From the Bosniak American Advisory Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Bosniak American Advisory Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BAACBH) expresses its support for the U.S. House of Representatives Resolution 1423 (H.Res. 1423) on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). On May 28, 2010, Rep. Christopher H. Smith (NJ-4) introduced the resolution, which was co-sponsored by Rep. Russ Carnahan (MO-3), Rep. Frank R. Wolf (VA-10), and Rep. Brian Baird (WA-3). With this resolution, Congress is observing the 15th anniversary of the genocide committed in the Bosnian city of Srebrenica in July 1995, and expressing support for the designation of "Srebrenica Remembrance Day" in the United States.
The H.Res. 1423, among other things, states the following:
- solemnly observes the 15th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide;
- supports the designation of ''Srebrenica Remembrance Day'' in the United States;
- commends the official bodies that have recognized the Srebrenica genocide, including the European Parliament, which declared a Srebrenica Remembrance Day in the European Union;
- honors the memory of the thousands of innocent people who died at Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1995, along with all individuals who were killed during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995;
- extends its condolences to the families and friends of those who died at Srebrenica in July 1995, and during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995;
- reaffirms its support for the independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, peace and stability in southeastern Europe as a whole, and the right of all people living in the region, regardless of national, racial, ethnic or religious background, to return to their homes and enjoy the benefits of democratic institutions, the rule of law, and economic opportunity, as well as to know the fate of missing relatives and friends.
BAACBH calls on all friends of Bosnia and Herzegovina to support this resolution and to immediately ask their congressional representatives to become co-sponsors of H.Res. 1423.
********************
Ed. note: You can find contact information for your House Representative here.
In Bosnia, a war was fought between civic nationalism and individual liberty versus ethnic nationalism and collectivism. Bosnia's struggle was, and is, America's struggle. Dedicated to the struggle of all of Bosnia's peoples--Bosniak, Croat, Serb, and others--to find a common heritage and a common identity.
Monday, May 31, 2010
Sunday, May 23, 2010
Sign that Serbia is Moving in the Right Direction
Serbia plans to open mass grave
It can only be a good thing for Serbia (and the Balkans as a whole) for this very public admission of war crimes guilt on behalf of the Milosevic regime. Serbian society will benefit by clearing the air with a full accounting.
It can only be a good thing for Serbia (and the Balkans as a whole) for this very public admission of war crimes guilt on behalf of the Milosevic regime. Serbian society will benefit by clearing the air with a full accounting.
Thursday, May 13, 2010
Does the Country Claim the Person, or Does the Person Claim the Country
A recent article from the Southeast Europe Times raises some interesting issues:
Honouring Mesa Selimovic
While countries argue over who gets to claim Selimovic, the man himself seemed to understand that national identification was a choice, not something decided by blood. Whether he was Bosnian or Serbian, he realized he was free from the constraints of tribal identity. His "blood" was not his destiny.
He also seemed to understand that identity is a complex thing; something facsists and extreme nationalists (as well as relgious fundamentalists and all other zealots) are incapable of grasping. He was able to embrace a Serbian identity without renouncing his former Bosnian identity.
The idea that the individual is free to reinvent him or herself, and to adopt and claim new identities, is fundamental to genuine freedom. Too many writers in the Balkans preached that ethnicity is destiny; how refreshing to celebrate one who knew better.
Honouring Mesa Selimovic
While countries argue over who gets to claim Selimovic, the man himself seemed to understand that national identification was a choice, not something decided by blood. Whether he was Bosnian or Serbian, he realized he was free from the constraints of tribal identity. His "blood" was not his destiny.
He also seemed to understand that identity is a complex thing; something facsists and extreme nationalists (as well as relgious fundamentalists and all other zealots) are incapable of grasping. He was able to embrace a Serbian identity without renouncing his former Bosnian identity.
The idea that the individual is free to reinvent him or herself, and to adopt and claim new identities, is fundamental to genuine freedom. Too many writers in the Balkans preached that ethnicity is destiny; how refreshing to celebrate one who knew better.
