather sudden decline in the 80s as credit dried up; the fall of the USSR ended Yugoslavia's usefulness as a counter to Soviet influence.
All of this is true. The situation in Yugoslavia was getting dire by the end of the 1980s, after the death of Tito--the 'great oak' who let nothing grow in his shadow--robbed the nation of any centralizing or unifying figure of sufficient note. None of this, however, explains why a genocide happened. Context is not causation.
Monday, July 31, 2006
"Fools' Crusade" Chapter One [4]
WHAT WAS REALLY WRONG WITH MILOSEVIC
Here Johnstone presents her portrait of Milosevic to counter the 'fictional character' of the previous section:
"What was really wrong with Milosevic is indeed closely related to what was wrong with the Serbian people as Yugoslavia began to come apart at the seams in the 1980s: they were extremely divided."
Johnstone does not go on to say that "Only Unity Saves the Serb," but the slogan of Serb nationalism echoes throughout this entire section. Johnstone does not explain why the diffusion of ethnic Serbs throughout the different republics of Yugoslavia, and the various divisions in their society (rural versus urban, political differences, etc.) are somehow more significant than, for example, the Albanian diaspora. Jews are pretty divided, too, as are the Irish, the Arabs, and the Kurds. Just to give a few examples.
Johnstone mentions Milosevic's 'ambiguity' several times in this section, the better to portray him as nothing more than just another ambitious, democratrically elected politician. She uses the fact that Milosevic's Socialist Party got more votes than the Serbian Radical Party as proof that the voters in Serbia rejected nationalism, unlike voters in Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia. That Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party was an ally of Milosevic, or the fact that the Serbian Socialist Party appealed to nationalist sentiment while led by Milosevic, simply doesn't figure in to her picture of the situation.
It is true that Milosevic was not a true believer in nationalism; he didn't really believe in anything but achieving and holding on to power. The issue in Yugoslavia was not the sincerity of Milosevic's nationalist beliefs, but rather the actions he took; nationalist sentiment was the source of his rise to power, and he used nationalist leaders like Seselj and Cosic until they became inconvenient the same way he used his old friend Stambolic back when it was more practical to be a dutiful Communist functionary and party member.
It is true that the Communist leadership in Yugoslavia sought to muffle and supress nationalist sentiment. Milosevic's record is clear--he kept his mouth shut in the late 1980s as the Kosovo crisis flared, so that he was the highest ranking Serbian leader who had not publicly condemned nationalist sentiment; and when he had the opportunity in 1987 at Kosovo Polje (an occassion that, unlike the facetiously tolerant 1989 speech, Johnstone pointedly ignores) to seize the moment and present himself as the leader of the Serb people (as opposed to the Republic), he did so.
Of course, years later--when the war was going badly, the Serbs were beginning to lose what they had gained, the Bosnian Serb leadershop stopped taking orders, and the US and NATO made it clear they'd finally had enough--Milosevic would ditch nationalism and even the Serb people outside of Serbia proper who'd been misfortunate enough to believe him.
Here Johnstone presents her portrait of Milosevic to counter the 'fictional character' of the previous section:
"What was really wrong with Milosevic is indeed closely related to what was wrong with the Serbian people as Yugoslavia began to come apart at the seams in the 1980s: they were extremely divided."
Johnstone does not go on to say that "Only Unity Saves the Serb," but the slogan of Serb nationalism echoes throughout this entire section. Johnstone does not explain why the diffusion of ethnic Serbs throughout the different republics of Yugoslavia, and the various divisions in their society (rural versus urban, political differences, etc.) are somehow more significant than, for example, the Albanian diaspora. Jews are pretty divided, too, as are the Irish, the Arabs, and the Kurds. Just to give a few examples.
Johnstone mentions Milosevic's 'ambiguity' several times in this section, the better to portray him as nothing more than just another ambitious, democratrically elected politician. She uses the fact that Milosevic's Socialist Party got more votes than the Serbian Radical Party as proof that the voters in Serbia rejected nationalism, unlike voters in Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia. That Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party was an ally of Milosevic, or the fact that the Serbian Socialist Party appealed to nationalist sentiment while led by Milosevic, simply doesn't figure in to her picture of the situation.