Saturday, May 08, 2010
The Unrealistic Abstractions of Realpolitik in the Balkans
Foreign policy analyst Nikolas K. Gvosdev published a troubling article at the website for Foreign Affairs magazine:
Unfreezing Kosovo: Reconsidering Boundaries in the Balkans
Briefly, Gvosdev argues that regional stability in the Balkans and security and economic development in Kosovo are impossible as long as Serbia--the "linchpin state of the western Balkans" as he tellingly describes it--is unreconciled to the independence of Kosovo under its current borders. He insists that the "issue" of independence (which apparently will not be resolved until Serbia gets its way) must be "delinked" from the "issue" of boundaries. In short, the West must agree to an ethnic partition of Kosovo.
The article isn't, on the surface anyway, the work of an overt supporter of ethnic partition. The tone is reasonable, and one might even take heart from Gvosdev's assertion that one of the negative consequences of the current situation is that nationalists are able to attack pro-reform and pro-Western parties by championing the “fate of Kosovo.” This seems to indicate that Gvosdev is no friend to the nationalist project, and wishes to see liberal, secular political forces win out in Serbia proper.
The problem with his analysis isn't simply in what he says, however (more on what he does say later). Namely, the context to the current state of affairs; i.e., the recent history of Kosovo within the old Yugoslavia and then under control of Milosevic's Serbia. This is not to say that the incidents he does address--the riots and other acts of violence aimed at Kosovo's Serbian minority--are not issues of genuine concern. Nor do I wish to suggest that relations between Pristina and Belgrade should be forever frozen in a pattern of atrocity one-upmanship. Milosevic is gone, Serb forces are no longer threatening the ethnic Albanian majority, and Kosovo and Serbia are still and will forever remain neighbors, mutually interested in securing peace and stability in the region.
However, his analysis is curiously myopic--Gvosdev seems completely unaware that events in Kosovo resonate throughout the former Yugoslavia. There is not a word about Bosnia in this article. Anyone familiar with the history of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s is well aware of the connection between events in Kosovo and Bosnia. To suggest that ethnic partition of Kosovo in order to placate nationalists in Belgrade is the path the greater security and peace in the region is to betray a shocking ignorance or indifference to the region's recent history.
Gvosdev gives some examples of agreements which he believes provide possible frameworks on how to proceed. He is very concerned not only with the Serbian-majority north, which he points out is not under Pristina's control (for reasons he does not dwell on), but also on some of the ethnic Serb enclaves in the south, and the many Serb Orthodox religious sites which are currently under the protection of NATO (and therefore also not under Pristinas' control--see how neatly this works?). Therefore, he suggests that a possible "solution" would be to pattern an autonomy agreement based on the Lateran Treaty, the agreement by which fascist Italy established the Vatican City as a sovereign nation capable of shielding serial child rapists from prosecution in their home countries. Gvosdev blandly portrays this pact, by which Mussolini courted favor with a right-wing, authoritarian church previously not inclined to look favorably on his radical regime, as merely a resolution of territorial beef between the church and the Italian state.
He also points out that both Poland and Armenia were promised independence before border had been settled--given that those two nations did not have long-standing fixed borders because of their history (any historical atlas of Europe will demonstrate this--go from map to map throughout history, and you'll note that Poland, sadly, never had the same borders for very long, due to aggression by its neighbors), Gvosdev might have a hard time ignoring that Kosovo has a long history as a well-defined geopolitical entity, but using a common Balkan revisionist tactic he claims that the borders were nothing but arbitrary administrative boundaries established by the Tito regime.
And this is the only time Gvosdev even acknowledges that there are other "disputed" boundaries in the Balkans. He dismisses these concerns by pointing out that Pristina doesn't control these areas, anyway--which means that hopefully nobody will ask him for his advice regarding the Russian occupation of significant areas of Georgia, for example. Gvosdev may not realize it, but he is arguing in favor of might making right--get enough militia on the ground able to bully the government into backing down, and viola--instant redrawing of the map.
Finally, what is so depressing about this article is that Gvosdev doesn't even realize that he is suggesting that the best way to defuse nationalist agitation is to give nationalists exactly what they want, or at least to make compromises on their terms. This is ethnic partition, no matter how one dresses it up, and it also is a validation of the premise that Serb nationalist demands have a legitimacy which cannot be fundamentally challenged, only modified. Ultimately, this sort of solution can only fuel more instability in Bosnia (and possibly the Sandzak as well), while his belief that this would actually increase the leverage that liberal and pro-democratic forces in Serbia wield seems naive to me.
Ironically, there was another story recently which suggests that Gvosdev has ignored a much less craven method of ensuring stability in the region--insisting on an acceptance of curent boundaries and a willingness to work within current national structures. Recently, the government in Turkey was able to get the governments of Serbia and Bosnia to sit down and pledge to work together. Predicatably, hardliners in the Republika Srpska were not pleased to see Belgrade dealing directly with Sarajevo without going through Banja Luka first. I suspect Gvosdev might be disappointed as well:
Serbia, BiH optimistic about new chapter in ties
Unfreezing Kosovo: Reconsidering Boundaries in the Balkans
Briefly, Gvosdev argues that regional stability in the Balkans and security and economic development in Kosovo are impossible as long as Serbia--the "linchpin state of the western Balkans" as he tellingly describes it--is unreconciled to the independence of Kosovo under its current borders. He insists that the "issue" of independence (which apparently will not be resolved until Serbia gets its way) must be "delinked" from the "issue" of boundaries. In short, the West must agree to an ethnic partition of Kosovo.
The article isn't, on the surface anyway, the work of an overt supporter of ethnic partition. The tone is reasonable, and one might even take heart from Gvosdev's assertion that one of the negative consequences of the current situation is that nationalists are able to attack pro-reform and pro-Western parties by championing the “fate of Kosovo.” This seems to indicate that Gvosdev is no friend to the nationalist project, and wishes to see liberal, secular political forces win out in Serbia proper.
The problem with his analysis isn't simply in what he says, however (more on what he does say later). Namely, the context to the current state of affairs; i.e., the recent history of Kosovo within the old Yugoslavia and then under control of Milosevic's Serbia. This is not to say that the incidents he does address--the riots and other acts of violence aimed at Kosovo's Serbian minority--are not issues of genuine concern. Nor do I wish to suggest that relations between Pristina and Belgrade should be forever frozen in a pattern of atrocity one-upmanship. Milosevic is gone, Serb forces are no longer threatening the ethnic Albanian majority, and Kosovo and Serbia are still and will forever remain neighbors, mutually interested in securing peace and stability in the region.
However, his analysis is curiously myopic--Gvosdev seems completely unaware that events in Kosovo resonate throughout the former Yugoslavia. There is not a word about Bosnia in this article. Anyone familiar with the history of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s is well aware of the connection between events in Kosovo and Bosnia. To suggest that ethnic partition of Kosovo in order to placate nationalists in Belgrade is the path the greater security and peace in the region is to betray a shocking ignorance or indifference to the region's recent history.
Gvosdev gives some examples of agreements which he believes provide possible frameworks on how to proceed. He is very concerned not only with the Serbian-majority north, which he points out is not under Pristina's control (for reasons he does not dwell on), but also on some of the ethnic Serb enclaves in the south, and the many Serb Orthodox religious sites which are currently under the protection of NATO (and therefore also not under Pristinas' control--see how neatly this works?). Therefore, he suggests that a possible "solution" would be to pattern an autonomy agreement based on the Lateran Treaty, the agreement by which fascist Italy established the Vatican City as a sovereign nation capable of shielding serial child rapists from prosecution in their home countries. Gvosdev blandly portrays this pact, by which Mussolini courted favor with a right-wing, authoritarian church previously not inclined to look favorably on his radical regime, as merely a resolution of territorial beef between the church and the Italian state.