It is true that Milosevic was not a true believer in nationalism; he didn't really believe in anything but achieving and holding on to power. The issue in Yugoslavia was not the sincerity of Milosevic's nationalist beliefs, but rather the actions he took; nationalist sentiment was the source of his rise to power, and he used nationalist leaders like Seselj and Cosic until they became inconvenient the same way he used his old friend Stambolic back when it was more practical to be a dutiful Communist functionary and party member.
It is true that the Communist leadership in Yugoslavia sought to muffle and supress nationalist sentiment. Milosevic's record is clear--he kept his mouth shut in the late 1980s as the Kosovo crisis flared, so that he was the highest ranking Serbian leader who had not publicly condemned nationalist sentiment; and when he had the opportunity in 1987 at Kosovo Polje (an occassion that, unlike the facetiously tolerant 1989 speech, Johnstone pointedly ignores) to seize the moment and present himself as the leader of the Serb people (as opposed to the Republic), he did so.
Of course, years later--when the war was going badly, the Serbs were beginning to lose what they had gained, the Bosnian Serb leadershop stopped taking orders, and the US and NATO made it clear they'd finally had enough--Milosevic would ditch nationalism and even the Serb people outside of Serbia proper who'd been misfortunate enough to believe him.
Sunday, July 30, 2006
"Fools' Crusade" Chapter One [3]
MILOSEVIC: A FICTIONAL CHARACTER
This next section is essentially a page of quotes from Western politicians and pundits describing Milosevic in extreme terms: as an "extreme nationalist," "genocidal killer," "junior-league Hitler," and so on. Some of the quotes are, in my opinion, fair (Margaret Thatcher gets my respect for calling out "Milosevic's regime and the genocidal ideology that sustains it...") while other are, indeed, somewhat over the top. Vice-President Al Gore was responsible for the "junior-league Hitler" crack; as already noted, over-simplified comparisons to the Nazi did nothing to clarify the situation, to put it politely.
It would be useful to study the discrepancy between the media image of Milosevic and his regime versus the reality; Johnstone in not interested in any sober analysis of this gap, however. Her reason for collecting these negative quotes is so she can say this:
"This torrent of abuse tells us very little about Milosevic, but a great deal about the political culture of the West, which allows its opinion-makers to resort to the most primitive level of insult."
Johnstone really needs to get out of the house more often if she thinks that Wesley Clark's comment "he only listens to one thing, and that is force" is an example of "the most primitive level of insult." And given that Milosevic presided over a nation in which Vojislav Seselj could say "I hate the Croats so much that I would have liked to gouge their eyes out with a rusty spoon," I'm guessing he knew a thing or two about nasty rhetoric.
This is Johnstone, however--remember that she closed her Introduction with a ringing condemnation of the 'slander' the Serb people have suffered since the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars. Apparantly, sticks and stones don't hurt as much as names in her world.
This next section is essentially a page of quotes from Western politicians and pundits describing Milosevic in extreme terms: as an "extreme nationalist," "genocidal killer," "junior-league Hitler," and so on. Some of the quotes are, in my opinion, fair (Margaret Thatcher gets my respect for calling out "Milosevic's regime and the genocidal ideology that sustains it...") while other are, indeed, somewhat over the top. Vice-President Al Gore was responsible for the "junior-league Hitler" crack; as already noted, over-simplified comparisons to the Nazi did nothing to clarify the situation, to put it politely.
It would be useful to study the discrepancy between the media image of Milosevic and his regime versus the reality; Johnstone in not interested in any sober analysis of this gap, however. Her reason for collecting these negative quotes is so she can say this:
"This torrent of abuse tells us very little about Milosevic, but a great deal about the political culture of the West, which allows its opinion-makers to resort to the most primitive level of insult."
Johnstone really needs to get out of the house more often if she thinks that Wesley Clark's comment "he only listens to one thing, and that is force" is an example of "the most primitive level of insult." And given that Milosevic presided over a nation in which Vojislav Seselj could say "I hate the Croats so much that I would have liked to gouge their eyes out with a rusty spoon," I'm guessing he knew a thing or two about nasty rhetoric.
This is Johnstone, however--remember that she closed her Introduction with a ringing condemnation of the 'slander' the Serb people have suffered since the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars. Apparantly, sticks and stones don't hurt as much as names in her world.
Saturday, July 29, 2006
"Fools' Crusade" Chapter One [2, continued]
Back to finish the opening section of Chapter One.