He also points out that both Poland and Armenia were promised independence before border had been settled--given that those two nations did not have long-standing fixed borders because of their history (any historical atlas of Europe will demonstrate this--go from map to map throughout history, and you'll note that Poland, sadly, never had the same borders for very long, due to aggression by its neighbors), Gvosdev might have a hard time ignoring that Kosovo has a long history as a well-defined geopolitical entity, but using a common Balkan revisionist tactic he claims that the borders were nothing but arbitrary administrative boundaries established by the Tito regime.
And this is the only time Gvosdev even acknowledges that there are other "disputed" boundaries in the Balkans. He dismisses these concerns by pointing out that Pristina doesn't control these areas, anyway--which means that hopefully nobody will ask him for his advice regarding the Russian occupation of significant areas of Georgia, for example. Gvosdev may not realize it, but he is arguing in favor of might making right--get enough militia on the ground able to bully the government into backing down, and viola--instant redrawing of the map.
Finally, what is so depressing about this article is that Gvosdev doesn't even realize that he is suggesting that the best way to defuse nationalist agitation is to give nationalists exactly what they want, or at least to make compromises on their terms. This is ethnic partition, no matter how one dresses it up, and it also is a validation of the premise that Serb nationalist demands have a legitimacy which cannot be fundamentally challenged, only modified. Ultimately, this sort of solution can only fuel more instability in Bosnia (and possibly the Sandzak as well), while his belief that this would actually increase the leverage that liberal and pro-democratic forces in Serbia wield seems naive to me.
Ironically, there was another story recently which suggests that Gvosdev has ignored a much less craven method of ensuring stability in the region--insisting on an acceptance of curent boundaries and a willingness to work within current national structures. Recently, the government in Turkey was able to get the governments of Serbia and Bosnia to sit down and pledge to work together. Predicatably, hardliners in the Republika Srpska were not pleased to see Belgrade dealing directly with Sarajevo without going through Banja Luka first. I suspect Gvosdev might be disappointed as well:
Serbia, BiH optimistic about new chapter in ties
Labels:
Bosnia,
Independence,
Kosovo,
Sovereignty,
territorial integrity
Thursday, April 15, 2010
Croatian President Calls For Reconciliation
Thanks to the Southeast Europe Times for this story
I'd like to take this on face value and hope that it's a good sign, but I haven't been following developments in Croatia at all lately, so I lack the context needed to interpret this development. What do you all think?
I'd like to take this on face value and hope that it's a good sign, but I haven't been following developments in Croatia at all lately, so I lack the context needed to interpret this development. What do you all think?
Friday, April 09, 2010
Bosnia: Lawmakers Reject Srebrenica Resolution
[see newsletter below]
National Congress of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina ONLINE NEWSLETTER – International No. 661 April 10, 2010 CONTENT 1. Bosnia: Lawmakers Reject Srebrenica Resolution 2. Serbia has more to apologize for ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------If you do not want to receive this Online Newsletter just reply with "UNSUBSCRIBE" in the subject line. Then your e-mail address will be promptly deleted.________________________________________________________________________ Balkan Insight8 April 2010 1. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Lawmakers Reject Srebrenica Resolution Sarajevo The House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina yesterday rejected a resolution condemning the crimes committed in Srebrenica in July 1995. The resolution was proposed by Representative Denis Becirovic of the Social Democratic Union, SDP, who argued that the adoption of the declaration would contribute to permanent peace building in the country. After the members of the House of Representatives refused to accept the proposition by the SDP, the party's representatives left the room, saying that they considered the move an “insult to victims of Serb, Bosniak or Croat nationality”. The resolution was refused by representatives of parties from Republika Srpska. Under the Dayton peace agreement which ended Bosnia’s 1992-95 war, the country was divided into two highly independent entities – the Serb dominated Republika Srpska and the Croat-Bosniak federation. The two entities are united by weak central institutions, but each has its own government, parliament and presidency. Srebrenica, the city where the Bosnian Serb Army committed genocide in July 1995, killing more than 8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) men and boys and expelling more than 25,000 people, is located in Republika Srpska (RS). A resolution condemning the genocide in Srebrenica was adopted by the European Parliament last year. The EP asked other European countries to adopt a similar resolution, and so far all the countries of the former Yugoslavia have done so, with the exception of Bosnia. The Serbian parliament adopted a resolution earlier this month condemning the massacre. Like Montenegro, Serbia did not explicitly call the crimes committed in Srebrenica acts of genocide. The same day that the House of Representatives rejected the proposed resolution on Srebrenica, the ruling party in RS, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, SNSD, announced its request for a declaration labeling the World War One massacres of Armenians in Turkey as genocide.----- Comment: Recall that in Dayton, "Bosnian leaders" gave half of the country and the veto power to Karadzic’s Serbs who were already militarily defeated. What else could we except in the Bosnian assembly after “our” leaders rewarded the perpetrators of the genocide to became lawmakers over the victims. Bosnia has only one problem; it is that nobody represents Bosniak people. Remark for media: Please, do not call us "Muslims". We are ethnic Bosniaks, is it so difficult to learn? Yes, some of us are religious Muslims, but also some of Serbs are religious Orthodox, and some Croats are religious Catholics, and jet you call them correctly: Serbs, and Croats. In Srebrenica were killed 8000 people, not because they were Muslim, but because they were Bosniaks. Muhamed Borogovac _________________________________ 2. Serbia has more to apologize for The crimes committed by the Serbs across Bosnia are too many to apologize away. But I would like to hear them try. By Jasmina Cesic — Special to GlobalPost REVERE, Mass. -— The Serbian government recently issued an apology for the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica, during which they systematically rounded up and killed about 8,000 Bosnian Muslims. Unfortunately, the mass killing, rape and torture of innocent civilians took place in other parts of Bosnia too, including my hometown of Visegrad, where my two brothers, grandmother and uncle were killed. In Visegrad, 70 percent of the population was Muslim, but that was before the Serb nationalists came with their slogan, "Kill everyone who is not Serb and bring and unite all the Serbs into one nation called Greater Serbia." After that, there were no Muslims left. Thousands were brutally murdered like my brother, Samir, who was only 15 at the time. The Serbs threw him off a bridge and shot him as he was falling. My grandmother was burned alive in her own house, as were many others. Numerous women and girls were raped. Some were taken to prison, like my father, where they were constantly tortured. The rest of Visegrad's population was forced to leave the city. My mother with my surviving siblings and very pregnant sister-in-law were among those forced to flee. My husband and I sought refuge in Bosnia's capital city, Sarajevo, which we naively thought was a safe haven. We truly believed that the world wouldn't let anything happen to this European city that was home to the 1984 Winter Olympics. However, as soon as we arrived in Sarajevo in April of 1992, the Serbian army surrounded the city with their tanks and canons in ditches, and started shelling. We were hungry and didn't have access to drinkable water in the besieged city, but our biggest problems were the snipers and constant shelling that killed and wounded many. The hospitals became full and I, like many other Bosnians, wanted to be a part of the defense and began assisting in Kosevo Hospital. My help didn't last long. One morning my husband and I were waiting for the bus to take us to work when a mortar fell one meter from us. I didn't know immediately what had happened. I was lying on the ground and could see my arm hanging off the bone. I could see holes in my legs. When I turned my head I saw my husband next to me blown in half. Around me lay about 20 wounded people and some dead people too. People came to take us to the hospitals. They wrapped me in a blanket to carry me. My husband and a few other dead people were left at the first hospital and the rest of us were taken to Kosevo Hospital, which ironically had been my original destination. In the hospital there was never enough anesthesia, no electricity or water, and never enough food. When we got electricity for a few hours, it was like we had a new life. For 25 days they couldn't sew up my shoulder because the flesh was dirty and my doctor had to cut more of it off every day to avoid gangrene. I just bit into bedsheets in my mouth to ease the pain, which was still much easier to bear than the pain from seeing