Johnstone has asked "Which one, in this particular case, is the bigger liar?" But the game is rigged--while Clinton is held accountable for his 'lie' (also a setup, since Clinton's quote wasn't a characterization of this particular Milosevic quote anyway), she does not, in turn, examine what Milosevic was, or was not, lying about. Even by the ridiculous schoolground-taunting level of "Yeah, but you lied even worse about me," Johnstone's staged rhetorical showdown falls flat.
Johnstone has asked "Which one, in this particular case, is the bigger liar?" But the game is rigged--while Clinton is held accountable for his 'lie' (also a setup, since Clinton's quote wasn't a characterization of this particular Milosevic quote anyway), she does not, in turn, examine what Milosevic was, or was not, lying about. Even by the ridiculous schoolground-taunting level of "Yeah, but you lied even worse about me," Johnstone's staged rhetorical showdown falls flat.
Thursday, July 27, 2006
The Kosovo Polje Speech
There are various editions and translations of this speech out there--in order to defuse any accusations of bias, I chose to link to the website of the International Committee to Defend Slobodan Milosevic. I hate to give these clowns any publicity, but I'm choosing them because:
a) any Balkan genocide deniers reading this can't pretend I'm using an "anti-Serb" source, and
b) it doesn't hurt to shine a light on these people from time to time.
LINKS TO TRANSLATIONS OF THE SPEECH:
Pro-Milosevic Website Links to Speech
The BBC translation is in two parts as a .pdf file--feel free to read it and the U.S. version.
You will notice right away that, indeed, this is not a fire-breathing, Nuremburg-rally-worthy call to bloodshed. This isn't a bad trick on Johnstone's part; a reader who is only vaguely familiar with the events in question might have expected to read the words of a Balkan Hitler, or at least a Goebbels. Again, the 'Nazi' parallels are regretable, because they are so imprecise. Hitler believed in Aryan racial superiority and the evil nature of Jewish people. Milosevic believed in whatever would help him gain, and then hold on, to power in Yugoslavia, and then Serbia.
The political, social, and economic situation in Kosovo does not warrant a mention at this point; the only thing that seems to matter is what Milosevic said that day; not the people he was speaking to, not the time or place.
One of the perceived injustices the Serb nationalists often refer to was the 1974 Constitution, which gave Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomy. There is no reason to doubt that this change weakened the power of Serbia in relation to the other republics; indeed, this was most likely the main reason the change was made. Serbia was by far the largest and most populous of the six republics, and the capitol was located there as well. The loss of two large areas--with their populations--was compounded by the fact that these two regions often voted against Serbian interests.
While this must certainly have been unpleasant for the ruling elite, it requires a serious glitch in your sense of perspective to read this tale of political maneuvering, backroom deals, and apparatchik duels as the epic struggle for survival that the radical nationalists portrayed.
Johnstone knows she's got 200-plus pags of changing the subject and moving the goals, so sometimes she just takes a breather and hopes the reader doesn't think too much about the unfounded assumptions that litter her work on the former Yugoslavia. If the reader stops to consider that in the repressive, tense, and volatile atmosphere of Kosovo, on the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Polje, this was a provocative, loaded speech...well, then the reader has thought about such questions a lot more than Johnstone apparantly has.
Or the reader might wonder about this:
The reassertion of Belgrades control over Kosovo was important the the rising nationalist movement. In 1989 struggle over the autonomy was heating up--an important detail one might to keep in mind when Milosevic speaks of being "in Serbia" while standing in Kosovo.
Or, finally, this:
Milosevic was the President of Serbia at the time; a country with several sizable minorities even without the two million Albanaians Milosevic's state was seeking to subdue politically and culturally (not the mention the Hungarians and Romanians, for example, of Vojvodina). Yet he speaks as the leader of the Serbs. Johnstone doesn't merely ignore the inconsistency; as we have seen, she doesn't even acknowledge that to be the President of Serbia is not the same thing, literally or conceptually, as being the leader of the Serbian people 'wherever they may live.'
So Milosevic refers to Kosovo as being part of Serbia even as his police and paramilitaries are repressing and undoing Kosovar autonomy; he presents himself as a tolerant, cosmopolitan progressive while playing the part of a tribal leader; and he calls for the unification of an ethnic group across national borders. And Johnstone sees nothing nationalistic in this.
a) any Balkan genocide deniers reading this can't pretend I'm using an "anti-Serb" source, and
b) it doesn't hurt to shine a light on these people from time to time.