hundreds of children around me in the hospital without an arm or a leg, or an eye. I still live with these images. I continually ask myself how some crimes are punishable and some get rewarded. The Dayton Peace Agreement allowed the Serbs to keep what they gained in the ethnic cleansing. They get to walk down the street of my hometown, free of non-Serbs like they always dreamed it would be, while their victims, like me, are far from home. Srebrenica survivors, instead of getting back their town, which is still part of Republic of Srpska, get an apology that is supposed to give them peace of mind while handing the Serbian government a green card to the European Union. Though many of us are aware that the Serbian apology was done for the wrong reasons, to get into the EU, I would still like to hear them apologize for the crime that occurred in my hometown and for those committed in other parts of Bosnia. No apology, no matter what, will bring back my brothers and husband, or my sister-in-law's two brothers and father who were killed in Srebrenica. My only hope is that such an apology will open the door to a brighter future for new generations. Let them live in the world where a crime has no color, race or religion but it is wrong regardless and for that, it needs to be punished if it cannot be stopped. --/Jasmina Cesic is the author of "The River Runs Salt Runs Sweet," a memoir of war-torn Bosnia. She came to the U.S. in 1993 as one of the first Bosnian refugees to seek better medical treatment./
National Congress of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina ONLINE NEWSLETTER – International No. 661 April 10, 2010 CONTENT 1. Bosnia: Lawmakers Reject Srebrenica Resolution 2. Serbia has more to apologize for ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------If you do not want to receive this Online Newsletter just reply with "UNSUBSCRIBE" in the subject line. Then your e-mail address will be promptly deleted.________________________________________________________________________ Balkan Insight8 April 2010 1. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Lawmakers Reject Srebrenica Resolution Sarajevo The House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina yesterday rejected a resolution condemning the crimes committed in Srebrenica in July 1995. The resolution was proposed by Representative Denis Becirovic of the Social Democratic Union, SDP, who argued that the adoption of the declaration would contribute to permanent peace building in the country. After the members of the House of Representatives refused to accept the proposition by the SDP, the party's representatives left the room, saying that they considered the move an “insult to victims of Serb, Bosniak or Croat nationality”. The resolution was refused by representatives of parties from Republika Srpska. Under the Dayton peace agreement which ended Bosnia’s 1992-95 war, the country was divided into two highly independent entities – the Serb dominated Republika Srpska and the Croat-Bosniak federation. The two entities are united by weak central institutions, but each has its own government, parliament and presidency. Srebrenica, the city where the Bosnian Serb Army committed genocide in July 1995, killing more than 8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) men and boys and expelling more than 25,000 people, is located in Republika Srpska (RS). A resolution condemning the genocide in Srebrenica was adopted by the European Parliament last year. The EP asked other European countries to adopt a similar resolution, and so far all the countries of the former Yugoslavia have done so, with the exception of Bosnia. The Serbian parliament adopted a resolution earlier this month condemning the massacre. Like Montenegro, Serbia did not explicitly call the crimes committed in Srebrenica acts of genocide. The same day that the House of Representatives rejected the proposed resolution on Srebrenica, the ruling party in RS, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, SNSD, announced its request for a declaration labeling the World War One massacres of Armenians in Turkey as genocide.----- Comment: Recall that in Dayton, "Bosnian leaders" gave half of the country and the veto power to Karadzic’s Serbs who were already militarily defeated. What else could we except in the Bosnian assembly after “our” leaders rewarded the perpetrators of the genocide to became lawmakers over the victims. Bosnia has only one problem; it is that nobody represents Bosniak people. Remark for media: Please, do not call us "Muslims". We are ethnic Bosniaks, is it so difficult to learn? Yes, some of us are religious Muslims, but also some of Serbs are religious Orthodox, and some Croats are religious Catholics, and jet you call them correctly: Serbs, and Croats. In Srebrenica were killed 8000 people, not because they were Muslim, but because they were Bosniaks. Muhamed Borogovac _________________________________ 