LINKS TO TRANSLATIONS OF THE SPEECH:
Pro-Milosevic Website Links to Speech
The BBC translation is in two parts as a .pdf file--feel free to read it and the U.S. version.
You will notice right away that, indeed, this is not a fire-breathing, Nuremburg-rally-worthy call to bloodshed. This isn't a bad trick on Johnstone's part; a reader who is only vaguely familiar with the events in question might have expected to read the words of a Balkan Hitler, or at least a Goebbels. Again, the 'Nazi' parallels are regretable, because they are so imprecise. Hitler believed in Aryan racial superiority and the evil nature of Jewish people. Milosevic believed in whatever would help him gain, and then hold on, to power in Yugoslavia, and then Serbia.
The political, social, and economic situation in Kosovo does not warrant a mention at this point; the only thing that seems to matter is what Milosevic said that day; not the people he was speaking to, not the time or place.
One of the perceived injustices the Serb nationalists often refer to was the 1974 Constitution, which gave Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomy. There is no reason to doubt that this change weakened the power of Serbia in relation to the other republics; indeed, this was most likely the main reason the change was made. Serbia was by far the largest and most populous of the six republics, and the capitol was located there as well. The loss of two large areas--with their populations--was compounded by the fact that these two regions often voted against Serbian interests.
While this must certainly have been unpleasant for the ruling elite, it requires a serious glitch in your sense of perspective to read this tale of political maneuvering, backroom deals, and apparatchik duels as the epic struggle for survival that the radical nationalists portrayed.
Johnstone knows she's got 200-plus pags of changing the subject and moving the goals, so sometimes she just takes a breather and hopes the reader doesn't think too much about the unfounded assumptions that litter her work on the former Yugoslavia. If the reader stops to consider that in the repressive, tense, and volatile atmosphere of Kosovo, on the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Polje, this was a provocative, loaded speech...well, then the reader has thought about such questions a lot more than Johnstone apparantly has.
Or the reader might wonder about this:
The reassertion of Belgrades control over Kosovo was important the the rising nationalist movement. In 1989 struggle over the autonomy was heating up--an important detail one might to keep in mind when Milosevic speaks of being "in Serbia" while standing in Kosovo.
Or, finally, this:
Milosevic was the President of Serbia at the time; a country with several sizable minorities even without the two million Albanaians Milosevic's state was seeking to subdue politically and culturally (not the mention the Hungarians and Romanians, for example, of Vojvodina). Yet he speaks as the leader of the Serbs. Johnstone doesn't merely ignore the inconsistency; as we have seen, she doesn't even acknowledge that to be the President of Serbia is not the same thing, literally or conceptually, as being the leader of the Serbian people 'wherever they may live.'
So Milosevic refers to Kosovo as being part of Serbia even as his police and paramilitaries are repressing and undoing Kosovar autonomy; he presents himself as a tolerant, cosmopolitan progressive while playing the part of a tribal leader; and he calls for the unification of an ethnic group across national borders. And Johnstone sees nothing nationalistic in this.
Tuesday, July 25, 2006
"Fools' Crusade": Chapter One [2]
I. INVISIBLE SERBIA
The first section of Chapter One, titled as above, starts by contrasting excerpts from two speeches. The first is from Bill Clinton's 1999 Memorial Day speech:
"In Kosovo, we see some parallels to World War II, for the government in Serbia, like that of Nazi Germany, rose to power in part by getting people to look down on other people of a given race and ethnicity, and to believe they had no place in their country, and even no right to live."
I'll admit right out that I wish he--and many other Western commentators--left out the 'Nazi' parallels. It's an easy, even lazy, comparison that risks overkill and also can cloud the specifics of the present with a hazy cloud of generalized, broad comparisons to the past.
Still, at leats Clinton was only comparing Serbian actions to the Nazis; as we shall see later, Johnstone holds contemporary Croatians, in particular, accountable for fascist crimes in WWII.