2. Serbia has more to apologize for The crimes committed by the Serbs across Bosnia are too many to apologize away. But I would like to hear them try. By Jasmina Cesic — Special to GlobalPost REVERE, Mass. -— The Serbian government recently issued an apology for the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica, during which they systematically rounded up and killed about 8,000 Bosnian Muslims. Unfortunately, the mass killing, rape and torture of innocent civilians took place in other parts of Bosnia too, including my hometown of Visegrad, where my two brothers, grandmother and uncle were killed. In Visegrad, 70 percent of the population was Muslim, but that was before the Serb nationalists came with their slogan, "Kill everyone who is not Serb and bring and unite all the Serbs into one nation called Greater Serbia." After that, there were no Muslims left. Thousands were brutally murdered like my brother, Samir, who was only 15 at the time. The Serbs threw him off a bridge and shot him as he was falling. My grandmother was burned alive in her own house, as were many others. Numerous women and girls were raped. Some were taken to prison, like my father, where they were constantly tortured. The rest of Visegrad's population was forced to leave the city. My mother with my surviving siblings and very pregnant sister-in-law were among those forced to flee. My husband and I sought refuge in Bosnia's capital city, Sarajevo, which we naively thought was a safe haven. We truly believed that the world wouldn't let anything happen to this European city that was home to the 1984 Winter Olympics. However, as soon as we arrived in Sarajevo in April of 1992, the Serbian army surrounded the city with their tanks and canons in ditches, and started shelling. We were hungry and didn't have access to drinkable water in the besieged city, but our biggest problems were the snipers and constant shelling that killed and wounded many. The hospitals became full and I, like many other Bosnians, wanted to be a part of the defense and began assisting in Kosevo Hospital. My help didn't last long. One morning my husband and I were waiting for the bus to take us to work when a mortar fell one meter from us. I didn't know immediately what had happened. I was lying on the ground and could see my arm hanging off the bone. I could see holes in my legs. When I turned my head I saw my husband next to me blown in half. Around me lay about 20 wounded people and some dead people too. People came to take us to the hospitals. They wrapped me in a blanket to carry me. My husband and a few other dead people were left at the first hospital and the rest of us were taken to Kosevo Hospital, which ironically had been my original destination. In the hospital there was never enough anesthesia, no electricity or water, and never enough food. When we got electricity for a few hours, it was like we had a new life. For 25 days they couldn't sew up my shoulder because the flesh was dirty and my doctor had to cut more of it off every day to avoid gangrene. I just bit into bedsheets in my mouth to ease the pain, which was still much easier to bear than the pain from seeing hundreds of children around me in the hospital without an arm or a leg, or an eye. I still live with these images. I continually ask myself how some crimes are punishable and some get rewarded. The Dayton Peace Agreement allowed the Serbs to keep what they gained in the ethnic cleansing. They get to walk down the street of my hometown, free of non-Serbs like they always dreamed it would be, while their victims, like me, are far from home. Srebrenica survivors, instead of getting back their town, which is still part of Republic of Srpska, get an apology that is supposed to give them peace of mind while handing the Serbian government a green card to the European Union. Though many of us are aware that the Serbian apology was done for the wrong reasons, to get into the EU, I would still like to hear them apologize for the crime that occurred in my hometown and for those committed in other parts of Bosnia. No apology, no matter what, will bring back my brothers and husband, or my sister-in-law's two brothers and father who were killed in Srebrenica. My only hope is that such an apology will open the door to a brighter future for new generations. Let them live in the world where a crime has no color, race or religion but it is wrong regardless and for that, it needs to be punished if it cannot be stopped. --/Jasmina Cesic is the author of "The River Runs Salt Runs Sweet," a memoir of war-torn Bosnia. She came to the U.S. in 1993 as one of the first Bosnian refugees to seek better medical treatment./
Monday, April 05, 2010
Great Picture of Bosfam Billboard in Tuzla
Thanks to Jazzy at Tuzla Daily Phot (see general link for blog at right) for this great sign that Bosfam are quite visible and active in Tuzla.
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