The second quote is Milosevic; it's from his infamous June 28, 1999 speech commemorating the 600th anniversary of the military defeat at the Field of Blackbirds:
"Never in history did Serbs alone live in Serbia. Today more than ever before, citizens of other nationalities and ethnic groups are living here. That is not a handicap for Serbia. I am sincerely convinced it is an advantage. National structure is changing in this direction in all countries in the contemporary world, especially in developed countries. More and more, and more and more successfully, citizens of different nationalitites, different faiths and races are living together. Socialism in particular, being a progressive and just democratic society, should not allow people to be divided by national or religious identity... Yugoslavia is a multinational community, and it can survive only on condition of full equality of all nations that live in it... Equal and harmonious relations amoung Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its way out of the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition for its economic and social prosperity."
That's a lot of quoting, but I wanted to include both excerpts as originally presented by Johnstone. The Milosevic quote certainly makes him seem like a reasonable guy; if you don't read the rest of the speech, and completely ignore the context in which the speech was given (a climate of ethnic tension, rising xenophobia, and festering violence underneath a repressive police state atmosphere, being artfully manipulated, encouraged, and exploited by Milosevic himself), you might even be inclined to think the guy got a raw deal.
I'll get to that in a moment. But first, let's consider the rhetorical use Johnstone has in store for her two, very selectively chosen, quotes.
"Here we have the contrasting words of two successful politicians, who each in his own country rose to be president with the reputation of being more clever than scrupulously truthful. Which one, in this particular case, is the biggest liar?"
See how neatly Johnstone sets this false dichotomy up? She quotes Clinton making (admittedly somewhat hyperbolic and generic) a specific historical comparison; while Milosevic is heard giving some vague, spongy paeons to multinational tolerance--within the context of Serbs tolerating other nationalities in their land, of course. And now the question isn't even the accuracy of NATO accusations against the Belgrade regime, but simply a contest between two quotes in a rigged competition.
But Johnstone isn't observant or wise enough to see the cheap shot she has just set up. Instead, we get this:
"In all simplicity, the answer has to be Clinton, becuse whether or not what Clinton says in this speech is true depends on what Milosevic said in order to rise to power."
The first section of Chapter One, titled as above, starts by contrasting excerpts from two speeches. The first is from Bill Clinton's 1999 Memorial Day speech:
"In Kosovo, we see some parallels to World War II, for the government in Serbia, like that of Nazi Germany, rose to power in part by getting people to look down on other people of a given race and ethnicity, and to believe they had no place in their country, and even no right to live."
I'll admit right out that I wish he--and many other Western commentators--left out the 'Nazi' parallels. It's an easy, even lazy, comparison that risks overkill and also can cloud the specifics of the present with a hazy cloud of generalized, broad comparisons to the past.
Still, at leats Clinton was only comparing Serbian actions to the Nazis; as we shall see later, Johnstone holds contemporary Croatians, in particular, accountable for fascist crimes in WWII.
The second quote is Milosevic; it's from his infamous June 28, 1999 speech commemorating the 600th anniversary of the military defeat at the Field of Blackbirds:
"Never in history did Serbs alone live in Serbia. Today more than ever before, citizens of other nationalities and ethnic groups are living here. That is not a handicap for Serbia. I am sincerely convinced it is an advantage. National structure is changing in this direction in all countries in the contemporary world, especially in developed countries. More and more, and more and more successfully, citizens of different nationalitites, different faiths and races are living together. Socialism in particular, being a progressive and just democratic society, should not allow people to be divided by national or religious identity... Yugoslavia is a multinational community, and it can survive only on condition of full equality of all nations that live in it... Equal and harmonious relations amoung Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its way out of the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition for its economic and social prosperity."
That's a lot of quoting, but I wanted to include both excerpts as originally presented by Johnstone. The Milosevic quote certainly makes him seem like a reasonable guy; if you don't read the rest of the speech, and completely ignore the context in which the speech was given (a climate of ethnic tension, rising xenophobia, and festering violence underneath a repressive police state atmosphere, being artfully manipulated, encouraged, and exploited by Milosevic himself), you might even be inclined to think the guy got a raw deal.
I'll get to that in a moment. But first, let's consider the rhetorical use Johnstone has in store for her two, very selectively chosen, quotes.
"Here we have the contrasting words of two successful politicians, who each in his own country rose to be president with the reputation of being more clever than scrupulously truthful. Which one, in this particular case, is the biggest liar?"
See how neatly Johnstone sets this false dichotomy up? She quotes Clinton making (admittedly somewhat hyperbolic and generic) a specific historical comparison; while Milosevic is heard giving some vague, spongy paeons to multinational tolerance--within the context of Serbs tolerating other nationalities in their land, of course. And now the question isn't even the accuracy of NATO accusations against the Belgrade regime, but simply a contest between two quotes in a rigged competition.
But Johnstone isn't observant or wise enough to see the cheap shot she has just set up. Instead, we get this:
"In all simplicity, the answer has to be Clinton, becuse whether or not what Clinton says in this speech is true depends on what Milosevic said in order to rise to power."
As I have pointed out in a previous post, Milosevic ended up a prisoner in The Hague for his actions, not his words. To be fair, Johnstone does point out that this excerpt is from the oft-referenced speech that is often cited as a defining moment in Milosevic's campaign to harness nationalist sentiment and, ultimately, lead his nation into self-destructive war. Her bait-and-switch isn't a complete non-sequiter. But for all its faults, Clinton's speech does refer to this speech specifically, or even to 'speech' in general; it is not specified how the government of Serbia accomplished this deed.
Johnstone has--rather less gracefully than she most likely would wish--changed the terms of debate. The U.S. and NATO case against Milosevic was based on documented military and political actions over a number of years; Johnstone wants us to believe that it all boils down to a cynical misrepresentation of his words, particularly one infamous speech. By using a simplistic speech by Clinton to represent the far more informed body of knowledge and debate that actually informed the decision to take military action against Milosevic and his government, Johnstone surely feels she has played a strong hand.
However, there is the matter of that speech that has been so grossly misrepresented in the West. Let us take a quick break from the text and see just what cards Johnstone is holding this round.
"Fools' Crusade": Chapter One [1]
"THE YUGOSLAV GUINEA PIG"
This is the title of Chapter One, where Johnstone purports to examine the "responsibility for the wars of distintegration." The title reiterates the belief that is fundamental to left revisionism--that the West was hostile to the existance of Yugoslavia, and it was Western intervention that was crucial to destroying that nation. There is very little reason to believe the latter; there is, essentially, no evidence at all for the former. If you think that gives Ms. Johnstone any pause, think again--this chapter is 50 pages long.
Here is the beginning of this chapter:
"Why Yugoslavia? How did the Serbs go from being the heroic little people who stood up to empires and Nazis in defense of freedom, to being the "new Nazis," pariahs of the Western world?"
This is a good question. It raises a couple of important issues; the oversimplification of the Yugoslav wars in the Western media, and the slanted history of Yugoslavia and the role played by Serbs and other ethnic groups in that history, particularly since World War II. Unfortunately, Johnstone doesn't seem to realize what issues it raises; instead, she apparantly means for the reader to consider this question at face value. Rather than question the grossly simplified, pro-Serb history of World War II, the Partisan resistance, the Ustasha regime, and the civil war that wracked Yugoslavia, Johnstone accepts this oft-repeated myth as gospel truth. She may scoff at the second oversimplification--that the Serbs are somehow an evil people committing Nazi-level crimes--but not because she rejects broadly-drawn caricatures of entire ethnic groups. She simply doesn't accept this particular generalization.
This is the title of Chapter One, where Johnstone purports to examine the "responsibility for the wars of distintegration." The title reiterates the belief that is fundamental to left revisionism--that the West was hostile to the existance of Yugoslavia, and it was Western intervention that was crucial to destroying that nation. There is very little reason to believe the latter; there is, essentially, no evidence at all for the former. If you think that gives Ms. Johnstone any pause, think again--this chapter is 50 pages long.
Here is the beginning of this chapter:
"Why Yugoslavia? How did the Serbs go from being the heroic little people who stood up to empires and Nazis in defense of freedom, to being the "new Nazis," pariahs of the Western world?"
This is a good question. It raises a couple of important issues; the oversimplification of the Yugoslav wars in the Western media, and the slanted history of Yugoslavia and the role played by Serbs and other ethnic groups in that history, particularly since World War II. Unfortunately, Johnstone doesn't seem to realize what issues it raises; instead, she apparantly means for the reader to consider this question at face value. Rather than question the grossly simplified, pro-Serb history of World War II, the Partisan resistance, the Ustasha regime, and the civil war that wracked Yugoslavia, Johnstone accepts this oft-repeated myth as gospel truth. She may scoff at the second oversimplification--that the Serbs are somehow an evil people committing Nazi-level crimes--but not because she rejects broadly-drawn caricatures of entire ethnic groups. She simply doesn't accept this particular generalization.
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